70th Anniversary of World War II

Is Historical Reconciliation Possible?
A Seventieth Anniversary Assessment

Okinawa’s Inconvenient Truths

Abe’s 70th Anniversary Statement
Historical Realism, not Revisionism

Northern Territories Compromise Possible
Japan Perspectives

*Japan Perspectives* is an English-language journal published by the Tokyo Foundation containing articles from the Foundation’s website. In addition to translations of the public policy research recommendations made by the Foundation, *Japan Perspectives* offers timely insights into and analyses of Japanese politics, economy, society, and culture written specifically for overseas readers.

The Tokyo Foundation is an independent, not-for-profit think tank that brings together the minds and skills of outstanding human resources through policy research and global leadership development projects to offer fresh perspectives that lead to positive social change.

Visit the Foundation’s website at: www.tokyofoundation.org/en

---

Back Issues of *Japan Perspectives*

If you enjoyed this issue of *Japan Perspectives*, you can download PDF files of earlier (and future) issues from the Tokyo Foundation website: http://www.tokyofoundation.org/en/publications. Please contact Public Communications at info@tkfd.or.jp if you need print editions of particular back issues (some are out of print) or wish to be placed on a postal mailing list to receive future copies.

---

All rights reserved. These articles, either in full or as an excerpt, may not be reprinted, copied, or retranslated without the express permission of the Tokyo Foundation. Citations must specify the source. The opinions expressed in the articles are those of the respective authors and do not necessary represent the views of the Tokyo Foundation.

Publisher: Masahiro Akiyama (President)
Editor-in-Chief: Akiko Imai (Executive Director)
Senior Editor: Nozomu Kawamoto (Public Communications)
Associate Editors: Kaoru Matsushita (Public Communications)
Junko Suzuki (Public Communications)
Mikiko Fujiwara (Public Communications)
Production Manager: Asako Uemura (Public Communications)

The Nippon Foundation Bldg, 3rd Floor, 1-2-2 Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo 107-0052, Japan
Tel: +81-3-6229-5504 (Public Communications) Fax: +81-3-6229-5508
E-mail: info@tkfd.or.jp URL: www.tokyofoundation.org/en

©2015 The Tokyo Foundation
CONTENTS

70TH ANNIVERSARY OF WORLD WAR II

Is Historical Reconciliation Possible? A Seventieth Anniversary
Assessment (1 & 2) ........................................................................................................ 3
Shin Kawashima, Jun’ya Nishino, Tsuneo Watanabe, Yuichi Hosoya
Reference: Statement by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe on the 70th Anniversary of the End of the War

Okinawa’s Inconvenient Truths ................................................................. 31
Yoshitoshi Taira

Abe’s 70th Anniversary Statement: Historical Realism, not Revisionism ........ 35
Taisuke Abiru

Compromise Possible on the Northern Territories ......................................... 38
Masahiro Akiyama

SECURITY LEGISLATION

The New Security Legislation and Japanese Public Reaction ....................... 40
Satoru Mori

Japan’s Security Legislation from an Operational Perspective .................. 51
Noboru Yamaguchi

Abe’s Hollow Victory? Public Uproar over Collective Self-Defense ............ 56
Katsuyuki Yakushiji

The Objectives of Japan’s New Security Legislation ................................. 61
Masahiro Akiyama
FOREIGN AID POLICY

Rethinking Japan’s Foreign Aid: Widening the Scope of Assistance from a Security Perspective ................................................................. 64

   The Tokyo Foundation

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Can America’s Hedging Strategy Last? ................................................................. 72

   Paul J. Saunders

VOICES FROM THE SYLFF COMMUNITY

The Socioeconomic Dimension of Irrawaddy Dolphin Conservation ............ 75

   Sierra Deutsch

Identifying Effective Prevention and Intervention Strategies for School Bullying in New Zealand ......................................................... 82

   The Tokyo Foundation
November 11, 2015

Is Historical Reconciliation Possible?

A Seventieth Anniversary Assessment (1)

Shin Kawashima, Jun’ya Nishino, Tsuneo Watanabe, Yuichi Hosoya

On July 6, 2015, with Prime Minister Abe’s much-anticipated seventieth anniversary statement in the offing, the ninety-fifth Tokyo Foundation Forum explored the challenges of historical reconciliation in the context of Japan’s relations with China, South Korea, and the United States. In Part 1 (abridged), the panelists draw on their areas of expertise to outline the basic issues and their context.

* * *

YUICHI HOSOYA “Is Historical Reconciliation Possible?” This is the topic of our forum today. The short answer, in my opinion, is “probably not.” However, I don’t want to close off the discussion before it begins, so let’s consider some basic questions. What do we mean by “historical reconciliation”? What exactly is the problem, and what are the obstacles in the way of reconciliation? How might we marshal our collective wisdom to overcome those obstacles?

We’ll start with presentations from our panelists explaining their basic perspectives on the issue. Let’s begin with China. Mr. Kawashima, you’re a member of the Advisory Panel on the History of the 20th Century and on Japan’s Role and the World Order in the 21st Century, which drew up recommendations for Prime Minister Abe’s seventieth anniversary statement. You were also a contributor to the Japan-China Joint History Research Report, and you’ve been involved in dialogue with Chinese historians in connection with the Sasakawa Japan-China Friendship Fund. What have you come away with from these experiences?
The Long Road to Closure with China

SHIN KAWASHIMA In a way, it’s verboten for historians themselves to make attempts at historical reconciliation or at reconciling different interpretations of history. But various circumstances have conspired to get me involved. It’s been a learning experience, and some of the lessons have been painful.

I’ve found that historians themselves—even Japanese and Chinese historians—are quite capable of dialogue. But I’ve come to have serious doubts regarding the degree to which such dialogue can benefit society as a whole.

The members of the joint history project, for example, drew up a report on the basis of their dialogue. As soon as people in government—especially the Chinese government—saw the report, though, they started bombarding it with criticism. As one of the project’s sponsors, the Chinese government insisted that certain parts of the report couldn’t be made public. So, those parts were redacted from the official Chinese version, and as a consequence of those changes, it was no longer the same report. Media reports, in addition to further distorting the findings, simply focused on the differences with the Japanese version. As a consequence, whatever progress we made through dialogue was lost. This is just one example, but it illustrates the basic problem, which is that historical issues take on a completely different cast depending on whether they’re being discussed at the academic, government, media, or grassroots level.

Meanwhile, recent political developments have made things more difficult. For example, the Chinese government has applied to UNESCO to have historical materials on the Nanjing massacre and the “comfort women” added to the World Heritage list, and the application is scheduled to be reviewed in September. Beijing has adopted a policy that puts these historical issues with Japan front and center, not only domestically but externally as well, making them the focus of public diplomacy and propaganda campaigns. Under the circumstances, you can’t help but wonder what historians like us can possibly accomplish.

People who specialize in reconciliation issues often say that the first step is for the parties to “forgive but not forget.” But it seems to me that neither China nor South Korea has arrived at that stage with regard to Japan. Both the government and the general public are still at the stage of “We won’t forgive, and we won’t forget.”
Ambiguities of the Japan-ROK Basic Treaty

HOsoya What about Japan and South Korea? This year a series of events were held in places like Tokyo, Seoul, and Jeju to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of diplomatic ties between Japan and the Republic of Korea. Mr. Nishino, you’ve probably attended quite a number of those events.

Jun’ya Nishino My field of specialization isn’t history per se but international politics, with a focus on the Korean Peninsula. However, my work does involve archival research in contemporary history. As I see it, the issues surrounding reconciliation with South Korea, as compared with China or the United States, are unique in the sense that Korea was never technically at war with Japan. In the context of the seventieth anniversary of Japan’s surrender, the main focus of reconciliation tends to be Japan’s role in World War II. But for the Koreans, it’s about the three and a half decades under Japanese colonial rule, from the annexation of Korea in 1910 until the end of World War II.

Japan and South Korea signed the Treaty on Basic Relations on June 22, 1965, and diplomatic ties were normalized six months later in December. The normalization process took fourteen years of negotiation. To reach an agreement, the two sides had to settle on a very ambiguous formulation concerning the period of colonial rule. Article 2 of the treaty states, “It is confirmed that all treaties or agreements concluded between the Empire of Japan and the Empire of Korea on or before August 22, 1910, are already null and void.”

Japan’s interpretation is that while the signing of the new treaty in 1965 invalidated the Japan-Korea Treaty of 1910, the older document was legal until then, thus giving legal status to Japan’s annexation and colonial rule of Korea. The South Koreans maintain that treaty was illegal from the start, and therefore that Japan’s annexation of Korea was a violation of international law. After fourteen years, they were still unable to bridge this gap, so they came up with a way of wording it that would pass muster with lawmakers on both sides. Still, many South Koreans were unhappy that the text of the treaty contained no expression of remorse or apology.

But then, in 1998, Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi and President Kim Dae-jung signed a joint declaration that, as I see it, completed the task of historical reconciliation, at least in a formal sense. The declaration records Minister Obuchi’s “deep
remorse and heartfelt apology,” along with President Kim’s appreciation of the prime minister’s statement and affirmation of the need for both countries to “overcome their unfortunate history and to build a future-oriented relationship based on reconciliation as well as good-neighborly and friendly cooperation.” You can sense a generosity of spirit on the South Korean side.

So why are the same issues still being talked about today? There are reasons on both sides, but when I come back to this issue, I’ll discuss how the situation is viewed in South Korea.

**Realities of the Japan-US Relationship**

**HOsoya** Next, I’d like to ask Mr. Watanabe to talk about Japan’s postwar reconciliation with United States. You spent ten years at a Washington think tank from 1995, and you’re one of a precious handful of researchers here in Japan who really understand what’s going on in the minds of US policymakers.

**Tsuneo Watanabe** My work centers on the study and analysis of Japan-US relations. I’m not a historian by training, so I’ll be approaching the subject by discussing how Americans view these historical issues, and also how the Japan-US alliance and the international order factor into our interpretation of history.

Of the countries we’re talking about today—Japan, China, South Korea, and the United States—which one stands out from the others? The answer, obviously, is the United States. America is the hegemonic power that has sustained the world order since the end of World War II.

One of the prime targets for nationalists who object to the “self-flagellation” of mainstream postwar Japanese historians is the Tokyo War Crimes Trial. But a wholesale rejection of the tribunal and its conclusions is tantamount to a rejection of postwar US leadership and the Japan-US alliance. This would provide the perfect opening for those powers that would welcome a breakdown in Japan-US relations. The Japanese can’t afford to lose sight of the fact that the United States is essential to the current world order, and that the Japan-US partnership has served both our interests well over the past seven decades. If we lose sight of that and reject the foundations of the current international order, the discussion could veer in a direction that we’ll live to regret.

In the West, the mainstream media’s recent coverage has focused on whether
“historical revisionists” in Japan are seeking to justify Japanese aggression in China in the 1930s. There’s no denying that there is a small minority in Japan who take that position. In every country, there are those who attempt to whitewash the past. And since Japan is a democracy and upholds freedom of speech, anyone is free to express such views.

What’s hard to understand is why this minority view should provoke such an extreme reaction in the Western media. It would be one thing if Japan were behaving in a manner its neighbors found threatening—say, by building up its military or expanding its territorial claims or challenging the existing world order—but Japan isn’t doing any of those things.

Some articles in the Western media have labeled Prime Minister Abe a revisionist. Abe is certainly a conservative at heart, but he’s also a dedicated supporter of the Japan-US alliance and the postwar international order built by the United States. Far from challenging that world order, he has made it clear that his government supports it vigorously.

Historical revisionism is an international issue insofar as an interpretation of history that justifies past aggression could also justify future challenges to the international order. In that context, people need to keep in mind that in East Asia, Japan is not the country that’s causing widespread alarm by brandishing its military might in an apparent bid to alter the international status quo. It’s China—which is, paradoxically, the country that is making the most noise over Japanese interpretations of history.

The other major point I would stress is that historical reconciliation is an ongoing process. We need to accept the fact that differences over the interpretation of history are going to continue cropping up from time to time, and when they do, we have to respond in a levelheaded manner, taking into account our own interests and the ramifications of our response for the international order.

In February this year, Greece began pressing Germany for World War II reparations amounting to 162 billion euros, including repayment of a loan that Nazi Germany forced the Bank of Greece to extend to the German occupiers. Most people felt the demands were outrageous, but the German government reacted in a calm and collected manner, pointing out that Germany and Greece had long since reached a political and legal settlement with regard to war damages and repayment of the loan. If instead the Germans had waxed defensive and tried to minimize their culpability, things could have gone badly for them. We need to learn how to respond to accusations and demands in a levelheaded fashion.

I agree with Mr. Hosoya in thinking that historical reconciliation with China or South Korea will not be easy, but that doesn’t mean we should give up. The best
way of dealing with this issue is to keep our focus on minimizing the damage to
the nation’s image and interests.

Past Efforts and Challenges

HOSOYA Thank you for the important suggestions in all of your presentations.
Next I’d like to ask four questions. The first three pertain to points Prime Minister
Abe made at a press conference in January concerning his planned seventieth-an-
niversary statement. It seems to me that these are vital to the issue of historical
reconciliation.

First: What would be the best way for Japan to officially sum up its deep regret
regarding the war? This is something our Asian neighbors are watching closely.

Second: What has Japan achieved in the seventy years since World War II?
What efforts has it made to bridge the gaps with other nations’ perceptions of
history and achieve reconciliation?

Third: Given the answers to the first and second questions, what policies should
Japan adopt henceforth?

The fourth question is one I would like to pose myself. What sort of historical
assessment of the war are you expecting from Prime Minister Abe in August, when
he gives his statement to mark the seventieth anniversary of Japan’s surrender?

Starting with question one, then, let me ask each of you how you believe we
should assess Japan’s role in the war with respect to China, South Korea, and the
United States. Mr. Kawashima, let’s start with China.

KAWASHIMA Mr. Nishino mentioned that Tokyo and Seoul have already achieved
reconciliation at the official level, and this is essentially true for Japan and China
as well. In 1995, Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama issued a statement expressing
the government’s “deep remorse” and “heartfelt apology” for the damage and suf-
fering Japan caused, and Prime Minister Jun’ichiro Koizumi adopted the same
wording in 2005. Although there was no immediate response from China, Premier
Wen Jiabao clearly acknowledged these expressions of remorse and apology and
indicated China’s appreciation in a speech to the Japanese Diet on April 12, 2007.
So, at least as far as statements by government leaders are concerned, you could
say that Japan and China have already gone a long way toward historical recon-
ciliation.

Apart from such statements, there’s also a group of four basic bilateral docu-
ments: the 1972 Joint Communiqué, the 1978 Treaty of Peace and Friendship, the
1998 Joint Declaration on Building a Partnership of Friendship and Cooperation
for Peace and Development, and the 2008 Joint Statement on Comprehensive Pro-
motion of a “Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests.” The 1972 Joint Communiqué set the tone by expressing Japan’s remorse over the war,¹ and each subsequent document reaffirmed that sentiment. The 1998 Joint Declaration went further and affirmed Japan’s commitment to uphold the Murayama Statement of 1995. All of these are official documents that were agreed on and adopted by the Japanese and Chinese governments. It’s useful to distinguish these two different levels: on the one hand, the anniversary statements by prime ministers expressing both “remorse” and “apology,” and on the other hand, the bilateral documents that have focused on remorse—albeit the two intersect in the 1998 Joint Declaration.

As to an assessment of Japan’s role in World War II, that’s a more complex question. Diplomatic relations between modern Japan and China go back to the Sino-Japanese Friendship and Trade Treaty of 1871. From then until the First Sino-Japanese War [1894–95], the two counties were on equal terms. But in the wake of that conflict, the relationship became an unequal one, as Japan took control of Taiwan and Penghu and concluded an unequal treaty with the Qing regime. Even so, relations didn’t deteriorate irrevocably at that time. The two nations were both bent on modernization, and Japan, which had already established a modern state, provided a model that China could follow. During this period, many Chinese scholars traveled to Japan to study and familiarize themselves with the workings of a modern state, including its laws, its organs of government, the concept of constitutional monarchy, and so forth.

The big turning point for Japan-China relations in the modern era came with the Twenty-one Demands that Japan submitted to China in 1915. The demands triggered a widespread anti-Japanese backlash in China, including a nationwide boycott of Japanese goods, and led to a sharp deterioration in bilateral ties. All of this helped fuel the radical May Fourth Movement.

Mainstream Japanese historians tend to see Japan’s China policy in the 1920s under Foreign Minister Kijuro Shidehara as a time of conciliation and nonintervention, characterized by support for the Washington Naval Treaty. But Chinese historians take the view that Japan waged a consistent and continuous campaign of aggression against China from the Meiji era on, marching headlong toward war as part of an imperialist policy toward the mainland.

This perception gap widens when you get into the 1930s. Chinese historians

¹ The English translation reads, “The Japanese side is keenly conscious of the responsibility for the serious damage that Japan caused in the past to the Chinese people through war, and deeply reproaches itself.”—Ed.
talk about the Fifteen Years War as a single historical event starting with the Manchurian Incident in 1931 and continuing until Japan’s surrender in 1945. This is consistent with the Chinese focus on Japanese aggression as the keynote of Japan-China relations. On the other hand, many Japanese scholars take the view that the conflict in Manchuria ended with the Tanggu Truce in 1933, and that the following years, up to the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937, were marked by efforts toward peace; it was not a continuous war of aggression.

One of the biggest perceptions gaps pertains to the outcome of World War II. The Chinese see it as the triumph of China over Japan, whereas most Japanese have the idea that Japan was defeated by the United States. This is a gap that’s very difficult to bridge.

These historical differences extend to attitudes toward the United Nations. The Chinese still equate the UN with the Allied powers of World War II. As they see it, China was given a permanent seat on the UN Security Council as a key member of the winning alliance, and they don’t see how Japan, as one of the defeated Axis powers, could possibly be accorded the same privilege. I personally feel that Japan has more than earned the right to a permanent seat, given its contributions to post-war international society, but that is not how the Chinese view things.

While I do think it’s possible for historians to narrow the perception gap with regard to the events leading up to the war by sharing and discussing the documentary evidence, that’s not the same thing as altering the government’s version of events or the way it wields that interpretation in the context of diplomatic relations. We need to keep in mind that for Beijing, historical reconciliation isn’t an absolute, freestanding issue; its aspect changes from one era to another because it’s linked to such factors as domestic politics, foreign policy, overall relations with Japan, and relations with the rest of East Asia.

NISHINO South Korean attitudes about World War II are still heavily tinged by bitterness and regret at not having been able to join in the struggle. History museums in South Korea almost invariably feature exhibits on the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea, which was established in Shanghai in 1919 as an outgrowth of the March 1 Movement for independence. In 1941, the Provisional Government formed the Korean Liberation Army, and it was preparing to send troops to take part in operations within Korea when Japan surrendered to the Allies. There’s still a strong belief among the South Koreans that history might have taken a very different course if the KLA had joined with the Allies in fighting Japan.

To be frank, there’s some controversy as to how to classify the so-called Provisional Government. Internationally, it’s usually treated as a political organization, rather than a government in exile, so it’s a complex issue for the South Koreans.
As I mentioned before, Japan’s annexation of Korea is one of the key sticking points in terms of historical reconciliation between Japan and South Korea. The 1965 treaty glossed over the issue of legality with ambiguous language, and it didn’t reemerge as a serious bone of contention until the beginning of this century. Recently, there’s been a growing tendency within South Korea to question the entire process by which the treaty was concluded. Signing and ratification took place under the authoritarian regime of President Park Chung-hee [1962–79], which suppressed the opposition by force, including those protesting the normalization of ties with Japan. Moreover, the final treaty was disappointing to South Koreans in that it incorporated no expression of remorse or apology from the Japanese government. The amount of economic aid pledged by Japan fell short of expectations as well. Of course, most South Koreans today acknowledge the role that Japanese “seed money” played in hastening South Korea’s economic development, but there’s a widespread sense that Seoul should have received something more important. This is the origin of the historical divide that’s plagued the Japan-Korea relationship in recent years.

Another key issue at the time of the 1965 treaty was whether Japan would recognize Seoul or Pyongyang as the legitimate government of the Korean Peninsula and whether Japan would have the latitude to establish diplomatic relations with North Korea at some point in the future. This is the issue addressed by Article 3 of the Treaty on Basic Relations. These issues were embedded in the bilateral relationship when the treaty was signed, but they’ve only surfaced fairly recently.

So, is reconciliation possible? If so, how long will it take? These are the questions we’re addressing today. I think we need to face the fact that a complete historical reconciliation between Japan and South Korea is going to be very difficult. But in terms of our relationship with the Korean Peninsula, it seems to me that if the North and South are united, the face of Korean nationalism is likely to change. So, we still need to think about historical reconciliation in the context of building a relationship with a reunited Korea, and it seems to me that the seventieth anniversary of the end of World War II, which is also the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties between Japan and South Korea, is good opportunity to examine these issues thoroughly.

History in the Cold Light of Today’s Realities

WATANABE In terms of historical interpretation, Japan’s relationships with China and South Korea are obviously very complex. The Japan-US relationship is fairly
simple by comparison. But Japanese feelings toward America are slightly more complicated. I think the key is how we come to terms with it ourselves.

Going back to the Tokyo Trial, I think the majority of Japanese understand why Japan, having lost the war, would be held accountable for the war crimes it committed. At the same time, there are people who question why the United States hasn’t been similarly held to account for its massacre of civilians in violation of international law in the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the firebombing of Tokyo.

Japan has nationalists on the left as well as on the right. Rightwing nationalists are basically conservative and tend to support the Japan-US alliance. But this brand of nationalism also has a tendency to justify the past and to vilify China and South Korea, and in its extreme form, it fuels animosity toward the United States as well. There’s also a strain of anti-US nationalism on the left, represented by some of those leading the protests against Abe’s security bills. So, there’s a potential for anti-Americanism on both the right and the left.

Any official statement regarding the past has to take full account of the importance of the Japan-US relationship. We need to realize that there are forces out there ready and eager to exploit any potential rift between Japan and the United States. And that would be bad for Japan and for the world as a whole.

Before the war, Japan isolated itself by failing to grasp or ignoring the fact that the world was changing and the tide was turning toward international cooperation. But since the war, Japan has taken a dramatically different course. For example, Japan is one of 190 states that are currently bound by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which came into force in 1970. Under the treaty, nonnuclear states like Japan agreed never to acquire nuclear weapons, while the nuclear states—the United States, Russia, Britain, France, and China—committed themselves to pursuing nuclear disarmament. Japan has the technological ability to develop nuclear weapons if it wanted to, but it has pledged not to. This is a pretty important fact to keep in mind.

Any summation of Japan-US relations in the seven decades since the war naturally entails a review of the path taken by Japan in the postwar era. A review guided solely by wishful thinking, divorced from international reality, could easily open up a Pandora’s box. Some of what comes out of it could seek to undermine the foundations of the US-led international system on which we depend. We need to trim our expectations to fit this reality, recognizing that life in the real world is not always going to match our ideals.

Unlike the United States, neither China nor South Korea was a democracy at the time when it made peace with Japan after World War II. So, even though our
70th Anniversary of World War II

governments reached an agreement, there was never sufficient discussion or understanding among the general public. The United States is a democracy that upholds freedom of speech and, since World War II, Japan has also built a democratic society conducive to free debate, so we’ve been able to have a relatively open discussion regarding historical interpretations and inconsistencies. That’s one reason reconciliation with China and South Korea has been more difficult than with the United States.

(Abridged and adapted from the transcript of the 95th Tokyo Foundation Forum, July 6, 2015.)
November 30, 2015

Is Historical Reconciliation Possible?

A 70th Anniversary Assessment (2)

Shin Kawashima, Jun’ya Nishino, Tsuneo Watanabe, Yuichi Hosoya

On July 6, 2015, with Prime Minister Abe’s much-anticipated 70th Anniversary Statement in the offing, the Tokyo Foundation held a forum to explore the challenges of historical reconciliation in the context of Japan’s relations with China, South Korea, and the United States. In Part 2 (abridged), the panelists review progress and setbacks to date and discuss what it will take to complete the reconciliation process.

*          *          *

YUICHI HOSOYA Let’s turn now to my second question: How should we assess Japan’s postwar record? What have we done—and what haven’t we done—to achieve historical reconciliation over the past seven decades? We’ll begin with Japan-China relations.

SHIN KAWASHIMA China celebrates its victory in World War II on September 3, and this year it will be marked by a military parade. Why does China use this date, rather than August 15, when Japan surrendered? This goes back to the fact that Japan officially signed the Instrument of Surrender on September 2 and that a victory parade was held by the Kuomintang government the following day in Chongqing. The Communist-led People’s Republic of China that later drove the Kuomintang off the mainland initially marked China’s victory over Japan on August 15 but later moved the date to September 3 to align with the Soviet practice. The PRC has also designated December 13 as a national day of remembrance for the Nanjing incident.

In assessing our bilateral ties, let’s start with a quick overview of the postwar period.

When Japan surrendered in 1945, there were more than a million Japanese troops in China, and the Chinese set about disarming and repatriating them in a businesslike fashion with a minimum of fuss. One reason was that neither the ruling Kuomintang nor the rival Communists wanted to turn the Japanese soldiers against them.
On October 1, 1949, the Communist Party founded the People’s Republic of China, with its capital in Beijing. Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang, meanwhile, fled to Taiwan and declared Taipei the temporary capital of the Republic of China. From then on there were essentially two Chinese governments. Japan had to choose one with which to negotiate a peace and establish official diplomatic relations. Both Chinas wanted Japan’s recognition, but with the Cold War escalating and spreading to East Asia, Tokyo had no alternative but to recognize Taipei as the legitimate government of China.

Since the end of the war, Chiang Kai-shek had advocated a “dualistic” view of prewar Japan, arguing that the Japanese people and the Japanese military were two separate entities. According to his way of thinking, responsibility for the war lay with a clique of militarists. The Japanese people and even the majority of rank-and-file soldiers were victims, like the Chinese. Mao Zedong adopted the same viewpoint.

That said, Chiang Kai-shek had decided early on to seek reparations from Japan and had calculated damages amounting to more than $51.5 billion. But as US priorities for Japan and the rest of the region shifted, the Allied powers agreed in principle to forego compensation, and under the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty concluded on April 28, 1952, the Republic of China waived all claims to reparations.

Over the next two decades or so, the watchword in Japan-ROC relations was the saying “repaying malice with virtue,” a reference to Chiang Kai-shek’s magnanimity. Until Chiang Kai-shek’s death in 1975, virtually every Japanese politician...
who met with him would at some point recite that saying as a kind of mantra of gratitude for Chiang’s magnanimity. Chiang, for his part, never mentioned Japan’s role in the war. So, where the two countries’ political leaders were concerned, “re-paying malice with virtue” seemed like a workable formula for postwar reconciliation and bilateral relations.

Beijing also embraced the theory that the Japanese people were innocent of the militarists’ crime as part of its strategy to weaken the influence of Taiwan and the United States in Japan. The idea was to enlist influential pro-Chinese figures in the private sector to lobby for eventual recognition of the Communist government and provide support for Japan’s leftist and anti-American forces. This was the origin of the Japan-China friendship movement. From Beijing’s standpoint, the overriding goal was improving China’s strategic position vis-à-vis Japan and the United States, and in this context, the issues of wartime responsibility were secondary.

In this way, the governments of mainland China and Taiwan both downplayed the issues of wartime responsibility in their dealings with Japan as they competed with one another for Japan’s friendship in the 1950s and 1960s. Back home, however, they were both disseminating anti-Japanese propaganda through the schools. That’s because the CPC and the Kuomintang both based their claims to legitimacy on their role in resisting and defeating Japanese aggression.

Meanwhile, most Japanese historians and other intellectuals of the period were highly critical of Japan’s prewar and wartime conduct and wrote passionately about its wartime responsibility. Unfortunately, in those days there was little interaction or exchange at this level between Japan and the Republic of China, and virtually none between Japan and Communist China, with which it had no diplomatic ties. This is one reason Japan’s reconciliation with the rest of East Asia gained so little ground at the grassroots level.

Another reason is that Taiwan wasn’t a democratic society when it normalized relations with Japan in 1952, and the same was true of China in 1972. In other words, when our East Asian neighbors made peace with Japan, their people weren’t actively involved in the decision-making process. This is one key difference between reconciliation in East Asia and in Europe after World War II. As democratic mechanisms have developed among our East Asian neighbors, their societies have begun demanding a renewed settlement of postwar accounts, both internally and externally. However much we protest that those issues have been settled legally and diplomatically, the East Asian public isn’t going to listen. This is the situation that began to confront Japan from the 1980s on, as democracy took hold in South Korea and Taiwan, and public opinion began to play a bigger role in Chinese society.

Japan established diplomatic relations with the PRC in 1972, and it began
providing official development assistance in 1979. Deng Xiaoping, who was pursuing a pragmatic policy of economic reform and liberalization, believed that China should acknowledge Japan’s economic seniority and learn from it, but without forgetting the lessons of history. During the 1980s, the economic relationship was largely a one-way street, dominated by Japanese ODA. So whenever historical issues threatened to rock the boat, Japan could usually resolve them by offering economic concessions.

By the 1990s, however, Japan’s economic power was declining relative to China’s, and Tokyo was cutting back on its ODA. As a result, Japan lost its economic leverage, and with it, the ability to neutralize tensions over historical issues. These trends accelerated in the twenty-first century. As Japan’s economic contribution became less important, the historical aspects of the relationship came to the fore until eventually historical and territorial issues completely dominated the diplomatic discourse.

The courts have compounded the problem. Under the 1972 joint communiqué establishing diplomatic relations between Japan and the PRC, Beijing renounced any claim to reparations, but the courts originally interpreted this as applying only to the state, not to private entities, so there was still the potential for individual Chinese plaintiffs to claim damages. But in the first decade of this century, both the Tokyo High Court and the Japanese Supreme Court ruled that China had waived all private claims as well. This had serious repercussions. Since issues of wartime responsibility could no longer be deliberated and settled in the courts, they came under the purview of society and politics. That’s when Japan and China began launching joint research projects and engaging in historical dialogue at various levels. The rejection of private claims by the Japanese courts may also have influenced the Chinese courts to begin considering such cases.

I think what all of this illustrates is the degree to which Beijing’s strategies, its economic relationship with Japan, and a host of other factors have affected the importance it places on these issues of historical interpretation and reconciliation. Of course, there was also an increase in dialogue and exchange, including joint research projects, which have helped to advance reconciliation on some levels. There were methods and mechanisms in place to prevent the escalation of problems, and these functioned to some degree. Unfortunately, those mechanisms have gradually been lost, and the problems have escalated. At the government level, reconciliation hit a high-water mark with Wen Jiabao’s speech before Japan’s National Diet on April 12, 2007. But things turned sour after that, and in the meantime, Beijing’s foreign policy underwent a substantial shift. We really need to start putting our heads together to salvage the situation.
HOSOYA Thank you for a very fresh perspective on these issues. Let’s turn now to relations between Japan and South Korea during the past seven decades.

JUN’YA NISHINO At the risk of oversimplifying, I would characterize the basic storyline as one of ongoing progress.

For the first two decades, from 1945 to 1965, Japan and Korea had no diplomatic ties. Bilateral talks began around the time the San Francisco Peace Treaty was concluded, but for fourteen years Tokyo and Seoul were unable to overcome their differences on the matter of Japan’s annexation of Korea. In 1965, they finally resolved them by means of ambiguous wording, as I explained earlier. The two countries’ leaders made a decision to put economic interests and security considerations first and deal with historical issues later. The South Korean government was desperate to speed up economic development. The Japanese government believed that an economically strong and politically stable South Korea was essential to Japan’s security. The interests of the two governments coincided, and that’s why the negotiations finally succeeded.

Those objectives have by and large been achieved. The South Korean economy developed rapidly, and in the late 1980s democratic government was established. Since then, South Korea has emerged as a highly dynamic economy and matured as a democracy. Partly as a consequence of this evolution, Japan–South Korea relations have run into the same sort of problems that Mr. Kawashima has just mentioned in connection with democratization.

I would argue that in the 1990s, just after the end of the Cold War, Japan made a serious, good-faith effort to grapple with the historical issues that the 1965 treaty had placed on the back burner. The 1993 Kono statement confronted the comfort women issue, and that was followed by the establishment of the Asian Women’s Fund and the Murayama statement of 1995. These efforts helped bring about the 1998 Japan–Republic of Korea Joint Declaration.

But during the following decade, historical controversies surged to the fore again. From the South Korean viewpoint, the blame for this lay with Prime Minister Jun’ichiro Koizumi’s annual visits to Yasukuni Shrine between 2001 and 2006.

On the other hand, Prime Minister Naoto Kan issued a statement in August 2010 marking the centennial of Japan’s annexation of Korea. It didn’t gain much attention in Japan, which is a shame because it was actually one of the more important foreign-policy initiatives taken by the government while the Democratic Party of Japan was in power. It’s a strong declaration of Japan’s remorse for the era of colonial rule and its determination to make amends.

This is my take on the last seven decades of Japan–Korea relations. I think a lot of people in Japan would agree with my interpretation in its general outlines, but
an increasing number of South Koreans today probably view things differently.

South Korean democracy developed rapidly in the 1990s, but conservative, anti-communist ideology dominated domestic politics before then. There was very little room for leftist, liberal thinking. But as democracy evolved, such ideas became more and more acceptable. In the decade between 1998 and 2008, South Korea had two successive left-leaning administrations. President Park Geun-hye is a conservative, but she won the 2012 election with only 51 percent of the vote; 48 percent voted for Moon Jae-in, a liberal. The left wing has become increasingly vocal and influential in South Korean society.

Many of the senior members of South Korea’s liberal camp are the same activists who spearheaded the democracy movement in the late 1980s. Their view is that Park Chung-hee went about normalizing relations with Japan the wrong way. At the time, South Korea was a weak and underdeveloped country, but it’s grown and matured. So, they argue, isn’t it time to rebuild the bilateral relationship on a new footing, more appropriate to South Korea’s current strength and international stature?

The courts have lent their voice to the notion that the terms of the 1965 treaty need to be reconsidered. This is implicit in the August 2011 Constitutional Court decision faulting the South Korean government for failing to negotiate a solution to the comfort women issue and the May 2012 Supreme Court ruling that South Korean victims of forced labor had the right to seek compensation from Japan. This sort of pressure from society and the judiciary has put the South Korean government in a very difficult position in terms of honoring the commitment it made to Japan at the state level.

When Values Coincide

HOSOYA The longer we continue our discussion, the more struck I am by the difficulty of achieving reconciliation with our neighbors. The situation in South Korea poses special challenges—perhaps now more than ever. We may be at a point where we need to summon all our resources and ingenuity to come up with a solution.

What about the United States?

TSUNEO WATANABE I think most people would agree that Japan and the United States have enjoyed good relations overall during the past seventy years. Japan has seen outbreaks of leftwing anti-Americanism and rightwing conservative nationalism, but despite occasional difficulties, we’ve generally managed to keep things on an even keel.

The Leaders’ Declaration issued at the Group of Seven Summit in Germany last June specifically mentioned the situation in the East and South China Seas under
the section on maritime security. In an obvious reference to China, the leaders stated that they “strongly oppose the use of intimidation, coercion, or force, as well as any unilateral actions that seek to change the status quo, such as large scale land reclamation.” This passage was inserted by Japan and the United States. Efforts like this help to reinforce prevailing international norms.

We saw a similar example of solidarity in support of international norms when Russia was suspended in March 2014, and the G8 became the G7 again. The other participating states agreed to suspend Russia to protest its annexation of Crimea. The United States has a huge interest in maintaining the liberal international order, and it supports it through ideological leadership as well as hard power. Japan also has an interest in the continuation of this American-led world order and shares its underlying ideals, so it has consistently cooperated with the United States over the past seven decades. These shared interests and ideals have allowed the Japanese and American people to achieve a fundamental reconciliation.

That said, there was a brief time when the relationship was in jeopardy. In 1989, when I was a student living in New York City, people in the Japanese community were warning me not to go out on December 7, Pearl Harbor Day. The Berlin Wall had just collapsed, and the Soviet Union was breaking down. For some time, though, US economic power had been in decline, while Japan and Germany, its former adversaries, were achieving robust growth. Japan-US relations had sunk to a low point over various trade disputes, and the backlash fueled a notion that Japan needed to be contained. The media and academia were disseminating gross misconceptions about Japan, suggesting that the country wasn’t a true democracy and not playing fair. In fact, one of the main reasons I went to study in the United States was to try to get to the heart of these revisionist misunderstandings. I studied political science largely to acquire the basic tools to counter this notion that Japan was fundamentally different.

What I came to realize is that when relations deteriorate at the state level, all kinds of other factors, including historical relations and cultural differences, are mobilized to reinforce a negative image. Once diplomatic ties improve, such negative images are swept away. Hollywood helped spread this ruthless image of Japan Inc. with movies like *Rising Sun* [1993], which was made at a time when there was deep concern over the expansion of Japanese business and the acquisition of American companies. In the movie, the son of a Japanese business magnate is implicated in the murder of a professional escort.

For years, Nazi villains were a staple of Hollywood cinema. During the Cold War, the Soviets were favored as the bad guys, and after the attacks of 9/11, it was the Arabs. But America is a democracy, so all of this is grounded in the prevailing
popular image. Once the image ceases to be relevant, people lose interest in the former villains, and the stigma disappears. That’s one of the good things about American democracy.

On the other hand, you also have powerful lobbies and interest groups to deal with in the United States. Korean Americans, for example, have been very active representing South Korean interests in the United States, including its disputes with Japan. Of course, it’s their right to engage in political activity and lobby US politicians. But this anti-Japanese campaign by proxy on US soil has really complicated relations between Japan and South Korea. This may be one of the drawbacks of America’s undiscriminating democracy.

Even so, America’s pluses far outweigh the minuses. And we need to understand the fundamental principles—the shared beliefs and values pertaining to democratic government and human rights—that make American society what it is. The historical perception gap hasn’t been a major issue in Japan-US relations so far, but it could turn into a political controversy depending on the timing and the circumstances, so we need to be on our guard.

What to Expect from the Abe Statement

HOSOYA We’ve heard from each of you regarding the development of postwar relations with China, South Korea, and the United States, so with those observations in mind, I’d like to turn to the third and fourth questions I raised: Seventy years after the end of World War II, what more needs to be done, and what policies should Japan adopt to repair or strengthen relations with these three countries? And, what are you expecting from Prime Minister Abe’s seventieth anniversary statement?

KAWASHIMA As a member of the panel that compiled recommendations for the prime minister regarding the anniversary statement, there’s a limit to what I can say, but I’ll offer what observations I can within those constraints.

According to the Cabinet Office’s 2014 Public Opinion Survey on Diplomacy, about 80 percent of Japanese citizens feel little or no affinity for China, the attitude in Okinawa being even cooler. The percentage of Chinese who feel no affinity for Japan is roughly the same. Clearly, public sentiment is not conducive to a warming of bilateral relations.

The contrast with the 1980s is striking. If you look at the results of the same survey during that period, more than 70 percent of Japanese respondents indicated that they felt an affinity for China, and the figures were also pretty high on the Chinese side, where Japanese films were enjoying a big surge in popularity. The
three major turning points in public opinion were the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, and the anti-Japanese demonstrations of 2005.

It’s worth noting, though, that 70 percent of Japanese respondents and 60 percent of Chinese regard the other country as important, according to the results of the 2014 Japan-China Joint Opinion Poll by Genron NPO. So while they may not feel particularly friendly toward one another, people in the two countries acknowledge one another’s importance. There’s nothing really abnormal about such a relationship. My personal feeling is that it’s better to accept the tensions that exist and try to build trust despite those realities than to try vainly to resurrect the positive images of the past. It’s natural for our relationship to evolve into one in which both sides view the other more critically even while acknowledging one another’s importance.

China is Japan’s biggest trading partner, and its importance to the Japanese economy is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future, whatever our political differences. China is rising and expanding, and China’s policies and actions—particularly in the security and political spheres—are of considerable importance to the future of Japan and the world as a whole. That being the case, the important thing is to never look the other way. Keeping watch without jumping to conclusions is a difficult thing to do. But we have no choice given the magnitude of China’s impact on the world today.

Another important point to keep in mind is that Japan has become a very sensitive issue in China. Lately Chinese television has been broadcasting historical dramas and documentaries dealing with the anti-Japanese resistance, and some of this is wildly inaccurate. You hear nonsensical statements like, “My grandfather was killed by Japanese soldiers when he was nine.” The CPC could be creating a major headache for itself by spreading so much anti-Japanese propaganda in the schools and the media. At the same time, there is no denying that Chinese public perception of Japan has deteriorated in certain respects. And the Chinese government’s policy toward Japan has become particularly temperamental over the past six years or so, since Wen Jiabao’s bid for reconciliation failed and the Senkaku Islands dispute flared up. On a personal level, the Chinese people seem to love Japanese products and popular culture, but in public and official settings, they have very harsh things to say about Japan.

Then there’s the fact that those who place top priority on economic development tend to favor closer relations with Japan, while those who don’t are more inclined to play up the territorial issue. Internal disagreements regarding domestic policy feed into dissent over Beijing’s Japan policy. So, when domestic problems
arise at the political level, the government is all the more vulnerable to a public backlash depending on its policy toward Japan. Because of this tendency, it’s becoming more and more difficult for Beijing to deal with Japan.

Under the circumstances, there’s little choice but to maintain dialogue where dialogue is possible and to prevent differences from escalating to a boiling point. President Xi Jinping’s policy over the past six months has been to prevent relations with Japan from swinging too widely in either direction.

As for what to expect from Abe’s statement, I don’t really know, but I think his emphasis is likely to be different from the Murayama and Koizumi statements [on the fiftieth and sixtieth anniversary of the war, respectively]. In those anniversary statements, the focus was primarily on the period before 1945. I think that Prime Minister Abe is likely to put more emphasis on the seventy years since the war and on all the efforts toward reconciliation Japan has undertaken since then. Having expressed remorse for the past and acknowledged the facts of history, I think he’ll focus on doing what remains to be done.

My personal opinion is that there are a number of things that we could be doing to improve the situation in the light of Wen Jiabao’s April 2007 speech to the Diet—with the proviso that we must continue to keep a sharp eye on China, as I mentioned earlier. The first relates to the Peace, Friendship, and Exchange Initiative announced by Prime Minister Murayama back in 1994, a year before his war anniversary statement. Under this initiative, Japan allocated substantial funds for programs to support exchange at the nongovernmental level with a view to promoting reconciliation with nations that were once at war with Japan. I believe these efforts should be continued into the future. Even those countries that say they are willing to “forgive but won’t forget” deserve our reassurance that we won’t forget either. And those countries that haven’t forgiven need it all the more.

Second, when it comes to discussing history, I think we need to talk about Japan’s postwar efforts toward reconciliation, not just prewar and wartime events. As an example, the Japan Center for Asian Historical Records has a very useful website that provides free digital access to historical materials housed in the National Archives of Japan, the Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the National Institute for Defense Studies of the Ministry of Defense. But for some reason, it only provides access to prewar and wartime records. If it were to include information on Japan’s postwar efforts toward reconciliation and its contributions to the international community, that could promote understanding of the progress we’ve made over the past seventy years.

A third thing we need to work on is improving the teaching of history in our schools.
Finally, I just want to mention that, when it comes to East Asia, one serious concern I have is Taiwan. The Japanese have a tendency to regard Taiwan as a friendly, pro-Japanese country, but the reality is much more complex. There are a number of changes underway in Taiwan today that could have important ramifications for Japan-China relations, Japan-US relations, and the role of Okinawa. I think the time is approaching when we’ll need to think seriously about ways to achieve reconciliation with Taiwanese society, not just with the government in Taipei.

**Twice as Humble, Twice as Tolerant**

**NISHINO** The first thing I would mention in regard to Japan-ROK relations is the growing mutual animosity among ordinary citizens. Two of three Japanese surveyed in the Cabinet Office’s latest Public Opinion Survey on Diplomacy said they felt little or no affinity toward South Korea. This is a very serious state of affairs. As recently as 2009, two out of three Japanese indicated that they felt close to the country. South Korean sentiment toward Japan is also very negative, but that’s been true for some time; the level of animosity hasn’t changed much on their side.

The recent deterioration in Japanese attitudes toward South Korea can be traced back to President Lee Myung-bak’s August 2012 landing on Takeshima and his demand that the Emperor apologize for Japan’s colonial rule of the Korean Peninsula. Both countries’ leaders need to recognize the gravity of the situation and make a concerted effort to avoid any further deterioration in bilateral ties.

On a positive note, both leaders attended receptions held on June 22 in Tokyo and Seoul to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the normalization of bilateral ties. I take this as a positive sign, an indication that they wanted to seize the opportunity to begin repairing relations. Hopefully, this will translate into further progress in the upcoming months, including the resumption of the Japan-China-ROK trilateral summit.

The second point I want to make concerns the “two-track approach” toward Japanese diplomacy proposed by the administration of President Park Geun-hye. I think it makes good sense to treat historical reconciliation as a separate issue to prevent it from casting a shadow over other facets of the relationship. At the same time, we have to be careful not to sweep these issues under the rug again. South Korean society and Japanese society have both undergone profound changes since 1965. Both sides need to keep working diligently and patiently to develop constructive approaches to the problem predicated on today’s realities.

This brings me to another point I wanted to mention. Japan and South Korea have actually made considerable progress in terms of cooperation and dialogue in
areas other than historical reconciliation, such as the economy, culture, people-to-people exchange, and most recently security. Unfortunately, these activities don’t get a lot of attention. Japan-Korea relations are multifaceted and multidimensional, and the historical aspect is just one component, albeit an important one. We need to start focusing more on these other areas if we want to improve the bilateral relationship.

As regards the Abe statement, I have two basic expectations. One is that the prime minister will deliver a message that resonates with the international community as a whole. Of course, we would like South Korea and China to respond positively. But judging from the content of speeches Abe made earlier this year and the conclusions of his advisory panel, it seems unrealistic to imagine that the August statement will elicit praise from Seoul. Still, if he can send a strong and effective message to the international community, acknowledging Japan’s past and conveying how it intends to contribute to the international community going forward, he will have passed an important test.

Concerning Japan-ROK relations specifically, I think that the prime minister needs to get the South Korean people to understand that Japan and South Korea have both worked hard to shape the bilateral relationship over the years. The June 2015 report on the government’s review of the 1993 Kono statement revealed how closely Tokyo and Seoul have been working since the 1990s to find a resolution to the comfort women issue. The report drew a sharp reaction from Seoul, and President Park keeps insisting that the first step is for Japan to confront the facts honestly, but I think we also need to discuss what South Korea’s next steps should be after Japan does confront the facts and how the two governments can bring closure to these issues, particularly the comfort women problem.

**WATANABE** I think you made an important point about the South Korean government’s part in shaping the bilateral relationship. In Tokyo last March, German Chancellor Angela Merkel praised the understanding and magnanimity of Germany’s former adversaries in extending the hand of reconciliation to Germany after World War II. Her words had deep implications.

Where Japan and the United States are concerned, there are very few unresolved issues requiring reconciliation. But if Japan is incapable of achieving reconciliation with its neighbors, that may undermine its value as a US ally. In that sense, we need to do our utmost to reconcile with our Asian neighbors if we want to maintain and improve our ties with the United States.

Another key to that relationship is shared values and a common interest in preserving the international order and international norms. Japan needs to clearly articulate what it wants to accomplish as a member of the international community.
and what sort of international order it wants to build, and then implement concrete policies toward achieving those goals. That’s why I applaud Prime Minister Abe’s attempts to make “proactive contributions to peace.” I agree with the prime minister that Japan needs to relax the legal constraints that have limited our ability to contribute proactively to regional stability as a necessary step toward becoming a mature nation. Unfortunately, he was not very successful in persuading the public of this need. The Abe statement will need to be consistent with his announced policies.

The prime minister needs to avoid backward-looking justifications or denials of the past. But he also needs to avoid an inward-looking, isolationist approach. The domestic opposition to Abe’s new security legislation is based on an isolationist fear of what might come from making a proactive contribution to world affairs. I’m hoping the Abe statement will clearly convey the value of Japan’s contribution to international society to date and also its commitment to make an even greater contribution going forward.

HOSONA If I may be forgiven a rather down-to-earth analogy, I’ve seen a certain amount of interpersonal friction develop among my seminar students at times, and I’ve realized that everyone has a tendency to magnify their own efforts and underrate the efforts of others. So I often tell them, “Take half the credit for your own contribution, and give others twice the credit for theirs, and you’ll probably have a more accurate assessment.” In other words, to get an objective picture of ourselves and others, we need to be twice as humble and twice as tolerant. It’s easy to criticize South Korea, China, or the United States, but I think that if we start by humbly examining our own conduct, we’ll find plenty of hints for improving relations.

Thank you all for a very worthwhile discussion.

(Abridged and adapted from the transcript of the 95th Tokyo Foundation Forum, July 6, 2015.)
On the 70th anniversary of the end of the war, we must calmly reflect upon the road to war, the path we have taken since it ended, and the era of the 20th century. We must learn from the lessons of history the wisdom for our future.

More than one hundred years ago, vast colonies possessed mainly by the Western powers stretched out across the world. With their overwhelming supremacy in technology, waves of colonial rule surged toward Asia in the 19th century. There is no doubt that the resultant sense of crisis drove Japan forward to achieve modernization. Japan built a constitutional government earlier than any other nation in Asia. The country preserved its independence throughout. The Japan-Russia War gave encouragement to many people under colonial rule from Asia to Africa.

After World War I, which embroiled the world, the movement for self-determination gained momentum and put brakes on colonization that had been underway. It was a horrible war that claimed as many as ten million lives. With a strong desire for peace stirred in them, people founded the League of Nations and brought forth the General Treaty for Renunciation of War. There emerged in the international community a new tide of outlawing war itself.

At the beginning, Japan, too, kept steps with other nations. However, with the Great Depression setting in and the Western countries launching economic blocs by involving colonial economies, Japan’s economy suffered a major blow. In such circumstances, Japan’s sense of isolation deepened and it attempted to overcome its diplomatic and economic deadlock through the use of force. Its domestic political system could not serve as a brake to stop such attempts. In this way, Japan lost sight of the overall trends in the world.

With the Manchurian Incident, followed by the withdrawal from the League of Nations, Japan gradually transformed itself into a challenger to the new international order that the international community sought to establish after tremendous sacrifices. Japan took the wrong course and advanced along the road to war.

And, seventy years ago, Japan was defeated.

On the 70th anniversary of the end of the war, I bow my head deeply before the souls of all those who perished both at home and abroad. I express my feelings of profound grief and my eternal, sincere condolences.

More than three million of our compatriots lost their lives during the war: on
the battlefields worrying about the future of their homeland and wishing for the happiness of their families; in remote foreign countries after the war, in extreme cold or heat, suffering from starvation and disease. The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the air raids on Tokyo and other cities, and the ground battles in Okinawa, among others, took a heavy toll among ordinary citizens without mercy.

Also in countries that fought against Japan, countless lives were lost among young people with promising futures. In China, Southeast Asia, the Pacific islands and elsewhere that became the battlefields, numerous innocent citizens suffered and fell victim to battles as well as hardships such as severe deprivation of food. We must never forget that there were women behind the battlefields whose honour and dignity were severely injured.

Upon the innocent people did our country inflict immeasurable damage and suffering. History is harsh. What is done cannot be undone. Each and every one of them had his or her life, dream, and beloved family. When I squarely contemplate this obvious fact, even now, I find myself speechless and my heart is rent with the utmost grief.

The peace we enjoy today exists only upon such precious sacrifices. And therein lies the origin of postwar Japan.

We must never again repeat the devastation of war.

Incident, aggression, war -- we shall never again resort to any form of the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. We shall abandon colonial rule forever and respect the right of self-determination of all peoples throughout the world.

With deep repentance for the war, Japan made that pledge. Upon it, we have created a free and democratic country, abided by the rule of law, and consistently upheld that pledge never to wage a war again. While taking silent pride in the path we have walked as a peace-loving nation for as long as seventy years, we remain determined never to deviate from this steadfast course.

Japan has repeatedly expressed the feelings of deep remorse and heartfelt apology for its actions during the war. In order to manifest such feelings through concrete actions, we have engraved in our hearts the histories of suffering of the people in Asia as our neighbours: those in Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia and the Philippines, and Taiwan, the Republic of Korea and China, among others; and we have consistently devoted ourselves to the peace and prosperity of the region since the end of the war.

Such position articulated by the previous cabinets will remain unshakable into the future.
However, no matter what kind of efforts we may make, the sorrows of those who lost their family members and the painful memories of those who underwent immense sufferings by the destruction of war will never be healed.

Thus, we must take to heart the following.

The fact that more than six million Japanese repatriates managed to come home safely after the war from various parts of the Asia-Pacific and became the driving force behind Japan’s postwar reconstruction; the fact that nearly three thousand Japanese children left behind in China were able to grow up there and set foot on the soil of their homeland again; and the fact that former POWs of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Australia and other nations have visited Japan for many years to continue praying for the souls of the war dead on both sides.

How much emotional struggle must have existed and what great efforts must have been necessary for the Chinese people who underwent all the sufferings of the war and for the former POWs who experienced unbearable sufferings caused by the Japanese military in order for them to be so tolerant nevertheless?

That is what we must turn our thoughts to reflect upon.

Thanks to such manifestation of tolerance, Japan was able to return to the international community in the postwar era. Taking this opportunity of the 70th anniversary of the end of the war, Japan would like to express its heartfelt gratitude to all the nations and all the people who made every effort for reconciliation.

In Japan, the postwar generations now exceed eighty per cent of its population. We must not let our children, grandchildren, and even further generations to come, who have nothing to do with that war, be predestined to apologize. Still, even so, we Japanese, across generations, must squarely face the history of the past. We have the responsibility to inherit the past, in all humbleness, and pass it on to the future.

Our parents’ and grandparents’ generations were able to survive in a devastated land in sheer poverty after the war. The future they brought about is the one our current generation inherited and the one we will hand down to the next generation. Together with the tireless efforts of our predecessors, this has only been possible through the goodwill and assistance extended to us that transcended hatred by a truly large number of countries, such as the United States, Australia, and European nations, which Japan had fiercely fought against as enemies.

We must pass this down from generation to generation into the future. We have the great responsibility to take the lessons of history deeply into our hearts, to carve out a better future, and to make all possible efforts for the peace and prosperity of Asia and the world.

We will engrave in our hearts the past, when Japan attempted to break its
deadlock with force. Upon this reflection, Japan will continue to firmly uphold the principle that any disputes must be settled peacefully and diplomatically based on the respect for the rule of law and not through the use of force, and to reach out to other countries in the world to do the same. As the only country to have ever suffered the devastation of atomic bombings during war, Japan will fulfil its responsibility in the international community, aiming at the non-proliferation and ultimate abolition of nuclear weapons.

We will engrave in our hearts the past, when the dignity and honour of many women were severely injured during wars in the 20th century. Upon this reflection, Japan wishes to be a country always at the side of such women’s injured hearts. Japan will lead the world in making the 21st century an era in which women’s human rights are not infringed upon.

We will engrave in our hearts the past, when forming economic blocs made the seeds of conflict thrive. Upon this reflection, Japan will continue to develop a free, fair and open international economic system that will not be influenced by the arbitrary intentions of any nation. We will strengthen assistance for developing countries, and lead the world toward further prosperity. Prosperity is the very foundation for peace. Japan will make even greater efforts to fight against poverty, which also serves as a hotbed of violence, and to provide opportunities for medical services, education, and self-reliance to all the people in the world.

We will engrave in our hearts the past, when Japan ended up becoming a challenger to the international order. Upon this reflection, Japan will firmly uphold basic values such as freedom, democracy, and human rights as unyielding values and, by working hand in hand with countries that share such values, hoist the flag of “Proactive Contribution to Peace,” and contribute to the peace and prosperity of the world more than ever before.

Heading toward the 80th, the 90th and the centennial anniversary of the end of the war, we are determined to create such a Japan together with the Japanese people.

August 14, 2015
Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan

August 26, 2015

Okinawa’s Inconvenient Truths

Yoshitoshi Taira

The controversy over US Marine Corps Air Station Futenma in Okinawa is widely regarded as a local issue, but the author cites historical evidence to suggest that the situation has important and disturbing implications for postwar Japan as a whole.

*          *          *

In this report I examine the meaning of the situation in Okinawa today for Japanese politics and security. Specifically, I probe the implications of the current situation in Okinawa, where 70 years after Japan’s defeat in World War II, the US military maintains an undiminished presence on the sprawling bases it built in the years between the Battle of Okinawa in 1945 and the islands’ reversion to Japanese control in 1972.

Removing the Residue of the Occupation

At the time of the 1952 San Francisco Peace Treaty, which brought an end to the Allied Occupation and restored sovereignty to postwar Japan, US military installations (exclusive use facilities) covered 135,200 hectares of mainland Japan—more than eight times the area of bases in Okinawa. During the 1950s, a series of incidents and accidents involving American forces stationed in Japan plagued communities around the country, spawning protests and fueling a surge in anti-American feeling as the US military sought to build new installations and expand existing ones. US Ambassador to Japan John Allison recommended a timely and orderly withdrawal, particularly of US ground forces, noting that the Japanese public regarded their presence as a symbol of the Occupation.

In 1957, newly elected Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi called on the United
States to withdraw its ground forces from Japan. The two governments reached an agreement to that effect at a bilateral summit in June that year, and the United States began drawing down, redeploying troops and closing down army installations. Over the next two to three years, the area of mainland Japan occupied by US military installations shrank to 33,000 ha. However, in Okinawa, which remained under US military control until 1972, vast tracts of land were expropriated for the use of the Marines redeployed from mainland Japan. US bases in Okinawa eventually occupied 33,500 ha, well over 21% of the prefecture’s total land area.

In the rest of Japan, meanwhile, the US Army forces dwindled, but the Air Force and Navy retained a conspicuous presence, including several sprawling bases in and around Tokyo. With economic growth soaring and the nation’s once-battered pride slowly returning, the presence of US military forces in the greater capital area was an unpleasant reminder of Japan’s humiliating defeat and occupation. In 1970, Prime Minister Eisaku Sato acknowledged before the Diet that it was “not a desirable situation to have so many foreign troops right nearby the nation’s capital.”

Under such initiatives as the Kanto Plain Consolidation plan, the cutbacks continued apace. By 1972, US military bases occupied just 19,700 hectares of the Japanese mainland, and by 1980 the figure was down to 8,500 hectares. (It currently stands at 8,000 hectares.)

What compelled conservative, anti-communist leaders like Kishi and Sato to push so hard for the withdrawal of US military bases? In the words of Kishi, who fought successfully for the conclusion of a revised Japan-US Security Treaty, it was all about clearing away the “residue” of the Occupation.

To one degree or another, this impulse to eradicate the traces of subjugation and place Japan on a fundamentally equal footing with the United States motivated the behavior and policies of all of Japan’s political leaders during that era. It drove the negotiations leading to the revision of the Japan-US Security Treaty in 1960, the reversion of Okinawa in 1972, and the withdrawal of US forces from mainland Japan from the 1950s through the 1970s. These were the top priorities for Japan’s postwar leaders as they sought to restore Japan’s sovereignty and establish equality.
with the United States in the wake of the Occupation. Having thus swept away the
detritus of a humiliating chapter in the history of Japan-US relations, Japan pro-
ceeded to build an ever deeper and more extensive bilateral security relationship
under the name of the “Japan-US alliance.”

Reality Check

But now let us stop and consider: Did Japan really eliminate the last traces of the
US Occupation? Okinawa eventually reverted to Japanese control, but the bases
built during the years under American military control still occupy 22,800 hectares
of Okinawa Island, almost 18% of the total land area. Under the circumstances,
one must ask whether the residue of the Occupation was eliminated or simply
pushed out of sight.

Kumao Nishimura, who helped negotiate the original bilateral security as head
of the Foreign Ministry’s Treaties Bureau, called the essence of the treaty “cooper-
ation between material and human resources.” This was his way of saying that
Japan had committed itself to providing bases (material resources) in return for the
American promise of military protection. In substantive terms, the most important
and tangible result of the treaty was the US military bases on Japanese soil. Yet by
concentrating those bases in Okinawa, the government was able to render them
invisible to most of the Japanese populace, even while the Japan-US alliance con-
tinued to develop and grow.

Having set the stage in this manner, we are now ready to ask the uncomfortable
questions Okinawa raises about the character and achievements of postwar Japan.
Broadly speaking, these boil down to two basic issues.

The first is, how should we assess the outcome of Japan’s efforts to sweep away
the “residue” that embodied its status as a defeated nation? To put it more bluntly,
how do the Japanese as a people reconcile themselves to the fact that Okinawa
today preserves the very image of Japan as a defeated nation? Can they continue
to tolerate the situation in Okinawa even though it vividly preserves the same em-
blems of defeat that they so zealously swept from the main islands? These questions
go to the very core of Japan’s character as a sovereign state since the conclusion of
the San Francisco Peace Treaty.

The second question is, how does Japan, as a democratic state, explain the fact
that Okinawa, which accounts for a mere 0.6% of Japan’s total land area, houses
73.8% of the US military installations (exclusive use facilities) in Japan—in other
words, that the burden of the bilateral alliance (the provision of bases) falls over-
whelmingly on the people of this one tiny prefecture? Since sovereignty lies with
the people in a democracy, the people must have the collective will to defend their own country and share the burden of defense equally. In this sense, the second question also goes to the very core of Japan’s development as a democratic state over the past 70 years of postwar history.

What all of this means is that the implications of the current base controversy go far beyond the immediate question of whether to build a replacement facility for Marine Corps Air Station Futenma elsewhere in Okinawa. It also means that the issue has relevance not merely for Okinawans but for Japan as a whole. The Henoko relocation plan raises in distilled form the uncomfortable question of the nature of postwar Japan as reflected in the image of Okinawa today.

(Abridged and adapted from a paper delivered to a Tokyo Foundation symposium, May 26, 2015)
October 5, 2015

**Abe’s 70th Anniversary Statement: Historical Realism, not Revisionism**

Taisuke Abiru

On August 24, 2015, Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan and President of the conservative Liberal Democratic Party, issued a statement to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II. This was the third statement of this kind issued by prime ministers of Japan, including those from Tomiichi Murayama and Junichiro Koizumi.

The 1995 Murayama statement, officially entitled “On the Occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the War’s End,” was the first statement to include three key terms: “aggression,” “colonial rule” and “deep remorse and heartfelt apology.” In 2005, PM Koizumi issued a 60th anniversary statement, which adhered to the basic line of the Murayama’s statement.

When the Abe administration officially announced its plan at the beginning of this year to issue the 70th anniversary statement, there were opinions in the Japanese media that one more statement by a PM would be unnecessary after the Murayama statement and the Koizumi statement, which explicitly acknowledged and apologized for Japan’s colonial rule and aggression. Then why did PM Abe decide to issue the new statement?

With the rise of China, in the last ten years we have witnessed radical changes in the security environment surrounding Japan. The escalation of territorial disputes between China and its neighbors in the East China Sea and South China Sea directly reflects these changes. There have been growing voices within Japanese society calling for a firm stance on the part of the government toward China on the Senkaku Islands dispute. Some people even expected the government to deny the Murayama statement on the grounds that, in their view, it was too masochistic. It is no secret that this history revisionist group constitutes a part of Shinzo Abe’s political support base which enabled him to return to the prime minister’s post again at the end of 2012. Therefore there were concerns at that time

_Taisuke Abiru  Research Fellow and Project Manager, Tokyo Foundation._
that Abe’s new statement would take a different view of historical revisionism.

His political support base, however, also includes a group of realist scholars who don’t hesitate to acknowledge Japan’s colonial rule and aggression before the end of World War II. In their view, China is committing the same mistake Japan did in that period by challenging the existing international order. Dr. Shinichi Kitaoka, president of International University, represents this group of realist scholars. He also actively supports the Abe administration’s new security initiatives under Japan’s “Proactive Contribution to Peace” program.

In this context it’s worth paying attention to the fact that Abe has established the Advisory Panel on the History of the 20th Century and on Japan’s Role and the World Order in the 21st Century, and appointed Dr. Kitaoka as Acting Chair of this advisory panel. Members of the Panel held seven meetings and published a report on August 6, 2015.

Reading both Abe’s new statement and the Advisory Panel’s report, it is obvious that the historic view of the group of realist scholars had a critical impact on the content of Abe’s new statement.

It turned out to be less hawkish than initially expected. It uses the same three key terms—aggression, colonial rule and deep remorse and heartfelt apology—from the Murayama statement.

Abe’s new statement also shares the logic of the Advisory Panel’s report in that it implies criticism of China’s behavior today in East China Sea and South China Sea by admitting that Japan ended up becoming a challenger to the international order in the past.

I understand that, when reading the following part, some people may raise the question of whether Japan learned from history:

In Japan, the postwar generations now exceed eighty per cent of its population. We must not let our children, grandchildren, and even further generations to come, who have nothing to do with that war, be predestined to apologize.

However, the sentences that follow this one should be noted:

Still, even so, we Japanese, across generations, must squarely face the history of the past. We have the responsibility to inherit the past, in all humbleness, and pass it on to the future.

And so, it’s fair to say that Abe’s 70th anniversary statement on the end of World War II shows Japan’s historical realism, not revisionism.
70TH ANNIVERSARY OF WORLD WAR II

This article was originally published on the website of the Valdai Discussion Club. It is reprinted here with the permission of the Club.
October 7, 2015

Compromise Possible on the Northern Territories

Masahiro Akiyama

I have been asked by the Valdai Discussion Club to comment on the topic of the “Kuril Islands” and Japanese-Russian relations prior to Japanese Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida’s planned visit to Russia. The club wanted to know what would have a positive influence on bilateral relations, “given the fact that the parties are not willing to compromise on the Northern Territories.”

Before answering this question, let me first go over the historical facts regarding the territorial dispute, since I do not agree with the premise that “the parties are not willing to compromise.”

First of all, the Northern Territories—the islands of Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and Habomai—are not part of the Kuril Islands, which are located to the north of these islands, but are the inherent territories of Japan. They have never belonged to any other country. Russia and Japan have signed several treaties relating to this area in the past (in 1855, 1875 and 1905), in all of which Russia admitted that the four islands are Japanese territory. They were taken and occupied by the former Soviet Union at the very final stages of World War II, or, to be more exact, two weeks after Japan accepted the Potsdam Declaration.

As far as territorial issues are concerned, my understanding of the Ukrainian situation is that Russia has special interests in the eastern part of that country, particularly, the Crimean Peninsula, owing to the region’s historical ties to Russia. But the Russian occupation of the Northern Territories has no legal grounds. Russia has continued to occupy them over the years while officially admitting in joint declarations that a territorial problem exists between our two countries.

The Japanese people feel that the occupation is illegal and unfair, but inasmuch as the four islands have been under Russian/Soviet control for more than half a century, we have gradually come to accept that there is no choice but to find a compromise. Without resolving the territorial dispute between our two countries,
we cannot sign a peace treaty, which is the most important step for both countries in further developing a bilateral partnership, as both governments wish. President Vladimir Putin has referred to achieving a *hikiwake*, a judo term that means a “draw,” and this has raised expectations among the Japanese public that a compromise is possible.

I do not think it is accurate to say that the Japanese government is “not willing to compromise” on the issue. And I believe the same goes for the Russian government, although the diplomatic authorities of both countries are taking a tough stance before the start of negotiations.

The present political situation in the two countries, moreover, is not favorable for advancing territorial negotiations. From this viewpoint, I do not understand the intentions of the Russian prime minister in visiting Etorofu last month. This is not conducive to creating goodwill, and I strongly protest his actions. This will only lead to angering the Japanese people. To change the atmosphere, we need some positive developments in economic cooperation, particularly in energy exploration or new ideas regarding the shipment of fuels. We need high-level dialogue between political leaders, as well as continued discussion and exchange in the private sector.

While I do not expect a breakthrough from the upcoming visit by Foreign Minister Kishida to Moscow, I do hope that both sides will make the effort to take a step forward in the territorial negotiations.

*This article was originally published on the website of the Valdai Discussion Club. It is reprinted here with the permission of the Club.*
The New Security Legislation and Japanese Public Reaction

Satoru Mori

The Abe cabinet succeeded in passing legislation to expand the scope of Japan’s security options in September, but the strength of public opposition was surprising. Satoru Mori urges the government to address the “unilateral pacifist” mindset of the Japanese people and to make a greater effort to convince them of the need to actively defend the embattled international order to ensure continued peace and prosperity.

On September 18, the Diet approved a package of controversial security laws that will come into force in March 2016. The new legislation will help deter aggressive behavior in the region by facilitating more effective cooperation between Japan’s Self-Defense Forces and the military forces of other countries, particularly Japan’s sole alliance partner, the United States, and also open the way for Japan to provide support for UN-sanctioned operations in response to threats to international peace. In these and other ways, it provides the essential legal framework Japan needs in order to defend the international order—and thereby our own peace and prosperity—in the midst of a changing and challenging international environment. The most significant implication of the new legal framework is that it would allow the Japanese government to (1) plan extensively for various types of contingencies and (2) train and equip the SDF accordingly. Planning and training form a significant part of deterrence, and thus the new security legislation opens the way for Japan to proactively contribute to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific and beyond.

However, the dominant impression among Japanese voters seems to be that the legislation is confusing. There is no denying that the language of some of the pro-

---

Satoru Mori  Security Legislation Project Member, Tokyo Foundation; Professor, Faculty of Law; Hosei University.
visions makes them difficult to parse at a glance. The large number of bills submitted to the Diet all at once—10 bills amending provisions of existing laws along with a permanent International Peace Support Bill—added to this impression of complexity, as did the opposition parties’ deliberate focus on a few highly technical provisions during Diet deliberations.

Nevertheless, if we examine the legislation systematically in terms of the kinds of actions permitted in different situations, we find that the content of the laws is neither mystifying nor threatening. One framework that could be used to systematically comprehend the nature and scope of SDF actions would look like this:

- **Use of Force**
  - (1) Under armed attack
  - (2) Threat to survival

- **Support Activities**
  - (3) Important influence on peace and security
  - (4) Collective international response

- **Peacetime Activities**
  - (5) Asset protection
  - (6) International peace cooperation

The four situations—(1) through (4)—are legally defined so as to delineate what the SDF can and cannot do. The following is a brief summary description of the different activities in which the SDF can engage.

**Demystifying the New Legislation**

*Situations in Which the Use of Force Is Permitted*

First, the use of force by the SDF under a defense operations order is restricted to two types of contingencies. The first, a situation in which Japan is “under armed attack,” is consistent with previous policy, meaning that Japan is able to exercise individual self-defense and that the Japan-US Security Treaty would be invoked. The second is a situation that poses a “threat to survival” in which an armed attack has been launched against another country that is in a close relationship with Japan and poses a clear danger of fundamentally overturning the [Japanese] people’s right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” Under these conditions and these
conditions alone will Japan now be able to exercise its right to engage in limited collective self-defense—that is, the use of force in defense of a close friend or ally.

The strategic rationale for permitting participation in collective self-defense in situations that pose a threat to Japan’s existence is to enhance the deterrent capability of the Japan-US alliance by allowing the SDF to coordinate effectively with the US military in the event of a major security crisis on the Korean Peninsula or elsewhere in the region.

While allowing limited participation in collective self-defense, the new laws preserve an exclusively defensive posture by stipulating that an actual armed attack (either on Japan or on a close friend or ally) must occur before Japan is permitted to respond with the use of military force. Moreover, prior Diet approval is required in principle before Japan can participate in limited collective self-defense. Although SDF forces could be mobilized without prior Diet approval in emergency situations, subsequent Diet approval would still be necessary. In this way the law maintains the principle of democratic control over the military.

Situations in Which Support Activities Are Allowed

The laws also provide for the dispatch of SDF units overseas in situations where there are emerging threats to peace that may have an “important influence on Japan’s peace and security” and in taking a “collective international response”—based on a UN resolution—to threats to international peace. However, in these situations, the role of the SDF will be limited to various support activities, search and rescue operations, ship inspection operations, and other noncombat activities in which the use of weapons will be permitted in principle only for purposes of self-preservation.

In terms of the deployment of the SDF for support purposes in these two situations, the legislation envisions the SDF cooperating in the areas of supplies, transportation, repair and maintenance, medical treatment, communications, airport and seaport activities, base support, billeting, storage, and training services (construction services are also envisioned for “collective international response”). The deployment of SDF units overseas under these situations means that Japan will be able to cooperate with other countries to defend the international order and restore peace in the event that the peace of the international community is under threat or attack by a specific power.

Although the SDF will be permitted to provide the kinds of logistic and cooperative support outlined above under “important influence” and “collective international response” situations, it will not be able to engage in such activities inside
of combat zones. If fighting breaks out or is thought likely to break out in the vicinity of such SDF operations, the unit commander is to temporarily suspend activities. Depending on the circumstances, the minister of defense may order the operation terminated.

The new legislation permits the use of weapons by SDF troops involved in overseas support activities, but only when necessary to protect themselves, other SDF personnel, or other people under their supervision, and they may not go beyond what is reasonably required to respond to the situation. In other words, they may use their weapons to expel hostile forces from the area or to protect themselves and others in the area. This will allow the SDF to evacuate while defending themselves and others in the vicinity in the event that the site of activity turns into a combat zone. Thus, while the new legislation expands the range of actions permitted to the SDF, it also establishes rules and mechanisms needed to manage the risks to which SDF troops and others may be exposed as a result.

These provisions address the risks inherent in such activities by enhancing the immediate response and deterrence capability of forces on the ground. Diet authorization is required without exception, moreover, prior to the deployment of SDF forces in “collective international response” situations.

**Peacetime Activities**

Under the new legislation the SDF may use weapons—again, only to the extent necessary—to protect the weapons and other equipment of foreign nations in the event of a compelling request by a military or comparable unit of the United States or other country that has established a cooperative security relationship with Japan and the SDF. This type of asset protection mission will likely prove valuable upon conducting multinational military exercises and combined ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) operations in the future. It should also be noted that asset protection missions are also possible during the situations mentioned above.

In addition, the legislation also allows the SDF to use weapons for the execution of missions in the context of UN peacekeeping operations. The SDF will be
Security Legislation

able to protect local populations who reside in areas where UN peacekeeping operations are carried out, and it will be capable of protecting individuals who are associated with the ongoing operations and other advisory activities. The SDF will also be able to rescue Japanese nationals overseas, premised on the consent of the state in which the rescue operation is to take place and the meeting of certain other conditions.

As the foregoing indicates, a close look at the substance of the new law refutes critics’ charges that it is “war legislation” and that it exposes SDF personnel to unacceptable risks. The process of seeking authorization from the Diet ensures that people’s representatives have final political say over the extent and shape of any SDF involvement in overseas conflicts. The new security legislation is designed to give Japan the latitude to formulate more effective responses to threats to international peace and security that may occur, in concert with the United States and other partners that share our interest in maintaining peace and the international order, while managing the risks involved.

Ostensible Causes of Public Resistance

Unfortunately, the legislation’s advocates were not entirely successful in educating the public as to its purpose and importance. In opinion polls by Japan’s major national newspapers, both before and after the bills’ passage, between 50% and 60% of respondents registered their disapproval, and between 70% and 80% felt that the government’s explanations were insufficient. Government officials, though, responded at length to numerous questions from both the ruling and opposition parties in the course of more than 200 hours of deliberations in the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors. These deliberations were reported in detail by the media. Why, then, was the public left feeling confused and insufficiently informed about the bill?

One factor was the opposition parties’ rather parochial parliamentary tactics, to which the government fell victim. They zeroed in relentlessly on abstruse technicalities without proposing viable alternatives and avoided any discussion of the larger strategic issues at stake.

Another factor was the nature of the media coverage. When a government official stumbled in the course of such questioning, the media would seize gleefully on the gaffe, playing the video over and over until the public lost faith in the ruling party and the government and became convinced that the legislation was too arcane and confusing for even the minister of defense to explain.

A third factor—timing—may have compounded the bills’ image problems. The
Security Legislation

bulk of the deliberations took place in August, when television stations were marking the seventieth anniversary of the end of World War II with programs and movies recalling the war and its devastation. Amid this general atmosphere of remorse over the past and determination never again to wage war, the opposition was able to play on the public’s fears and suspicions by labeling the bills “war legislation.”

The Postwar Japanese Psyche

Still, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that something deeper and more fundamental prevented the bills from winning the understanding and active support from even a bare majority of the people. It may be that the bills’ advocates failed to recognize and clearly address the basic premises underlying the pacifism that the Japanese people have embraced since World War II. For this reason, they failed to dispel fears and suspicions rooted in this uniquely Japanese view of peace—doubts that stood in the way of an objective understanding and acceptance of the new legislation and its purpose.

The first of these doubts and fears is the straightforward concern that broadening the legal scope of the SDF’s activities heightens the danger of Japan’s waging another war, with all its attendant horrors. Put simply, this is a basic suspicion of military power and its use derived from history. Japan once plunged into a war of aggression, as a result of which countless people suffered and died. The determination never to wage war again is a widespread sentiment among the Japanese people, who renew that commitment each August, when bitter memories of the war are summoned once again. This memory has led the Japanese to psychologically equate the flexible use of military power with war. This makes it more difficult for the Japanese public to appreciate the strategic logic that military effectiveness could help deter war.

The second concern is the fear of becoming embroiled or entangled in others’ conflicts. Japan is a formal ally of the United States, whose military presence extends throughout the world. A segment of the Japanese public fears that, if cooperative ties between the SDF and the US military are strengthened, Japan would come under pressure to make a military contribution to any conflict in which the United States became involved elsewhere—including instances of military intervention—even if Japan’s own security and interests were not at stake. They see Article 9 of the Constitution as a bulwark that has allowed them to resist such pressure from the United States; once the government loosens the constraints of Article 9, they fear, Japan will have no means of resisting US demands to intervene in conflicts around the world.
The third fear is that, by loosening the constraints of Article 9 and permitting even limited collective self-defense, Japan will exacerbate tensions in the region and heighten the risk of war—whereas (they believe) peace would certainly prevail if Japan simply maintained the status quo. Underlying this fear, it would seem, is a tacit assumption that Japan’s actions alone determine whether peace prevails in the region. In other words, there are those who believe that the Constitution and the existing interpretation of Article 9 are the sole determinants of peace in the region, not paying any heed to the role played by the SDF and the alliance.

When the Japanese government embraced a constitutional interpretation prohibiting the use of force except in the event of a direct attack on Japan by a foreign state, it did so predicated on the understanding that its ally the United States would use its unparalleled military might to defend Japan from aggression. On the one hand, this interpretation of Article 9 helped foster among the Japanese a fairly widespread acceptance of the necessity of the Japan-US alliance, as attested by the results of numerous public opinion polls. But a certain segment of the Japanese public appears to have lost sight of the key role US forward deployment and extended deterrence have played in preserving peace by deterring the use of military force against Japan. Ironically, the people came to believe that Japan itself had single-handedly preserved peace through its adherence to an interpretation of Article 9 that strictly prohibited Japan’s participation in collective self-defense. The natural corollary of this passive, unilateral pacifism—which amounts to a kind of postwar Japanese exceptionalism—is a deep suspicion of military power per se.

In recent months, some scholars have attempted to legitimize such concerns by claiming that the new security legislation illustrates a “security dilemma”—the notion that actions taken by a state to improve its own security can have the paradoxical effect of heightening tensions by causing other states to step up defense measures in response. They argue that by changing the government’s interpretation of the Constitution and taking legislative steps to strengthen the Japan-US alliance, Japan itself is altering the status quo in a way that threatens to disrupt peace in the region. Of course, this completely ignores the realities of our security situation today—failing, for example, to address the issue of China’s burgeoning military capability, threatening behavior, and its expressed intention to alter the status quo to achieve its claims in the East and the South China Seas.

**Confronting Unilateral Pacifism**

At the heart of the Japanese public’s fears and suspicions of legislation to expand the scope of the SDF’s activities lies this unique Japanese view of peace, rooted in
bitter memories of the war and the “passive, unilateral pacifism” that took root in an environment of heavy reliance on US military force under a strict interpretation of Article 9. The answer is not to belittle such fears or disparage them as the products of narrow-minded ideological dogma but to accept those deep-rooted concerns as a fundamental reality of Japanese society and address them directly through persistent dialogue, even after the bills have passed.

There is no question that Japan must stand by the commitment to peace articulated in Article 9. But as the security environment surrounding Japan has changed, so have the means required to preserve the peace. Theoretically, a number of different options are available to us in pursuit of that goal, but not all of them offer a realistic chance of achieving it. Unless Japan adapts to the realities of today’s changing security environment, it will find the peace it claims to value increasingly elusive.

The fundamental task facing our government leaders and security policy experts is to talk to the Japanese people patiently and persistently and convince them that, given the realities confronting Japan today, continued adherence to unilateral pacifism actually puts the cause of peace at risk—that, to the contrary, the key to peace lies in the ability and willingness of the Japanese nation to adapt to a changing international environment.

The majority of the Japanese public appears to understand the need for and the rationale of the new security legislation; their reluctance to support the legislation wholeheartedly appears to be rooted in the anxieties and fears associated with expanding the scope of SDF activities. Therefore, it is not sufficient simply to defend the necessity of each new security bill and policy as it arises. The government must rise to the larger challenge of addressing the fears and doubts stemming from their core, fundamental belief in unilateral pacifism.

**Domestic Reassurance**

Reassuring the people is a vitally important task for any democratic government. In this case, the Japanese government’s success or failure in this endeavor will determine whether Japan can adapt its security policies to a changing international environment. To reassure the people regarding the recently passed legislation, the government needs to do the following.

First, every prime minister should deliver a comprehensive defense policy speech to address the first concern mentioned above—that a broader role for the SDF might lead Japan into waging war. The prime minister should delineate his views on the purposes that the SDF should fulfill and the need for deterrence in
Security Legislation

concrete terms, and he should state clearly that Japan will never use its military for purposes of aggression as in the past. To be sure, the new security legislation the prime minister sought has been voted into law, but the government’s efforts to reassure the Japanese people on a constant, ongoing basis will determine its ability to secure the public’s support for the deployment of the SDF in the event of a crisis situation.

Second, in order to address the second type of fear mentioned above—that Japan will be drawn into an American armed intervention overseas—our top officials need to speak in concrete terms regarding the implications of various international issues for Japan’s own security so as to instill an awareness of Japan’s own independent stake in maintaining the existing international order. We need to abandon the mindset of “standing behind the United States because we owe it our allegiance as an ally.” The Japanese public needs to develop a habit of assessing the country’s policy toward international developments in the light of their potential impact on Japanese security. Having raised the people’s awareness of such issues in advance, the government will be in a better position to persuade the public, in the event of a joint action with the United States and others, that Japan is making an independent decision grounded in its own interests. Such a narrative must be built on an ongoing basis to allow the Japanese people to make a more realistic appraisal of the state of international affairs.

Third, to address concerns that the new security legislation will have the paradoxical effect of exacerbating international tensions, the government needs to set forth a comprehensive security strategy to deal with today’s changing international environment and delineate the role the SDF and the Japan-US alliance play within that overarching strategy. Now that the new security legislation has been enacted, it is time to outline an integrated strategy for promoting peace and prosperity, spanning the entire spectrum of external policy—from diplomacy and defense to economics, trade, and development assistance—and explain the role expanded SDF operations have to play within that strategy. This will help relieve anxieties over the expansion of SDF activities by making it clear that military capability is just one aspect of a much larger effort by Japan to adapt to a changing security environment.

While a main pillar of Japan’s China strategy might be deterrence through enhancement of the Japan-US alliance and the SDF, the government should, for example, also detail efforts at engagement in the economic and social spheres, as well as diplomatic initiatives aimed at encouraging China to take the path of dialogue and negotiation, as opposed to unilateral action challenging the status quo.
A Proactive Internationalist Vision

Thus far, domestic debate over Japanese security policy—erupting each time Japan finds itself under international political pressure to contribute more to global security—has centered on the same old legalistic and emotionalistic arguments. The recently passed legislation triggered similar debates, with the bills’ opponents citing everything from constitutional and procedural issues to international security theory.

The surge of public interest in national security issues is to be welcomed, especially in a country where domestic economic, social, and welfare issues tend to overshadow other voter concerns. Unfortunately, none of the arguments coming from the opposition parties addressed the upheavals roiling the international system and the challenge Japan faces in maintaining its own peace and security in the midst of these changes.

The distinguished political scientist Masataka Kosaka once stated that Japanese foreign policy “should aim not simply to preserve Japan’s security but to preserve it in a manner consistent with Japanese values.” He argued that the Japanese needed to be more conscious of the importance of “working to build the kind of international order that reflects our own national values.” Japan’s foremost national value is peace and prosperity for all, and the country has worked diligently toward this goal over the past 70 years.

The source of Japan’s peace and prosperity has already expanded its reach around the globe. The public must come to the realization that Japan will never be a “peace state” in any meaningful sense of the term as long as we persist in viewing international security as a matter of standing behind the United States and shirking the risks and responsibilities of actively protecting the international order on which peace rests. If Japan wishes to uphold the ideal of peace enshrined in Article 9 as a Japanese value, it must work to build and maintain an international order that supports that ideal by assessing and responding to international affairs soberly and strategically, with Japan’s own security interests in mind.

To cope with the challenges of today’s turbulent international environment, Japan needs to make the transition from the passive mindset of unilateral pacifism to a more proactive internationalist vision of the world order. This shift in consciousness will not occur overnight, but now is the time to lay the foundation. In this context, it would be a mistake to consider the controversy over the new legislation at an end, now that the bills have passed. Rather, we should view it as the beginning of a national dialogue on the best way for Japan to pursue the ideal of peace while responding to a rapidly changing international environment.
cherishing our deep feelings of remorse for the past, we must raise our eyes to the horizon and prepare to confront the complex problems looming there with realism and persistent vigilance.
There was very little debate on the actual substance of Japan’s recently enacted security legislation, despite the uproar it caused at home and abroad. Senior Fellow Noboru Yamaguchi provides an analysis of the provisions from a perspective closer to on-the-ground operations with reference to the new Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation, which sets the parameters for cooperation between the US military and the SDF.

* * *

In spite of the great commotion caused by Japan’s new security legislation, the content of the bills remained largely opaque to most people. The provisions are quite technical, and the government did not do a very good job of communicating their significance. Diet debate—which many complained was inadequate—focused narrowly on the wording of the provisions for specific contingencies and on their constitutionality. Critics have sought to build up opposition by labeling the bills “war legislation” and appealing to the public’s pacifist tendencies, but such name-calling served only to thwart serious debate on what the bills actually would enable Japan to do.

The tendency of the government to resort to legalese is quite understandable, given its need to explain the technical details of the proposed amendments and new stipulations. But it might be profitable to look at things from a perspective closer to on-the-ground operations. The new Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation, released in April 2015, represent the results of high-level deliberations with officials responsible for US military strategy and have been compiled from an operational perspective. Reference to this document, which sets the parameters for cooperation between the US military and Japan’s Self-Defense Forces, would be
extremely useful in terms of abetting an understanding of why the provisions were worded the way they were.

The new guidelines are organized into eight sections, of which Parts IV and V lay out concrete measures that might be carried out during operations involving SDF and US troops. These are Section IV, “ Seamlessly Ensuring Japan’s Peace and Security,” and Section V “ Cooperation for Regional and Global Peace and Security.” The relevant parts of these sections are as follows:

IV-A. Cooperative Measures from Peacetime
IV-B. Responses to Emerging Threats to Japan’s Peace and Security
IV-C. Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against Japan
IV-D. Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against a Country Other than Japan
IV-E. Cooperation in Response to a Large-Scale Disaster in Japan
V-A. Cooperation in International Activities (UN Peacekeeping Operations etc.)
V-B. Trilateral and Multilateral Cooperation

Sections IV-A through IV-E deal with responses to threats to Japan’s security. For example, IV-B widens the geographical scope of emergencies described as “situations in surrounding areas” in earlier versions of the guidelines, while IV-D defines the limited situations in which the right of collective defense might apply. By contrast, Sections V-A and V-B focus on how Japan and the United States will work together for the peace and security of the international community.

With the exception of Section IV-E, which outlines responses to large-scale disasters, the sections appear to be differentiated in terms of the levels of the potential use of weapons and military force. The figure below categorizes the actions treated in Sections IV-A though IV-D and Section V into differently colored zones according to the level of force they may involve: the bottom zone involving no use of force, the middle zone involving the use of weapons mostly for law enforcement, and the top zone involving military force. Some of the peacetime scenarios dealt with in Section IV-A may also involve the use of weapons in some scenarios, including responding to ballistic missile attacks and protecting assets.

The situation calling for the highest level of force involves a response to an armed attack on Japan. Article 88 of the Self-Defenses Law allows the SDF to use force “to the limit necessary for protecting the country” when a defense operations order is issued and conditions for the exercise of the right of self-defense are met. This kind of scenario, which under international law is regarded as an exercise of
the right of individual self-defense, is the only case in which Japan can use military force.

The part of the guidelines that deals with the right of collective self-defense—which has been the focus of debate on the latest revisions to the national security law—comes in Section IV-D, “Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against a Country Other than Japan.” As the government has repeatedly explained, this right is limited only to such situations as when an attack “threatens Japan’s survival.” In other words, the situations in which this right would apply are very similar to the cases where the use of force for individual self-defense is permitted, such as a direct armed attack on Japan. The new legislation merely extends this right to situations that are more difficult to describe as relevant to the right of individual self-defense under international law.

In assessing the legitimacy of any use of force, I believe that the extent of international consensus required provides a useful measure. The bold line in the figure shows what level of international support is necessary for the use of force in various situations. Under the UN Charter, the use of force requiring the highest level of international support involves cases of collective security, such as when a UN force is created by the international community to drive out an aggressor. Article
Security Legislation

51 of the UN Charter acknowledges the right of individual or collective defense “until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security” as a second-best measure in cases where a UN response is not quick enough to defuse the situation. The recent legislation in Japan makes no supposition of any use of armed force in a case involving Japanese participation in a UN force, and the scenarios envisaged go no further than the yellow areas in the figure (use of weapons, limited use of force).

In cases involving the deployment of a UN force, the agreement of the entire international community, including all the permanent members of the Security Council, is required, which gives such actions a high level of legitimacy. In the case of collective self-defense, there needs to be a request from the party to be assisted, meaning that this will be based on an agreement between at least two countries—the one providing assistance and the one requesting it. No such conditions exist in the case of the right of individual self-defense, in which military force is exercised based solely on the decision of the country that has come under military attack (or deems such an attack to be imminent). We can therefore organize the three cases as follows: collective security requires the broadest consensus, individual self-defense requires the least, and collective self-defense somewhere in between.

The new security legislation does not go so far as to enable the SDF to engage in collective security arrangements as members of a UN force, but it does increase the options available short of such participation. For example, authorizing the SDF to use weapons to protect another country’s units or to carry out their missions during UN peacekeeping operations would open up the possibility of taking part in a broader range of missions, including those in which such a need could arise. As the figure shows, what is really new in the latest legislation is that it allows the limited exercise of the right of collective self-defense and that it geographically expands the areas where the SDF may be deployed to “situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security,” rather than just “situations in areas surrounding Japan.”

There are other changes providing for a greater range of concrete options that Japan may take that are within the parameters of the earlier constitutional interpretation and legal restrictions. For example IV-A, “Cooperative Measures from Peacetime,” specifies that the US and Japan “will provide mutual protection of each other’s assets if engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan in a cooperative manner.” This is asset protection. This gives the SDF the right to use weapons to protect firearms and other military equipment through an extension of the thinking that has been in place for some time.

To make the debate over the security legislation more fruitful, it is important
to look at concrete examples of possible scenarios. It is also necessary to under-
stand the position that such examples occupy within the overall framework of 
Japan’s national security policy.

In that sense, the new guidelines provide a comprehensive vision that covers 
everything from peacetime to national emergencies and international cooperation, 
making it a relatively easy way to understand where each of the individual argu-
ments stands in terms of the overall picture.
Abe’s Hollow Victory?

Public Uproar over Collective Self-Defense

Katsuyuki Yakushiji

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe achieved a cherished policy goal with the September 19, 2015, passage of security legislation revising the ground rules for military engagement. In the process, however, he triggered a major public backlash, underscoring the strength of the nation’s attachment to its pacifist Constitution. Katsuyuki Yakushiji weighs the costs and benefits of Abe’s legislative victory.

* * *

On September 19, the Diet passed a package of security bills that loosen constraints on Japan’s military and open the way to limited participation in collective self-defense, one of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s key policy objectives.

Passage of the bills came after days of fierce clashes between the ruling and opposition parties, climaxing in the early hours of Saturday morning. Deliberations in the Diet turned chaotic while tens of thousands of protesters chanted outside and news helicopters whirred overhead.

It was the first time in recent memory that a piece of national legislation had triggered such an uproar, not merely within the Diet but more widely among the general public. Although the security bills concerned issues seemingly remote from people’s everyday lives, they turned out to be highly divisive.

The new legislation is controversial because it permits Japan to engage in collective self-defense, albeit under very limited conditions. What this means is that the government can deploy the Self-Defense Forces to assist an ally in combat operations overseas, even if Japan itself is not under attack. Opponents argue that under the new laws, Japan could end up participating in an attack on another country in clear violation of the postwar Constitution.

Katsuyuki Yakushiji  Senior Associate, Tokyo Foundation; Professor, Toyo University.
What Do the New Laws Change?

In the wake of defeat in World War II, the nation adopted a pacifist Constitution that renounced the use of force to settle international disputes. This national commitment never again to wage war has been a basic premise of postwar Japanese government for almost seven decades. Although this has not prevented Japan from maintaining the SDF, strict constraints have been imposed on its scope and mode of activity.

Seen in this light, the new legislation marks a major turning point in Japanese security policy. But how exactly will it change things? Let us begin by reviewing the provisions at issue.

The Legislation for Peace and Security, as the government has named it, consists of 10 separate laws, whose key provisions do the following:

1. Provide greater latitude to the SDF in providing logistic, medical, and other rear-area support for US and other foreign armed forces in situations that have a major impact on Japan’s security.
2. Permit SDF support for UN peacekeeping operations and other internationally coordinated peace and security operations, including previously prohibited “police-like” missions.
3. Permit the deployment of SDF personnel to rescue Japanese nationals abroad in the event that their lives are endangered by armed conflict, terrorism, etc.
4. Permit the use of force by the SDF even if Japan is not under direct attack, in the event that a country in a close relationship with Japan is under armed attack and Japan’s safety is threatened as a result (limited collective self-defense).

Most countries incorporate such latitude into their security policies as a matter of course. But for decades the Japanese people were told that under their war-re-nouncing Constitution, the Self-Defense Forces existed solely to protect the peace.
and security of the people within the confines of their own territory (including territorial waters and air space). This is why many now find it difficult to accept the idea of the SDF playing a more open-ended role in war zones around the world.

**Individual and Collective Self-Defense**

Article 9 of the Constitution begins, “Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.” This seems a clear enough prohibition on the use of military force overseas.

The second paragraph continues, “To accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.” Taken at face value, paragraph 2 would seem to deny Japan the right even to maintain its own armed forces. However, the government has long taken the position that the Constitution does not deny Japan the right to defend itself from attack and that the SDF is constitutional as long as its sole purpose is self-defense.

One way in which the government reassured people inside and outside of Japan that the SDF would not overstep these bounds was by maintaining a sharp distinction between individual and collective self-defense. According to the government’s interpretation, Article 9 permitted Japan to engage in individual self-defense but not collective self-defense. In other words, it had a natural right to use force to repel a direct attack by another country, but it did not have the right to use force to protect or aid an ally if Japan itself was not under direct attack. This interpretation placed limits on the size and type of Japan’s military capability and reinforced the prohibition on the use of force overseas. The interpretation of Article 9 as prohibiting collective self-defense has been a defining feature of Japan’s security policy under every previous postwar administration.

However, in July 2014, the Abe government issued a cabinet decision (“Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan’s Survival and Protect its People”) that loosened the interpretation of Article 9 to permit the limited exercise of the right of collective self-defense. Armed with this new interpretation, the cabinet drafted legislation (one of the laws passed on September 19) that would allow the SDF to engage in overseas combat under the following conditions:

(1) An armed attack has been launched against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan, threatening Japan’s survival and presenting a
clear danger to the Japanese people’s fundamental right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

(2) There are no other appropriate means available to repel the attack.
(3) Use of force is limited to the minimum degree necessary.

The government may deploy the SDF overseas to engage in military action only if these three rigorous conditions are met.

**Sidestepping the Constitution**

Arguing the need for new legislation, the government pointed out that Japan’s security environment had changed fundamentally since the Constitution had come into effect. It made the case that Japan needed a new legal framework adapted to such pressing realities as the modernization and expansion of the Chinese military, North Korea’s development and testing of nuclear weapons and missiles, the spread of terrorism around the globe, and the relative decline of US power. It claimed that by broadening the scope of SDF activities, including joint exercises carried out with US forces, the new laws would strengthen the Japan-US alliance and provide a more potent deterrent to aggressive behavior by other countries in the region.

A substantial number of experts, commentators, and voters agreed, stressing the need for new policies in the face of China’s efforts to expand control over the South and East China Sea in violation of international law. But such practical policy considerations did not quell the growing furor over the government’s bid to reinterpret the Constitution by fiat.

Opponents charged that the so-called Peace and Security Law was actually war legislation designed to open the door to SDF involvement in war; that participation in collective self-defense was a violation of the Constitution; and that, if the legislation passed, Japan would become embroiled in American conflicts.

The legal argument proved particularly potent. Successive cabinets have consistently taken the position that collective self-defense is prohibited under Article 9. If collective self-defense is unconstitutional, then the only way to make it legal is by amending the Constitution. Critics warned that the precedent of nullifying such a longstanding and accepted interpretation with a single cabinet decision would undermine the stability of the Constitution as the law of the land. The government could offer no satisfactory answer to this objection.

As a consequence, the bills came under fire from legal experts nationwide, including constitutional scholars, former chiefs of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau, and former Supreme Court justices. Many scholars signed petitions opposing the bills.
Security Legislation

Broad-based Backlash

Another notable feature of the recent protests was the degree of spontaneous involvement by university students and other young people. These were not, for the most part, people affiliated with and mobilized by any particular organization or party. They were simply concerned young people who received and spread the word via social media and gathered outside the Diet Building in numbers Japan has not seen since the early 1970s.

These protesters were afraid that the legislation could propel Japan into another war. But above all, they were outraged that the prime minister had bypassed the prescribed democratic procedures for amending the Constitution and had reinterpreted a key provision by cabinet decision. The political methods Abe used to pursue his goals ended up galvanizing a broad cross-section of the nation to action.

Notwithstanding the breadth and intensity of this backlash, Abe’s new legislation is unlikely to usher in dramatic changes in the quantity and quality of SDF activity overseas in the foreseeable future. The three conditions noted above constitute a high hurdle to participation in combat operations in the name of collective self-defense. In fact, the type of scenario envisioned seems unlikely in the extreme. Some in the Defense Ministry have dismissed the most controversial portion of the legislation as something that is unlikely ever to be put into effect.

Meanwhile, Prime Minister Abe could end up paying a high price for his nominal victory. In public opinion polls, between 70% and 80% of respondents said they opposed the new security laws. For the time being, though, the Abe government’s approval rating has remained relatively stable.

And while the government was channeling its energy into passage of unpopular security legislation, its vaunted campaign to revitalize the economy was losing momentum, raising doubts as to the long-term efficacy of Abenomics. Soon after passage, the prime minister returned to his economic agenda, reshuffling his cabinet and announcing a fresh set of goals for his growth strategy, including boosting gross domestic product to ¥600 trillion and raising the nation’s total fertility rate to 1.8 in a bid to build a “society in which all 100 million people are actively engaged.” How these goals will be achieved, though, has yet to be spelled out.
The security-related legislation submitted by the government of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has become very controversial, both in Japan and elsewhere. People are wondering why such bills were introduced, whether Abe intends to turn Japan into a military power and expand the boundaries of self-defense, and why so many people in Japan are against them.

The legislation has two main objectives: (1) to secure Japan’s peace and integrity and (2) contribute to international peace and stability. The following gives a brief overview of the bills and their aims.

*          *          *

The securing of Japan’s peace and integrity has grown in importance due to the fundamental transformation of the security environment in recent years. This can clearly be seen in the shifting balance of power, particularly in Asia, rapid advances in technological innovation, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the rise in terrorist attacks and cyber threats. The legislation is aimed at addressing these developments.

At the same time they are premised on the thinking that no country can secure its peace by itself alone; in Japan’s case, it has relied on and will continue to maintain its alliance with the United States. In this context, the bills have two focuses.

One is for the Self-Defense Forces to provide logistic support for foreign forces in situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s security. Another is to introduce the concept of the right for collective self-defense, which the government had long interpreted as being prohibited by Article 9 of the Constitution.

With regard to the latter, in July 2014 the Japanese government decided to change its constitutional interpretation, but the exercise of the right for collective
Security Legislation

Self-defense is allowed in very limited situations, such as an armed attack against a foreign naval vessel (belonging to the US Navy, for example) in waters close to Japan that poses a threat to Japan’s survival.

* * *

The second component of the legislation—contributing to world peace and stability—is an important pillar of Japan’s foreign policy. The international community has indicated its desire for Japan to shoulder a bigger security burden, and Abe sought to honor such requests by announcing in his policy speech before the Diet that he would promote Japan’s proactive contributions to international peace.

Two different activities are envisioned by this. One is related to the expansion or easing of restrictions in the use of arms during UN peacekeeping operations. Another is the provision of logistic support when collectively addressing a situation that threatens international peace and security, based on a UN resolution or other international consensus.

* * *

Prime Minister Abe certainly does not intend to make Japan a military power. It is only in response to the transformation of the security environment that he felt the need to make the Japan-US alliance more functional and to promote collaboration with strategic partners. Japan, after all, has not changed its exclusively defense-oriented posture, and there has been no significant increase in the defense budget for 20 years.

The expansion of the boundaries of self-defense to include the exercise of collective self-defense is extremely limited, as mentioned above; still, it is much narrower than the right most other countries enjoy. It has, moreover, nothing to do with Russia; in fact, there is every possibility of Japan providing logistic support to Russian forces, for example, during UN peace-keeping operations and within other international peace support frameworks.

* * *

The phenomenon of so many Japanese people protesting the legislation is quite curious and is no doubt related to the change in the interpretation of Article 9. The article reads as follows:
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

The article was the basis for the controversy surrounding the Self-Defense Forces. The constitutionality of the SDF has been firmly established by assigning it an exclusively defensive role, though, preventing it from being used as “means of settling international disputes.” The SDF’s activities and operations are severely restricted; moreover, its participation in collective defense arrangements that may lead to taking military action in foreign countries had been prohibited.

The government’s reinterpretation of Article 9 eases this prohibition for a very limited number of cases. The new legislation has nonetheless triggered a strong backlash among those who criticize it as being unconstitutional. While the bills merely call for procedural changes, critics have begun calling them “war bills” and have incited a public uproar.

The government should have explained that the bills have many other important objectives, but the prime minister chose to focus on the right of collective self-defense, even though this right is very narrowly circumscribed. To make matters worse, the legislation is very complex with many gray zones, raising suspicions that it was intended to enable Japan to wage war.

Deliberations on the bills that are now starting in the upper house could dispel such suspicions and lead to a more balanced understanding of the legislation. Toward that end, the government should seek the cooperation and support of a number of opposition parties. This would also contribute to a better understanding of Abe’s initiative among foreign countries.
FOREIGN AID POLICY

September 9, 2015

Rethinking Japan’s Foreign Aid

Widening the Scope of Assistance from a Security Perspective

The Tokyo Foundation

FOREWORD¹
(To the English summary of the Policy Proposal)

Foreign aid has been called Japan’s “most important foreign policy tool.” It forms the basis for our influence among the world’s developing countries and is said to play a pivotal role in our diplomatic activities. But changing circumstances, including our own fiscal constraints, have made it imperative for Japan to make more effective use of economic assistance and other resources by creatively combining them in pursuit of common foreign-policy objectives.

In the following summary of our policy proposals, we make the case for an overarching foreign aid policy that requires expanding the areas of peace-building assistance beyond the confines of traditional development cooperation to incorporate a broader range of tools. To achieve this, we outline nine specific policy recommendations.

August 2015

Masahiro Akiyama
President, Tokyo Foundation

OVERVIEW

Japan has an important role to play in support of international peace, stability, and prosperity. For decades now, Japan’s contribution to international society has focused overwhelmingly on support for economic and social development via official development assistance (ODA). Henceforth Japan needs to further broaden the scope of its overseas activities, especially in relation to international security. We

¹ The original (full) version of the report in Japanese was published in October 2014. It is available at: http://www.tkfd.or.jp/files/doc/2014-03.pdf
are facing ever-diversifying security threats, partly due to globalization—including piracy, violent extremism, large-scale natural disasters, and epidemics, in addition to the armed conflicts of the past—that possibly may negate the development gains of recent years. Moreover, international peace and stability is essential to the well-being of our country.

In its National Security Strategy (NSS) and Japan Revitalization Strategy, the government of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has identified the creation of an international environment favorable to Japan a national goal. Recognizing the importance of foreign aid as a policy tool for achieving this goal, the government also formulated a new Development Cooperation Charter, approved by the cabinet in February 2015. But achieving such a challenging objective in today’s rapidly changing world requires a more focused use of resources and a comprehensive framework that integrates the entire range of foreign aid tools at our disposal. Thus, to facilitate Japan’s engagement in the tasks required for international peace and stability, we have drawn up the following policy recommendations.

**SUMMARY OF PROPOSALS**

**Building the Foundation for a Comprehensive Approach**

**Proposal 1** To better address the issues of international peace and security, Japan’s peace-building initiatives should be expanded to encompass activities under every relevant policy area, from economic and social development to diplomacy and security. The government should begin erecting a framework for a truly “comprehensive approach” to unify policy goals and guidelines across government agencies and facilitate operational cooperation in the field.

Until now, Japan has placed peace-building activities under the rubric of economic and social development assistance and has limited such activities, narrowly targeting conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction. But security has multiple dimensions and requires wide-ranging support in every sector. This echoes the notion referred to in the National Security Strategy calling for a framework to facilitate “seamless assistance in security-related areas,” combining various modes of assistance. It is time to act on that policy, and to do so, the government needs to go beyond the calls for greater interagency cooperation and to promote the “All Japan approach” currently being advanced in the field. The Japanese government should also consider extending the scope of its peace-building assistance for fragile and unstable states.
Proposition 2 We recognize the fact that development and regional stability issues are becoming ever more closely intertwined. In order for the government to better respond to the challenges ahead, an office of peace building and international security should be created within the National Security Council—the central organ for orchestrating a comprehensive approach—to coordinate economic aid and SDF operations abroad.

We call on the government to create an administrative unit within the National Security Council to oversee cooperation in the areas of peace building and international security, including overseas activities of the Self Defense Forces (SDF) like peacekeeping, counter-piracy and other multinational operations, HA/DR (humanitarian assistance and disaster relief), and capacity building. Where applicable, the use of ODA and other forms of assistance should be examined closely at this level to attain multiplier effects. The unit should be given the capability and authority to coordinate interagency policy in relation to national and regional strategies that are drawn up on the basis of long-term analyses of the internal and external situation; to specify the resources needed to put those strategies into effect; and to establish priorities for the allocation of resources and guidelines for their use.

Enhancing the Impact of Japan’s Peace-Building Assistance

Proposition 3 The development and pooling of civilians equipped to provide security-related assistance is an urgent priority for Japan. As part of this effort, the current Foreign Ministry program for human resources development in the area of peace building, which is earmarked for expansion, should train civilians to work effectively with law-enforcement and security personnel in the field. At the same time, steps should be taken to create an environment conducive to routine communication between the aid community and the security sector, both at the policymaking level and in the field.

Anticipating that peace-building personnel may be called on to work collaboratively with law-enforcement and military officials, Japan needs to develop a pool of trained civilians equipped with a cross-sectoral grasp of security and development issues. They should also have a good understanding of the legal bases and constraints, and operational formats governing the SDF. Furthermore, the government should step up its efforts to build active collaborative mechanisms between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) as well as between the Ministry of Defense and the SDF so as to cultivate a
shared culture of respect and working together. Facilitating joint planning and field operations will also benefit both communities to enhance field situational awareness and risk management, and in streamlining evacuation procedures.

**Proposal 4** For each overseas SDF mission, a foreign policy and development advisor should be appointed to provide diplomatic support. Having such political advisors at the field level would serve to strengthen information-sharing and collaboration between the SDF and diplomatic personnel. They could also help clarify the foreign-policy relevance and rationale of the SDF’s activities and provide diplomatic advices in external relations for the SDF mission commander.

In July 2014, the government established the new post of vice-minister of defense for international affairs to strengthen defense diplomacy functions within the Ministry of Defense. This is an important step in properly communicating Japanese defense policies abroad and promoting top-level security cooperation. However, we believe that to support the SDF’s international engagements, there is also a need for lower-level political counselors or senior political advisors for each deployment to provide direct diplomatic and foreign-policy support to SDF mission commanders. Such support is needed as the mission commander is the sole or one of very few representatives for Japan (when there is no diplomatic presence) in field operations.

**Proposal 5** Japan’s defense installation in Djibouti should be assigned a broader role to support regional security. It can uphold such functions and serve as a supply base for SDF operations in providing emergency humanitarian aid, disaster relief, peacekeeping, and reconstruction assistance in Africa. Furthermore, the government should move swiftly to institute and fund an operable system of civil-affairs programs by the SDF.

As a part of international counter-piracy efforts off the Horn of Africa, Japan maintains a base in Djibouti for the purpose of conducting aerial surveillance and early warning operations. Going forward, this installation should be assigned broader functions as a supply base for SDF operations in the provision of emergency humanitarian aid, disaster relief, peacekeeping, and reconstruction assistance in Africa. Also, as a point of entry to the region, the facility can serve as a center of SDF pre-deployment training and capacity-building programs, a coordination hub with aid personnel, and for the rescue and evacuation of Japanese civilians (that is, noncombatant evacuation operations), and a point for information sharing and security cooperation with the United States, France, the EU and other partners. In
**FOREIGN AID POLICY**

order to maintain and advance SDF operations, it is imperative that the SDF start providing civil-affairs programs for the local community. The Japanese government should establish a flexible system and funding scheme so that deployed forces can initiate such programs with the approval of the Japanese ambassador and the SDF commanding officer in the field. It could well be linked to regional ODA projects and could help Japan build and maintain ties in the host region, thereby strengthening Japan’s international presence.

**Developing Non-ODA Peace-Building Tools**

**Proposal 6** *We strongly urge the government to begin instituting new, more flexible mechanisms of economic cooperation and linking such aid with its security cooperation policies. It should also expand its interpretation of the principles governing Japanese ODA to permit aid for infrastructure with the potential for dual civilian-military use.*

We believe that Japan should remain faithful to its longstanding postwar commitment to peace and to the principle that “any use of ODA for military purposes or for aggravation of internal conflicts should be avoided.” At the same time, we must recognize the fact that public resources in developing countries may be heavily concentrated in the law-enforcement and military branches, and that any effective aid program needs to take into account the role such agencies play in the delivery of disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, and other activities to assist and protect civilians. For this reason, Japan should consider developing mechanisms for non-ODA economic cooperation applicable to situations and purposes outside the scope of current practices. In addition, the government should relax its interpretation of the abovementioned principle to allow the use of ODA for the development of infrastructure with the potential for dual civilian-military use, such as airport runways.

**Proposal 7** *To support efforts for regional stability, the efficacy of the capacity-building assistance programs carried out by the Defense Ministry and the SDF needs to be enhanced. Changes in the legal infrastructure, including amendments to the Act for the Establishment of the Ministry of Defense, will be necessary to enhance the design and implementation of these projects and allow for the transfer of needed equipment.*

Japan’s capacity-building assistance differs from that of the United States and Eu-
European countries in that it is not geared to building recipients’ capacity to conduct combat operations. Instead, it is oriented to such goals as enabling “recipient countries to contribute to the stability and improvement of the international security environment” targeting such areas as HA/DR, maritime security, military medicine, and UN peacekeeping operations. To enhance the effectiveness of such assistance, Japan needs to revise its legal infrastructure to incorporate capacity building among the official duties of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF. It should also design a system for a careful, ongoing review of capacity-building projects to ensure that they do not have such unintended consequences as fueling regional tensions or supporting government oppression against its own people.

Proposal 8 The new “Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology” has opened the way for the transfer of defense equipment needed to preserve the stability of the region. Japan should begin laying the foundation for measures (such as grants, loans, and operational support) to assist other countries in the acquisition of costly defense equipment.

“The Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology,” approved by the cabinet in April 2014, have opened the way for the transfer of defense equipment for purposes of international security cooperation, including UN peacekeeping, anti-terrorism, and anti-piracy operations, as well as to help enhance the security capabilities of developing countries. This has greatly expanded the scope of Japan’s potential contribution to international security by permitting the transfer of equipment deemed consistent with peaceful purposes. It has also made possible the export of equipment to be used for cooperation in search and rescue, transport, early warning, surveillance, and minesweeping with close, like-minded countries. One stumbling block is cost. Keeping in mind the region’s growing challenges, including the defense of sea lanes, the government should examine the possibilities for providing public and private forms of financial assistance to purchasing countries.

Looking Ahead: Formulating the Principles for Comprehensive Cooperation

Proposal 9 Japan’s foreign aid should provide meaningful support geared to the two basic goals of human security, namely, “freedom from want” and “freedom from fear.” With these broad aims in mind, the government should draw up a set of overarching principles and policies to guide a truly comprehensive approach to international cooperation, extending to such areas as public ad-
ministration and culture, to chart a long-term course for a “proactive contribution to peace based on international cooperation.”

The preamble of the Constitution of Japan states that “all peoples of the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want” and pledges the nation’s ongoing efforts “to accomplish these high ideals.” These freedoms are the two pillars of human security, which is the guiding principle of the Development Cooperation Charter. Yet, in practice, Japanese foreign aid has been slanted toward “freedom from want.” To act on the nation’s constitutional ideals, the government should open the way for an approach to international cooperation that includes greater aspects of freedom from fear.

Looking ahead, Japan will need a set of principles to guide an approach to international cooperation that integrates all relevant sectors, each of which has an impact on the others. We should begin now to systematically integrate all the existing tools of foreign aid into a comprehensive and seamless policy framework, enhancing genuine partnership among a wide range of public, private, and non-profit actors in Japan’s international cooperation.
About the Project on “Linking Foreign Aid and Security Cooperation”

This project aims to assess Japan’s foreign assistance from the perspective of security. Particularly, it explores approaches to achieving more effective linkages between traditional aid and such Ministry of Defense initiatives as international peace cooperation activities and capacity building of other militaries. The project also studies similar trends in other donor countries in the hope of clarifying Japan’s foreign policy priorities and the importance of international peace and stability for its own security.

Needless to say, maintaining international peace and stability is one of Japan’s chief interests. However, mounting public debt at home and growing contentiousness with its East Asian neighbors may inhibit Japan from taking a further proactive role. Thus, Japan’s foreign engagement needs to be reexamined so as to produce the maximum results within limited means and resources. This requires a more synthesized, inter-agency approach that goes beyond traditional tool-based or country-based planning. Such planning must start with the identification of strategic objectives in a given region and then assess policy issues and the available means to address the problems.

The United States and many European countries are adopting similar approaches with the understanding that international peace and stability are essential for maintaining the international order and safeguarding economic interests that pertain to national security. The EU, for example, has been adopting rigorous policy measures under a “comprehensive approach” to address linkages between development and security. This project also examines the lessons learned by these countries in Iraq and Afghanistan and in the wake of the various insurgencies of the 1990s and explores the possibility of multilayered security cooperation with such like-minded countries.

Project Leader:
Akiko Fukushima, Senior Fellow, Tokyo Foundation

Member:
Ippeita Nishida, Research Fellow & Project Manager, Tokyo Foundation
Can America’s Hedging Strategy Last?

Paul J. Saunders

Washington is pursuing a hedging strategy toward Beijing in the hopes of accruing the benefits of cooperation while avoiding the costs of competition. The core problem, Paul Saunders notes, is whether the United States and China can develop a sufficiently trusting relationship for engagement to succeed even as Washington conveys mistrust. The current state of the US-Russia relationship may be a cautionary tale.

* * *

America’s recent “freedom of navigation” operations in the South China Sea—and the possibility of a direct conflict between the United States and China—have again focused attention on the highly complex US-China relationship and the broader security environment in the Asia-Pacific region. While Washington attempted to demonstrate that the operations were not directed solely at China by sending the same destroyer that sailed near Beijing’s new artificial islands through areas claimed by the Philippines and Vietnam, the message was a clear one. Less clear is the course of the growing US-China rivalry in East Asia.

US policy toward China in the post–Cold War era has incorporated elements of both cooperation and competition. Analysts generally describe US strategy as one of “hedging” or, in other words, pursuing engagement with China while simultaneously taking prudent steps to defend important US national interests, which includes upholding commitments to US allies. Most consider this a sensible approach that minimizes the risks of a policy oriented exclusively toward engagement or confrontation.

Indeed, there are strong reasons to take this approach. The United States has enormous economic interests in the US-China relationship, which (among other things) helps to finance US government borrowing, earns substantial returns for US
investors and exporters, and provides inexpensive goods to American consumers. Sharply reducing or cutting off the US-China relationship would be extremely costly. Conversely, of course, the United States has enormous security interests in East Asia. Any nation that dominated the region could pose a direct threat to the United States and challenge US international leadership, an invaluable asset in protecting American global interests.

**America’s China Policy Dilemma**

While the US has many other security and economic interests in East Asia—including some in each area that are countervailing—this simplistic collision between economic and security interests is America’s fundamental dilemma. Of course, there could also be security benefits to engagement, such as joint efforts to deal with problems like Syria, or economic benefits to confrontation, such as expanded trade and investment relations with US allies and others in the region. The hedging strategy is so attractive because it appears to allow Washington to do all of this at the same time and thereby to avoid making very difficult and consequential choices. But does it?

Hedging rests on the assumption that in simultaneously pursuing cooperative and competitive policies, the United States will achieve the best of both worlds, accruing many of the benefits of cooperation while avoiding most of the costs of competition. However, it seems at least equally possible that this strategy could actually produce the worst of both worlds—by contributing to a situation in which America gains few of the benefits of cooperation (and accepts many of its costs) while shouldering many of the costs of competition (yet winning few of its benefits). The core problem is one of trust: can the United States and China develop a sufficiently trusting relationship for engagement to succeed even as Washington conveys its mistrust by hedging?

**How Hedging Can Fail**

From this perspective, the US-Russia relationship may be a cautionary tale. Washington has pursued a broadly similar policy toward Russia—“cooperate when we can, confront when we must”—for much of the last two decades. That relationship has virtually collapsed due to deep mutual mistrust. Moscow sees US military interventions and support for regime change as evidence of opposition to Russia’s status as a great power that will ultimately culminate in an effort to oust Russia’s leaders and replace them with a friendly democratic government that would not
uphold Russia’s national interests. Washington sees Russia as seeking to reestablish dominance across the former Soviet region and central Europe through force, intimidation, and political meddling. This is not about who is right or wrong, but about a set of current outcomes that look predictable in retrospect (and that some predicted in advance). In many respects, the United States and China now seem to be on a similar path.

Unfortunately, America’s hedging strategy thus far looks inadequate to the task ahead. If China is also hedging, the cooperative side of the bilateral relationship looks too weak to prevent serious conflict. US-China trade and investment are vastly greater than US-Russia economic ties—and therefore create influential constituencies favoring a stable relationship—but can carry only so much political weight, particularly when Americans are again questioning trade deals and when China’s political system is under stress. To put it most directly, economic interdependence did not prevent England and Germany from going to war in 1914. Unfortunately, when the psychology of an interdependent relationship tips into confrontation, mutual dependencies can rapidly evolve from points of cooperation to sources of leverage. When that happens, larger dependencies produce greater leverage and higher stakes. Consider European Union economic sanctions against Russia or, for that matter, US oil sales to Imperial Japan.

At the same time, if China is instead pursuing the strategy perhaps most feared by the United States and its allies—gradually escalating confrontation camouflaged by limited cooperation in certain areas—the US rebalance to Asia seems unlikely to deter increasingly self-confident Chinese leaders with expanding anti-access/area-denial capabilities and a sense that America is past its prime. The fact that the United States would eventually prove them wrong would not reduce the potential costs of this situation.

From a policy perspective, these realities suggest two key conclusions. First, hedging is probably not sustainable indefinitely. Secondly, however, because hedging is currently far preferable to taking considerable risks by making a clear choice between engagement and confrontation, the United States should pursue hedging in a way that can work as long as possible. That means simultaneously trying much harder both to cooperate with China and to compete with it without provoking a conflict. It won’t be easy.
The Socioeconomic Dimension of Irrawaddy Dolphin Conservation

Sierra Deutsch

Sierra Deutsch, a Sylff fellow at the University of Oregon, went to Myanmar and Cambodia to assess the two countries’ different approaches to natural resource management. In this article, she describes the preliminary findings of her research and argues that the experiences of local people affected by natural resource policies are important and may have implications for the success of those policies.

As concern has grown over the alarming acceleration of environmental problems since the emergence of the industrial era, the science of natural resource management has evolved in an effort to confront such issues. In recent years, conservation efforts have shifted from a focus on individual species to an ecosystem-based management (EBM) approach. With this change, the concept of the “human dimensions” of resource management—which emphasizes the diverse forms of knowledge and beliefs of stakeholders and their incorporation in conservation policy—has come to the fore. It is now widely recognized that natural resource management is really about the management of natural resource users. Taking it a step further, recent research has pointed to the importance of socioeconomic analyses in conservation research strategies.
Historically, the question “Is this conservation project working?” has often been answered without considering the perceptions and experiences of the people whose livelihoods are most directly affected by conservation policies. While biological indicators are obviously an important part of conservation work, understanding how conservation programs are perceived and experienced by the local communities most affected by them is also vital—both for the sake of the communities themselves and because support from those communities may have important implications for the long-term success of conservation efforts.

The Status of the Irrawaddy Dolphin

The Irrawaddy dolphin (Orcaella brevirostris) inhabits rivers throughout Southeast Asia and coastal waters in the Indian and Pacific Oceans from the Bay of Bengal to the Philippines. The species is listed as “threatened” by the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), with five sub-populations listed as “critically endangered.” Since the dolphins are not hunted directly for consumption, they are considered a “nonconsumptive” resource.

The main threats to their survival are upstream industrial pollution, accidental catches by gillnet fishing, and mortalities resulting from electro-fishing.

Conservation measures that seek to aid in the recovery of Irrawaddy dolphin populations must therefore address the socioeconomic factors that indirectly affect their survival, making Irrawaddy dolphin conservation projects an ideal focus for a study on the socioeconomic dimension of conservation initiatives.

Conservation measures for the Irrawaddy dolphin vary by country. They include attempts to mitigate habitat degradation, restrictions on the fishing practices and gear that endanger the dolphins, educational outreach, poverty alleviation through development, encouragement of tourism, and formation of fisher cooperatives. Each country has had varying success in conservation of the Irrawaddy
dolphin and, because of its widespread distribution in multiple countries, the Irrawaddy dolphin is also an ideal subject for a cross-country comparison of conservation projects.

**Diversification vs. Preservation: Two Contrasting Approaches**

Cambodia’s approach seeks to preserve the status quo of privatized resources and focuses more on the *diversification* of livelihoods and the economic development of rural communities\(^1\). Meanwhile, Myanmar has focused more on the *preservation* of livelihoods in rural communities\(^1\). Cambodia’s approach seems to be failing and the imminent extinction of its dolphin population has been predicted\(^1\), while Myanmar’s approach seems relatively successful\(^1\). Yet the perceptions and experiences of these policies by the people that are most directly affected, while taken into consideration during planning and implementation\(^4,14\), seem to have been largely ignored once the policies have been implemented.

**Bringing Local People into the Discussion**

I used questionnaires to gather data for the hypotheses I have about different perceptions of conservation among the participants. But I also wanted to make sure that participants were given an opportunity to highlight what *was important to them*. Too many well-intentioned Western researchers go to “developing” countries and make assumptions about the needs and desires of their participants without bothering to ask the local people in those countries what they think. Of course, I had to set out with at least a few questions and expectations in mind—if only because it is virtually impossible to get funding without them! But I purposely chose to carry out personal interviews and fo-
Voices from the Sylff Community

cus-group discussions—in addition to questionnaires and participant observation—to allow participants to tell me what was important to them and what they wanted foreign researchers to help with in the future.

Preliminary Findings

At the conclusion of my fieldwork, I had a total of 128 individual interviews, 275 completed questionnaires, and 25 focus-group discussions. These came from 8 riverside villages in Myanmar and another 8 in Cambodia (16 villages in total). The data are still in the preliminary stages of analysis: All of the audio recordings still need to be transcribed in Burmese and Khmer and then translated. (I felt this was a more accurate way of assessing the data, since the interpreters I used on-site may have left out some of what was said, assuming it wasn’t important enough to repeat). However, I have already seen several themes emerge and hope to confirm them once I have the full translations.

First, virtually all participants seem to think fondly of the Irrawaddy dolphin and expressed a desire to continue to protect it. Second, many participants in both countries seemed to express frustration with ongoing corruption—law enforcement often takes monetary bribes in exchange for “looking the other way” when illegal fishing gear (which unintentionally harms dolphins as well) is used in the river. Many of those participants seemed concerned for the future of the river and its ability to supply the fish that is their primary source of protein. Third, while participants in both countries seem to feel that conditions in their communities have improved over the last 10 years, I was surprised by the differences in how participants expressed that improvement.

Many of the people in Cambodia—where they have experienced a shift toward capitalism since the early 1980s—tended to emphasize the presence and role of money in their lives, often discussing improvements in terms of people having bigger houses, owning motorbikes or cars, and having more money in general (basically, the standard symbols of Western “wealth”). In contrast, participants in Myanmar—where they have just recently begun to experience a shift toward capitalism since 2010—seemed to place more emphasis on community enrichment, frequently discussing improvements in terms of things like better schools, improved
medical treatment, and the construction of flood walls. While these are only preliminary findings that need to be confirmed, they are also just a few of the themes immediately obvious from the data. I am confident that many exciting and important findings remain to be made.

Encouraging the Involvement of Underrepresented Groups

Traveling has always been one of my great loves. As I spent more time traveling, particularly in developing countries, I gradually became aware of a desire to address the social and environmental problems that seemed to be everywhere. I had the opportunity to meet many people along the way from diverse geopolitical regions, cultures, ethnicities, religions, genders, and ages who were contributing to solutions for these social and environmental problems.

Around the same time, I began to become aware of my undeserved privilege as a middle-class, white North American to access resources—such as education and the ability to travel abroad—that are not available to the vast majority of the world’s population. Because of this awareness and because of these interactions with the people who inspired me, I decided that even though I enjoyed studying whales and dolphins immensely, I felt a deep responsibility to use the resources available to me to contribute to the peace and well-being of humankind and the planet.

It is my hope that the results of this study will encourage more involvement of underrepresented groups in assessing the effectiveness of environmental and other policies on a local, regional, national, and global scale. I believe that acknowledging the diverse ways in which people experience and perceive conservation initiatives is especially important where conservation policy appears to be failing. The addition of alternative worldviews to a collective analysis may ultimately lead to more effective approaches to, and better solutions for, the environmental problems that affect us all.

Literature Cited


extirpation of another Asian river dolphin: The critically endangered population of the Irrawaddy dolphin in the Mekong River is small and declining.’ *Marine Mammal Science.*
November 26, 2015

**Identifying Effective Prevention and Intervention Strategies for School Bullying in New Zealand**

The Tokyo Foundation

Jaimee Stuart, who received a Sylff fellowship at New Zealand’s Victoria University in 2009–11, organized a conference on school bullying as a Sylff Leadership Initiatives (SLI) project on July 8, 2015, in Wellington, New Zealand. Attending the workshop as observers from the Tokyo Foundation were Mari Suzuki, director for leadership development, and program officer Mana Sakamoto. The following is a report by Mana Sakamoto.

*          *          *

New Zealand has one of the highest prevalence of bullying in the world, with nearly 70% of students aged 8 to 12 and 50% aged 13 to 17 having experienced bullying at their schools, according to a Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study. Drawing on her research and experience as a phycologist, Sylff fellow Jaimee Stuart convened a mini-conference titled “Bullying: Identifying Effective Prevention and Intervention Strategies” to address this serious social problem, bringing together 75 participants from research institutions, governmental agencies, community organizations, and the media for a rare opportunity to share best practices and discuss how the issue can be tackled together.

Despite the pervasiveness of school bullying in New Zealand, which was found to affect both bullies and victims negatively even after they reached middle age, the many school-based interventions have failed to achieve beneficial changes in behavior. This is believed to be because such programs are not based on research.
Voices from the Sylff Community

Voices from the Sylff Community

evidence, they do not systematically address the complexity of bullying behavior, and they do not have broad community and government support.

By convening this conference, Stuart—a research fellow at the Centre for Applied Cross-Cultural Research and the Roy McKenzie Centre for the Study of Families at the Victoria University of Wellington—sought to encourage fuller dialogue among policymakers, researchers, and practitioners. She also hoped to produce an evidence base on which guidelines for effective intervention and prevention guidelines can be developed and issued to families, schools, and communities. A set of resources on bullying, including video presentations of the sessions to be disseminated online and an edited book for the general public compiled with submissions from invited presenters, will also be produced.

Potentially Fatal Consequences

In her opening remarks, Stuart pointed out that minority groups, such as the Maori, can also become targets of bullying, as many people find it difficult to accept the symbolic role of this indigenous group in New Zealand culture. Likewise, sexual minorities and increasing numbers of immigrants are often victimized. Bullying can have long-term repercussions for both perpetrators and victims, she noted, with bullied students more likely to suffer poor health and develop psychological symptoms and bullies having greater risk of serious injury and of becoming substance abusers and criminal offenders. The consequences, she added, can sometimes be fatal.

The workshop was held in conjunction with the 19th Conference of Austral-
Voices from the Sylff Community

Asian Human Development Association, which was organized to share knowledge, wisdom, and research-based insights into healthy development for young people and families. Held the day before the start of the AHDA conference, Stuart’s workshop helped to shed light on bullying behavior and encouraged dialogue for a fuller range of participants.

Short presentations introduced key statistics regarding youth behavior and implications for long-term, negative health and social influences. Examples of intervention and prevention programs were shared, including KiVa, an evidence-based intervention for school bullying developed in Finland with funding from the Finnish Ministry of Education and Culture. Through an online game, students learn the best ways to deal with bullying behavior. Three schools in New Zealand currently use KiVa in their curriculum, and in the light of the preliminary positive results, many more schools are expected to adopt this program.

In another short presentation, the Gibson Group introduced a documentary about a unique intervention program in New Zealand schools that was shown on a national network in July. Small tutorials are held with students to discuss bullying behavior that is actually occurring in their class, enabling students to understand how their behaviors have led to bullying (http://www.gibson.co.nz/screen-projects/bullies).

In addition, a number of concurrent workshops were held, including one on cyber bullying that discussed cases of online intimidation and harassment. Differences with face-to-face or physical bullying were noted, such as anonymity, and schools were urged to provide training for teachers so they can quickly spot such hidden forms of bullying.

Another workshop given by the Ministry of Social Development asked participants to create a community intervention plan involving students and their families, highlighting the importance of community and family involvement in addressing school bullying. Other workshops and a panel discussion were held on such topics as the influence of family violence on girls’ behavior, safe and peaceful schools, and the role of the community in addressing bullying.

“One of the Best Workshops I Have Been To”

All the objectives of Stuart’s SLI project were met. The sessions of the conference were filmed so that videos can later be shared with other experts, filling an important void in resources. New networks were formed among the participants, which should not only lead to an improved school environment but also engender new initiatives to combat bullying. Based on the results of the conference, Stuart also
plans to present policy proposals to the Bullying Prevention Advisory Group and publish a book in the near future.

The conference generated great enthusiasm among participants, who referred to it as “one of the best workshops I have been to in my professional career.” One doctoral student at the University of Auckland, who drove all the way to Wellington to attend the conference, said he was impressed by the commitment other participants had shown in addressing the issue, adding that he was able to actively communicate with experts and gather information for his research.

Many speakers related their firsthand experiences with bullies. Sharing emotionally difficult stories required great courage, but they were determined not to retreat into their shells out of a desire to combat the bullying issue.

While working as a project organizer, Stuart actively and enthusiastically communicated with participants, and the conference is likely to have a positive impact on future efforts to reduce young New Zealanders’ engagement in and exposure to violent behavior. It was also an excellent example of how an SLI project can be shaped to incorporate both research and networking elements and to address important social issues in a developed country.

Thanks to the SLI award, moreover, Stuart was able to raise 1,200 NZ dollars, which will be donated to the Mental Health Foundation of New Zealand.

The Tokyo Foundation wishes her much success in all her future initiatives.
70th Anniversary of World War II

Is Historical Reconciliation Possible?

A Seventieth Anniversary Assessment

Okinawa's Inconvenient Truths

Abe's 70th Anniversary Statement

Historical Realism, not Revisionism

Northern Territories

Compromise Possible

December 2015

New Security Law

Abe’s Hollow Victory?

Public Uproar over Collective Self-Defense

The New Security Legislation and Japanese Public Reaction

Japan’s Security Legislation from an Operational Perspective

Foreign Aid Policy

Rethinking Japan’s Foreign Aid from a Security Perspective

The Tokyo Foundation

Developing Policy • Investing in People • Transforming Society