

Noboru Yamaguchi

Deciphering the New National Defense
Program Guidelines of Japan

Putting the National Defense Program
Guidelines into Practice: Five Proposals
from the Tokyo Foundation

PLUS

National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2011
and Beyond

Policy Research at the Tokyo Foundation

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DECEMBER 17, 2010

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National Security Policy Project

The Tokyo Foundation's National Security Policy Project (2007–11) was aimed at contributing to the process of formulating Japan's security policy by providing proposals focusing on the National Defense Program Guidelines. "Deciphering the New National Defense Program Guidelines of Japan," written by project leader Noboru Yamaguchi in February 2011, focuses on explaining three key terms used in the document: a Dynamic Defense Force, active participation in international peace cooperation activities, and seamless responses to various contingencies.

The project next developed five proposals for putting the Guidelines into practice, calling for (1) strengthening the government's crisis management structure, (2) deepening the Japan-US alliance, (3) enhancing international peace cooperation activities and security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region, (4) developing a Dynamic Defense Force, and (5) implementing a new arms export control policy.

This Policy Research Brief contains these two articles, along with a reprint of the "National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2011 and Beyond," adopted by the government in December 2010.

Project members hope that these proposals will contribute to the realization of the Guidelines and help protect the country's national interests.

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Deciphering the New National Defense Program Guidelines of Japan

Noboru Yamaguchi

On December 17, 2010, the Security Council and the cabinet approved the “National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2011 and Beyond.” The Guidelines contain a number of key terms: a “Dynamic Defense Force,” active contributions “to creating global peace and stability,” and “seamless responses” to contingencies. All of these terms indicate key concepts underpinning the defense policies that the new Guidelines seek to implement. They are in a sense a distillation of the broad-ranging debate that went into crafting the Guidelines. At the same time, though, it is far from clear what, precisely, these terms mean in isolation; it is important to approach them in the overall context of the discussion that went into the preparation of these Guidelines. Below I summarize the considerations behind these three terms in the hope that it will serve to enhance the debate as Japan moves forward in crafting its security and defense policy on the basis of the Guidelines.

1. Dynamic Defense Force

The National Defense Program Guidelines state: “Japan will develop a Dynamic Defense Force that possesses readiness, mobility, flexibility, sustainability, and versatility. These characteristics will be reinforced by advanced technology based on the trends of levels of military technology and intelligence capabilities.” The Dynamic Defense Force referred to here is a key theme in this version of the Guidelines. It appears to be

a representative concept informing Japan's moves to build and wield its defensive capabilities. The phrase "Dynamic Defense Force" is somewhat abstract, though, making it necessary to piece together its concrete significance from the discussion surrounding the new Guidelines.

The phrase has its roots in reports issued by two councils set up at different times as advisory organs to the prime minister ahead of the drafting of the new Guidelines. The term "dynamic deterrence" appeared for the first time in the August 2009 report of the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities. After the reins of government passed to the Democratic Party of Japan in the fall of that year, a newly established body named the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era also used the term in its report, "Japan's Visions for Future Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era," issued in August 2010. This latter report notes an increase in "the importance of 'dynamic deterrence' with enhanced operational capabilities," indicating the need for Japan to break free from "the idea of so-called static deterrence [that] focuses mainly on the quantities and size of weapons and troops." The new Guidelines, too, argue that "Japan needs to achieve greater performance with its defense forces . . . placing importance on dynamic deterrence" with a focus on "operational use of the defense forces."

The Dynamic Defense Force concept called for in the new Guidelines aims to break free in two main ways from the mold of the "Basic Defense Force Concept," which has underpinned Japanese defense policy since the Guidelines issued in 1976. The first of these is to move away from a focus on the deterrent effect of the existence of defense forces per se by putting the forces to operational use—in short, to aim for "dynamic deterrence" by displaying Japan's defense capabilities in action. For example, to avoid inviting violations of its sovereignty, such as foreign incursions into Japanese waters or airspace, the nation will need—as indicated in the new Guidelines—a "clear demonstration of national will and strong defense capabilities through such timely and tailored military operations as regular intelligence, surveillance, and re-

connaissance activities.” The Dynamic Defense Force posture will also serve to bolster the operations of the Japan-US alliance thanks to an improved liaison and cooperation stance, allowing Japan to work seamlessly with its ally in response to shifting contingencies, and heightened interoperability between Japan’s Self-Defense Forces and their American counterparts.

The second departure from the previous position involves a rethinking of force disposition with certain priorities in mind. Under the “Basic Defense Force Concept,” Japan sought to maintain a balanced distribution of its forces in line with geographic and other considerations. This meant stationing defense units equally across a complete set of geographic subdivisions. The new Guidelines, on the other hand, include a review of the geographic disposition of Japanese forces, as well as enhancements to Japan’s defense posture, such as through surveillance activities and maritime patrols, including in the nation’s southwestern territories. Now that Japan is faced with heightened tensions on the Korean Peninsula and opacity in China’s efforts to modernize its military, it is moving to increase the effectiveness of its deterrent force by adopting a clear posture with respect to prioritized areas in response to the situation.

Japan’s defense mechanisms must function as a form of dynamic deterrence as one necessary condition—but not the only one—for achieving the Dynamic Defense Force that the new Guidelines aim for. Ahead of its deterrent nature, a nation’s defensive force must also play the role of improving the security environment so as to prevent threats from appearing in the first place. With respect to this point, the new Guidelines state that Japan’s defense forces must aim firstly “to acquire dynamism to effectively deter and respond to various contingencies” and secondly “to proactively engage in activities to further stabilize the security environment in the Asia-Pacific and to improve the global security environment.” In this light, we should view the Dynamic Defense Force as a concept that functions of course as a means of deterrence, as noted above, but also as a public good for the global commu-

nity, something that fosters further stability in the international environment.

In pursuing this Dynamic Defense Force concept, Japan will obviously need to deploy highly responsive, maneuverable units with a degree of flexibility. In addition, it will be necessary to prepare the frameworks in which these units can actually be put to use in operations. Further key elements of Japan's approach will be to collect intelligence, make appropriate judgments on that basis, and draw on the so-called C4ISR functions: command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

2. Active Participation in International Peace Cooperation Activities

“Toward a Peace-Creating Nation” was the subtitle of the report issued by the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era ahead of the formulation of the new Guidelines. In a policy speech delivered on January 24 this year, Prime Minister Naoto Kan stated that for Japan, “it will be indispensable to pursue foreign and security policies that actively address the creation of peace, based on balanced pragmatism.” While the new Guidelines do not contain the exact phrase “creation of peace,” they rest on the fundamental stance that Japan should take active part in international peacekeeping activities, making contributions to global peace and stability and to human security as the “third objective” of its security policy. The first objective is “to prevent any threat from directly reaching Japan and to eliminate external threats that have reached it,” while the second is “to prevent threats from emerging by further stabilizing the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region and by improving the global security environment.” The first two objectives both relate to threats impacting Japan directly, but the third is purely geared toward enabling Japanese contributions to the stability of the global community.

To date Japan has handled United Nations peacekeeping operations and other international peace cooperation activities within a theo-

retical framework that positions them as a way to enhance global or regional stability with the ultimate goal of increasing Japan's own security. The new Guidelines depart from this with their description of the third objective as "to contribute to creating global peace and stability and to secure human security." With this stance, Japan shoulders its natural duties as one of the world's top economic powers and as a trading nation that depends on peace and stability in all the world's regions. Ever since the "lost decade" of economic malaise in the 1990s, the Japanese people have tended to focus their attention on domestic issues, losing not only their pride in Japan's place in the world but their sense of responsibility to the global community. The new Guidelines should prompt them to awaken once again to Japan's position and the role it must play in the world.

All this being said, deploying and operating defensive forces entail considerable costs, and there are limits to how much funding can be directed to this area. It will be necessary to consider whether to place the focus more on the defense of Japan or on international peace-creation activities, and how best to strike a balance between them. Given the destabilizing factors in the surrounding region, such as the situation on the Korean Peninsula, devoting nearly all SDF resources to international activities will not be a realistic choice. It will be important to decide on Japanese participation in international efforts based on a comprehensive examination of their necessity, urgency, effectiveness, and other factors. With respect to policy, it is meaningful to set standards for these decisions in advance. When deciding how to deploy defensive forces, it will also be beneficial to prioritize areas whose functions are useful in both types of activity. To defend Japan's surrounding seas and airspace, as well as its offshore islands, the nation must be able to swiftly move SDF units from where they are usually stationed and to deploy them where they are needed. The capacity needed for this—maritime and air transport capabilities, for instance—will also be of use when SDF members take part in international peace cooperation activities. So far the SDF

functions have been pared down mainly to rear-area support capabilities, based on the forces' heavy reliance on domestic logistics, maintenance, and supply infrastructure in the light of their main mission: defending the Japanese homeland. Improvements to this situation that boost the SDF capability to independently project force throughout Japan's offshore islands will put Japanese defense forces on a better footing to take part in international efforts.

3. Seamless Responses to Various Contingencies

In the new Guidelines, the opening paragraph of the section titled "Basic Policies to Ensure Japan's Security" states that "In the event of various contingencies, [the nation] will seamlessly deal with the situation as it unfolds." Considerations of the meaning of this "seamless response" concept must look at three main aspects. First, the response must be seamless in the sense that it covers all stages of a situation, from normal conditions right up through an emergency situation. Second, it must be seamless in terms of enabling harmonized responses to multiple contingencies, should more than one arise at the same time. And third, it must be seamless in the sense that all relevant organs, from the central government ministries on down, respond in a coordinated manner to a crisis.

Tensions climb from a normal situation, passing through various crisis phases and finally escalating to a contingency requiring the use of defensive force. It goes without saying that uninterrupted responsiveness is called for throughout this entire process. To achieve the dynamic deterrence that the new Guidelines seek to implement, it will be essential to appropriately gauge the stance for Japan as a whole to take, including SDF operations.

The new Guidelines list a number of priority areas, including (1) ensuring the security of the seas and airspaces surrounding Japan, (2) responding to attacks on offshore islands, (3) responding to cyber attacks, (4) responding to attacks by guerrillas and special operations

forces, and (5) responding to ballistic missile attacks. With respect to these five areas, the Guidelines also state: “The SDF will effectively respond to the abovementioned contingencies while taking into account the possibility of different and multiple contingencies occurring consecutively or simultaneously.” If Japan were faced with the imminent threat of a ballistic missile attack, for example, in many cases it would also need to prepare against attacks on its nuclear power plants and other key facilities; ensuring the security of its surrounding sea and air territory would also be a closely related issue in such a situation. There must be no lapse in the national response to all these contingencies, and the actions taken on each front must be closely coordinated with one another.

Japan must also make sure that the responses of its Ministry of Defense, the SDF, and other governmental organs constitute a seamless whole. The fields of economic and resource security, as well as human security, are closely linked to that of military security, making this seamlessness absolutely vital. The incident in September 2010, when a Chinese trawler rammed Japan Coast Guard patrol vessels in waters near Japan’s Senkaku Islands, hinted at the multifaceted and complex nature of incidents that may arise in the future. In this case the patrol vessels were able to avoid the danger of their law-enforcement actions escalating to a military-level problem. We did, however, see China cut off exports of rare earth elements to Japan, and Japanese citizens involved in business activities were detained in China. These developments were prime examples of resource-security and human-security issues. It is important for Japan’s government organs to be prepared at all times to respond to situations like this in a coordinated manner. The new Guidelines stipulate: “The Cabinet Secretariat, the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces (SDF), the police forces, the Japan Coast Guard, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Justice and other government agencies will regularly cooperate with each other.” But this cooperation must go beyond the central governmental sphere to include smooth coordination at the level of

local bureaus. Japan must have seamless cooperation among these entities, as well as between the local and central agencies.

This paper is based on discussions carried out as part of the Tokyo Foundation National Security Policy Project and reflects input from multiple project members. It was first published on February 10, 2011.

Putting the National Defense Program Guidelines into Practice: Five Proposals from the Tokyo Foundation

The new National Defense Program Guidelines spell out various innovations and advocate the strengthening of Japan's security posture. The Tokyo Foundation's National Security Policy Project offers proposals that would help ensure their actual implementation.

The National Defense Program Guidelines adopted in December 2010 spell out various innovations and advocate the strengthening of Japan's security posture. Inasmuch as the guidelines express medium- to long-term ideas and the direction that the nation ought to pursue, their implementation requires a process of formulating concrete Mid-Term Defense Program projects for each fiscal year and drafting or improving relevant laws and regulations and developing new policy guidelines.

Failure to formulate concrete measures will mean that the ideas presented in the new Guidelines will be for naught. Members of the Tokyo Foundation's National Security Policy Project engaged in repeated discussions concerning the measures urgently required for the implementation of the Guidelines.

As a result of these deliberations, the project team identified five most important policy areas: (1) strengthening the government's crisis management structure, (2) maintaining and strengthening the Japan-US alliance, (3) enhancing security cooperation and international peace cooperation activities in the Asia-Pacific region, (4) developing a "Dynamic Defense Force," and (5) implementing a new arms export control policy.

Proposal 1: Strengthen the government's crisis management structure

(1) A framework to enable more effective crisis management

Describing the government's role in a crisis, the Guidelines state, "In the event of various contingencies, it will seamlessly deal with the situation as it unfolds." For this to happen, the security and crisis management capabilities of the government, particularly the cabinet, must be strengthened.

The creation of a framework for seamless task planning and leadership from a unified perspective is vital. This will work only if the lines separating different ministries and agencies—including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, National Police Agency, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism, and Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry—are transcended. Over the short term, conceivable countermeasures in the event of a crisis could include temporarily putting in place, at the cabinet-secretary or deputy-chief-cabinet-secretary level or higher, a structure to perform the functions of consolidating information, communicating the intentions of the government to pertinent organizations, and coordinating the activities of different entities.

Over the medium term, an advisory committee should be established under the prime minister to design a structure charged with national crisis management. Along with examining the overall concept for such a structure, this committee can also identify measures for its establishment as an institution.

Specifically, a panel of experts in the areas of security and crisis management should be established as staff for top government leaders. This structure would be headed by the chief cabinet secretary or a newly appointed parliamentary deputy chief cabinet secretary (a longstanding member of the House of Councillors would be one idea).

This panel would undertake the formulation of Japan's medium-to long-term national defense strategy and integrated security strategy

and also regularly consider the government's response to an array of crisis scenarios. In the event of an actual crisis, this panel would not become involved in actual operations but would make an overall assessment of the government-wide response and provide response guidance from a longer-term perspective.

(2) Strengthening information security as a prerequisite for enhanced intelligence functions

Strengthening information security systems is fundamental to the nation's overall collection and analysis of information as well as its utilization. It is also important in terms of the Japan-US alliance, for it can lead to more appropriate decision-making by Japan through effective utilization of information provided by the United States, a country with excellent intelligence capabilities.

The sharing of information possessed by different government agencies is predicated upon individual agencies trusting the information security systems of the other agencies to which they provide information on a reciprocal basis. Information security systems are also crucial in the context of information sharing between the administrative and legislative branches of government. Along with clarifying Diet members' obligation of confidentiality, the Diet should hold closed sessions so that members can engage in debate based on privileged information.

Furthermore, the establishment of a permanent information committee would also be required in the legislative branch to ensure that policy pertaining to information and information security for Japan as a whole is properly followed.

In making a response extending across government ministries and agencies, it must be made clear where responsibility lies. This will involve, for example, the establishment under the deputy chief cabinet secretary of a project team that will quickly sort out different aspects of the response, including government-wide efforts, matters to be ad-

dressed separately by each ministry and agency, legislative action, administrative measures, and operations to ensure that everyone involved is equipped with the hardware and software needed to share information and keep it secure.

In addition, the responsibility for the measures to be taken must be clarified, and prompt action to implement them should follow.

(3) Reinforcement of awareness concerning communications preparedness

One point that became clear in the aftermath of the Great East Japan Earthquake was the vulnerability of the communications infrastructure. The destruction of the cell phone infrastructure had an enormous impact on the victims and made it difficult for information to be shared among and instructions and requests to be communicated to different organizations: the national government, local disaster headquarters, relief agencies, and municipalities hit by the disaster.

Given that damage to the communications infrastructure can be foreseen in the event of a large-scale disaster or armed attack, Japan should make provisions to supplement it through channels that include the utilization of a disaster radio network, emergency restoration of contact through communication satellites, and network reinforcement based on mobile communication terminals.

Consideration should also be given to utilizing the tactical network communication system created by the Self-Defense Forces. With regard to a potential inland earthquake centered on Tokyo or major quakes in the Tokai and Tonankai regions, in particular, special attention should be given to the government's communications functions, since they would presumably cause widespread damage.

To ensure the gathering of information required for decision-making by top government officials and for guiding and supervising the agencies involved, the government should back up its communications network or else be prepared to reconfigure the communications infrastructure on a temporary basis.

Additionally, consideration should be given in advance to such countermeasures as the temporary relocation of government offices, including the Prime Minister's Office, should the need arise, and the conducting of drills for such a scenario.

Proposal 2: Continue efforts to maintain and strengthen the Japan-US alliance

If the international community recognizes the strength of the Japan-US alliance, this can significantly help deter aggression. The way that the United States demonstrated its willingness to cooperate generously in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake should be seen as a golden opportunity. The question of whether or not Japan can continue working closely with the United States in post-quake recovery and reconstruction, including efforts to come to grips with the nuclear accident, and regain the confidence of the international community is crucial for the future of the bilateral alliance.

Of foremost importance is the broad sharing of the recognition that the realignment of US forces on Okinawa, including the relocation of Futenma Air Station to the Henoko area, would help ease the burden on Okinawa. At the same time, a bold vision for the future of Okinawa's society and economy should be mapped out, including plans to utilize bases south of Kadena after they have been relocated.

The situation surrounding Japan, such as issues involving the Korean Peninsula, is unpredictable, and consideration for so-called traditional military security must be kept in place. Likewise, as far as the Japan-US alliance is concerned, Japan should carry out more in-depth discussions concerning common strategic objectives from the standpoint of Japan's own surroundings. Pressing on with measures related to joint operational plan formulation and joint exercises would also be critical.

Proposal 3: Work actively to promote security cooperation and enhance

international peace cooperation activities in the Asia-Pacific region with the aim of becoming a peace-building nation

One predominant feature of the Guidelines is the emphasis given to bilateral and multilateral security cooperation. In particular, the Guidelines cite further stabilization of the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region as an objective of Japan's security for the first time and also advocate that Japan work toward regional security.

The March 11 disaster shook the Japanese people out of their inward-looking tendency, which had become pervasive since the “lost decade” of the early 1990s. When the Japanese people saw how nations around the world—like their ally the United States and neighbors such as China and South Korea—reached out to lend a hand, they were reminded of their membership in the international community.

This show of support also demonstrated the world's expectations of Japan, which even after being hit by the earthquake and tsunami remains a global power with the world's third-largest economy. Japan should contribute to the global economy through its own recovery and sincerely respond to the outpouring of support from various countries.

Prime Minister Naoto Kan indicated that while a temporary drop in Japan's official development assistance is unavoidable, the nation should contribute to the world by substantially increasing its ODA once it has recovered. Urgent action is also required, though, in order to solidify Japan's presence in the international community and ensure it has a voice.

Japan should move quickly to contribute actively to the international community through not just ODA but also such other ways as the provision of personnel for international peace activities and international disaster relief work, balancing these efforts with its own recovery process.

Although previous Guidelines identified Japan's defense and international contribution objectives, they had not referred to regional security. The Asia-Pacific security environment has worsened in the

two decades since the end of the Cold War, and this is not unrelated to Japan's passive posture regarding regional security.

In this light, the nation should more actively work toward the region's stabilization. Japan should cultivate broad recognition that promoting defense exchange and regional cooperation in tandem with strengthening its own defense capabilities constitutes an important dual-track policy for the nation's security and defense. These activities should be supported through adequate budgetary allocations.

As a major regional power, Japan should take the lead in instituting frameworks for bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation and in creating a structure for multilayered cooperation. Specifically, Japan should reinforce the Japan-US alliance and coordination with the ASEAN Regional Forum and promote regional network formation by strengthening Japan-South Korea and Japan-Australia coordination.

Along with the advancement of bilateral defense exchange, efforts are also needed to promote the institutionalization of trilateral and multilateral cooperative frameworks—including Japan-US-South Korea, Japan-US-Australia, and Japan-US-China relations—and to be involved in regional rule creation.

While coordinating its activities with other countries in the region, Japan should also actively support capacity building in Southeast Asia and elsewhere. When it participates in international cooperation activities outside the region, Japan's involvement should be based on its own regional strategy, such as by attaching importance to strengthening cooperation with other countries in the region as it undertakes such activities.

There is an increasing need for development assistance to destitute areas of the world that are potential breeding grounds for international terrorism, piracy, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and pandemics, as well as for underlying activities to maintain security. The international community has high expectations with regard to Japan's active involvement in these endeavors.

There are also rising expectations of the military's role in interna-

tional disaster relief. After the Great East Japan Earthquake, the SDF assigned more than 100,000 troops—a figure close to half the total number of defense personnel—to engage in rescue and other assistance activities in disaster-stricken areas and at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant.

The US armed forces supported the SDF activities by launching Operation Tomodachi, dispatching as many as 24,000 troops and deploying two dozen ships, including an aircraft carrier, and approximately 190 military aircraft. These activities by Japan and the United States have shown the people of Japan, who have been wary of nonmilitary uses of military forces, that the military has an essential role to play in international disaster relief.

Contributing to international peace is already an intrinsic role of the SDF. In order to step up SDF activities in this area, the Japanese government should not wait until the completion of recovery from the disaster but secure the necessary budgetary and human resources to the maximum extent possible.

Proposal 4: Implement the following measures in aiming for a more Dynamic Defense Force

(1) Strengthen the emergency deployment capabilities (hubs and mobility capabilities) of the defense force

Important factors in building a Dynamic Defense Force are putting in place advance military posts and bases that can serve as hubs for military unit deployment and having the ability to quickly establish necessary hubs. On that basis, the defense force needs to have air and marine transport capacity for moving troops and supplies as well as the ability to gain air and sea supremacy in order to make such transport possible.

The SDF concentrated 106,000 troops in the Tohoku district in response to the March disaster, which was made possible by the exist-

ing network of posts and bases located in the vicinity of disaster-stricken areas. Ground Self-Defense Force posts in Iwate, Sendai, Fukushima, and Koriyama, as well as bases of the Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces in such locations as Hachinohe and Matsushima became hubs for the activities of military units. Along with providing accommodations for troops that converged from around the country, these SDF installations further functioned as logistics hubs for military units working on the front lines of disaster relief.

Meanwhile, the US forces utilized ships belonging to the US Seventh Fleet as a support base and assisted SDF troops assigned to rescue work by acting quickly to re-open Sendai Airport, where operations had been paralyzed by the disaster, so that it could be used as a logistics hub. US forces first restored 1,500 meters of runway—the minimum length required for C-130 transport planes to land. After that it used C-130s to bring in heavy equipment and restored the minimum functions for the airport to operate as an air base, including a 3,000-meter runway.

On top of that, approximately 260 support troops needed to perform air traffic control and transport hub operations were deployed. In this way the US forces transformed Sendai Airport into an air transport base for supplying emergency provisions to afflicted areas and providing supplies to US troops.

At present, emergency deployment capabilities for offshore islands—including those in southwestern Japan where SDF installations are sparse—need attention. Military posts and bases capable of serving as hubs in the event of an emergency should be put into place. The SDF needs to follow the US example in Sendai and equip itself with the ability to set up and operate hubs in areas with inadequate infrastructure.

(2) Case studies of complex contingencies

The new Guidelines call for preparations against complex contingencies involving the consecutive or simultaneous unfolding of situations.

The responses specified by the Guidelines include (1) ensuring the security of Japan's airspace or surrounding waters, (2) responding to attacks on offshore islands, (3) responding to cyber attacks, (4) responding to assaults by guerrillas or special operations forces, and (5) responding to ballistic missile attacks.

Undertaking case studies for dealing with such complex contingencies will be quite helpful in terms of contingency preparedness. This is because case studies premised on worst-case scenarios will involve giving advance consideration to how the SDF and relevant authorities should respond in a crisis and the manner in which they should cooperate.

This will also make it possible to clarify the anticipated capacity levels of each institution (or capacity limitations and problem areas that need to be improved) and to obtain a basis for formulating concrete response plans and an idea of the anticipated damage (as well as the tolerable degree of damage). Preparing countermeasures in advance of a crisis will enable expeditious decision-making, so the response itself will be quicker. This would therefore be conducive to achieving a more Dynamic Defense Force.

Giving consideration to a crisis scenario involving the Korean Peninsula would be worthwhile, for instance. A war between North and South Korea could conceivably be reignited should the Korean War Armistice Agreement be violated. A form of civil unrest could also flare up in North Korea, or may even occur at the same time as a war. In such a situation, a flood of refugees from the Korean Peninsula could wash up along Japanese shores via the Sea of Japan.

Many Japanese nationals in South Korea would then need to be rescued. At the same time, support for US operations would have to be carried out for such a "situation in areas surrounding Japan." There would be a need as well to ensure a state of readiness for missile attacks, terrorist assaults by special operations forces, and cyber attacks.

Should such a situation develop, Japan would need to orchestrate its own response. Specifically, while communicating with neighboring

countries, Japan must keep abreast of all activities on the domestic front—such as those of relevant agencies, the SDF, and the Japan Coast Guard—and manage information appropriately, make swift decisions, issue commands, and ensure that orders reach where they are needed.

Necessary legislative measures are being put in place, and drills, tactical exercises, and so on are being carried out to deal with individual emergencies. There is an urgent need, though, to address the handling of situations that occur simultaneously or take place one after another.

Proposal 5: Implement a new arms export control policy

The Guidelines do not go so far as stipulate that the Three Principles on Arms Exports be revised. But in Section VI, entitled “Basic Foundations to Maximize Defense Capability,” the Guidelines make an indirect reference to the necessity of easing the principles, stating, “Japan will study measures to respond to such major changes” as the fact that participation in international joint development and production—now the mainstream among developed nations—enables improved performance of defense equipment and ways of dealing with the rising cost of equipment.

The 1962 Three Principles on Arms Exports were part of a policy of solidarity with West-bloc nations during the Cold War era. But their subsequent revision in 1976 into something more restrictive brought about a major change in the scope of the original policy. Maintaining this policy was problematic even during the time of the Cold War, and ever since the transfer of military technology to the United States in 1983, Japan has managed to deal with this by making exceptions based upon statements by the chief cabinet secretary or the consent of relevant ministries and agencies.

The security environment in the Asia-Pacific region has deteriorated since the end of the Cold War. Moreover, given the difficulty of increasing defense spending in Japan’s current fiscal situation, it is clear

that Japan must proceed with joint international arms development and production while at the same time deepening the Japan-US alliance, enhancing regional cooperation, and increasing international contributions. These steps are being hindered, however, by the Three Principles.

Since the end of the Cold War Japan has taken action to make exemptions in cases such as UN peacekeeping operations, activities for the removal of anti-personnel landmines, joint development of ballistic missile defense systems, and counter-terrorism and anti-piracy activities. But there is a limit to making exemptions on a case-by-case basis.

One recent example is the suspension in 2010 of the joint development of carrier-based battle command system software, a BMD system research project that Japan and the United States had been working on together. Because it was decided in 2010 that BMD systems would be deployed in Europe, the US planned for European countries to purchase the aforementioned software system under joint Japanese-US development. Given the current policy, however, action to make an exception to the Three Principles would have been required. This would have meant going through a protracted process involving an exchange of notes between Japan and the United States and approval by the Japanese cabinet.

Seeking to avoid a lengthy, convoluted process, the United States chose to pursue independent development. Japan ended up not only hurting its alliance with the United States but also missing an opportunity to contribute to improving the security of close allies as well as a prime chance to raise the level of civilian technology through military software development.

Furthermore, if Japan endeavors to become more active in PKOs and other forms of international cooperation, as expressed in the Guidelines, it will need to consider donating a variety of equipment, including arms, so that developing countries can enhance their peacekeeping capabilities.

In this light, Japan has few choices. The clearest-cut choice would be prompt termination of the Three Principles policy. Japan is a “white

list” country that participates in all export control regimes. It is a nation that implements export controls on arms in accordance with an iron-clad export control law, the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act (Act No. 228 of 1949). The Foreign Exchange Act is rated on a par with laws in the United States and European countries.

Presumably, contributing to international peace and security by controlling arms, general-purpose goods, and so forth in accordance with UN resolutions, the Foreign Exchange Act, and sanction laws unique to Japan should suffice under normal conditions. But if this is ambiguous as a guiding principle, arms export controls should be administered in accordance with the new principles presented below.

- (1) Strictly control and regulate technology transfers and exports of arms, etc., in accordance with the principle of a peace-loving nation.
- (2) Do not carry out technology transfers and exports of arms, etc., to parties to international disputes (including potential cases).
- (3) Do not carry out technology transfers and exports of arms, etc., to countries and regions where human rights are being violated or to parties to such abuse.
- (4) Abide by UN resolutions and other international agreements pertaining to banning or limiting exports of arms, etc.
- (5) Make decisions on a case-by-case basis in accordance with principles (1) through (4) for international technology cooperation in such forms as exports and technology transfers for humanitarian purposes, exports and technology transfers for the purpose of encouraging capacity building for peace building in other countries, and the international development of weapons.

Note: Under the Three Principles, *arms* are defined as goods that “based on shape, features, and so forth . . . are to be used by military forces and directly employed in combat.” Among the goods listed in Paragraph 1 of Appended Table 1 of the Export Trade Control Order (Cabinet Order No. 378; Dec. 1, 1949) for the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act (Act No. 228; Dec. 1, 1949) and technolo-

gies related to arms listed in Paragraph 1 of the Appended Table of the Foreign Exchange Order (Cabinet Order No. 260; Oct. 11, 1980), they comprise eight types of conventional weapons: those falling in one of the seven categories specified in the UN Register of Conventional Arms and those in the additional category of small arms (including portable surface-to-air missiles).

This paper was first published on July 29, 2011.

APPENDIX

National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2011 and Beyond

Approved by the Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2010

*(Provisional Translation)**

I. NDPG'S Objective

In light of the current security environment surrounding our country, and according to the 'Defense Program of Fiscal Year 2010' (approved by the Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2009), the Government of Japan sets out the "National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2011 and Beyond" as a new guideline for Japan's security policy and defense forces.

II. Basic Principles of Japan's Security

The first objective of Japan's security policy is to prevent any threat from directly reaching Japan and to eliminate external threats that have reached it so as to minimize the ensuing damage, and thereby secure the peace and security of Japan and its people. The second objective is to prevent threats from emerging by further stabilizing the security en-

* Reprinted from the Ministry of Defense website <www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/d_policy/pdf/guidelinesFY2011.pdf>.

vironment in the Asia-Pacific region and by improving the global security environment, so as to maintain and strengthen a free and open international order and ensure Japan's security and prosperity. The third objective is to contribute to creating global peace and stability and to secure human security.

In order to achieve these objectives, Japan will promote its own efforts, facilitate cooperation with its ally and countries in the Asia-Pacific, and pursue multi-layered security cooperation with the international community in a consolidated manner. Measures for this include more active utilization of Japan's diplomatic and defense capability, support for the United Nations' activities related to international peace and security, and promotion of diplomatic efforts such as establishing cooperative relationships with other countries.

Under the Constitution, and in line with basic principles such as maintaining an exclusively defense-oriented policy and not becoming a military power that poses a threat to other countries, Japan will continue to uphold its basic defense policies, such as securing civilian control, maintaining the three non-nuclear principles, and building a modest defense force. At the same time, Japan will participate more actively in activities in which the international community cooperates to improve the international security environment (hereinafter referred to as "international peace cooperation activities"), including United Nations peace-keeping activities and activities to deal with non-traditional security issues, such as humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and counter-piracy initiatives.

To address the threat of nuclear weapons, Japan will play a constructive and active role in international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts, so as to achieve the long-term goal of creating a world without nuclear weapons. At the same time, as long as nuclear weapons exist, the extended deterrence provided by the United States, with nuclear deterrent as a vital element, will be indispensable. In order to maintain and improve the credibility of the extended deterrence, Japan will closely cooperate with the United States, and will also ap-

appropriately implement its own efforts, including ballistic missile defense and civil protection.

III. Security Environment Surrounding Japan

1. Looking at trends of the global security environment, the probability of large-scale war between major countries has declined due to increasing interdependence among countries, but there is now a growing risk that the impact of unrest or a security problem in a single country will immediately spread worldwide. Moreover, in addition to regional conflicts arising from ethnic and religious disputes, there are a growing number of so-called “gray-zone” disputes—confrontations over territory, sovereignty and economic interests that are not to escalate into wars.

In such an environment, we are witnessing a global shift in the balance of power with the rise of powers such as China, India and Russia, along with the relative change of influence of the United States. On the other hand, the United States continues to play the most significant role in securing global peace and stability.

Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, international terrorist organizations and piracy remain imminent security challenges for the international community, including Japan. Regional conflicts and the countries whose governance has weakened or collapsed also pose a challenge that could affect the global security environment. Moreover, risks concerning sustained access to the seas, outer space and cyberspace have emerged as a new challenge. From a long-term perspective, we should also be aware of the impact which climate change may have on the security environment.

It is extremely difficult for countries to individually deal with these global security challenges, and thus, it is important that countries that share common interests to regularly cooperate with each other.

The role of military forces in the international community is becoming increasingly diverse. In addition to deterring or responding to

armed conflicts and building confidence and promoting friendship among countries, military forces, in cooperation with the non-military sector, are playing an important role in a growing number of cases, in conflict prevention, peace building such as reconstruction assistance, and in the non-traditional security field.

2. In the Asia-Pacific region, as interdependence expands and deepens, countries are strengthening their cooperation with each other to resolve security challenges. In particular, specific cooperative measures are being undertaken to resolve challenges in the non-traditional security field.

The global shift in the balance of power is apparent in the Asia-Pacific region. Large-scale military forces, including nuclear forces, continue to be concentrated in the areas surrounding Japan, and many countries are modernizing their military forces and increasing their military activities. In addition, there remain unclear and uncertain elements in the region, such as disputes over territories and the maritime domain, and issues over the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait.

North Korea is continuing its development, deployment and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, and maintains a large-scale special operations force. It has also repeatedly conducted provocative military actions on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea's military activities constitute an immediate and grave destabilizing factor to regional security. They also pose a serious challenge to international non-proliferation efforts.

China, a growing major power, is beginning to play an important role for regional and global security. On the other hand, China is steadily increasing its defense expenditure. China is widely and rapidly modernizing its military force, mainly its nuclear and missile force as well as navy and air force, and is strengthening its capability for extended-range power projection. In addition, China has been expanding and intensifying its maritime activities in the surrounding waters. These trends, together with insufficient transparency over China's military

forces and its security policy, are of concern for the regional and global community.

Russia has significantly reduced the size of its military forces in the Far East since the end of the Cold War, but its military activities are increasingly robust.

In such an environment, the United States is strengthening its engagement in this region. It attaches increasing importance to cooperation with its allies and partners, including Japan, the Republic of Korea and Australia, and is striving to enhance security ties through bilateral and multilateral frameworks. These efforts are important contributions to the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region and lay the foundation for the United States in tackling global security challenges.

3. Japan, with its vast territorial waters, is a trading nation which heavily depends on imports for the supply of foods and resources and on foreign markets. Thus, securing maritime security and international order is essential for the country's prosperity. Moreover, Japan is geographically surrounded by water and has a long coastline and numerous islands. In addition to frequent natural disasters, Japan faces security vulnerabilities resulting from the concentration of industry, population and information infrastructure in urban areas and from the presence of a large number of key facilities in coastal areas.

4. In considering the above, a full-scale invasion against Japan that will threaten its existence, such as a large-scale landing invasion, is unlikely to occur, but the security challenges and destabilizing factors Japan faces are diverse, complex and intertwined. Japan needs to appropriately deal with various contingencies arising from such challenges and factors (hereinafter referred to as "various contingencies"). It is also important that Japan actively tackle both regional and global security challenges in cooperation with its ally, partners and other countries concerned.

IV. Basic Policies to Ensure Japan's Security

1. Japan's Own Efforts

(1) Basic ideas

Recognizing that a country's security depends first and foremost on its own efforts, Japan will constantly utilize all means to ensure its security under the basic defense policies, and in cooperation with its ally, partners and other countries concerned. In the event of various contingencies, it will seamlessly deal with the situation as it unfolds.

(2) Integrated and strategic activities

Japan will conduct integrated and strategic activities as follows.

a. Japan will improve its capability to collect and analyze information in the relevant government ministries and agencies. It will also strengthen its information security system that extends across ministries and agencies so as to facilitate information sharing among them. In doing so, Japan will promote its efforts to develop and use outer space, from the perspective of strengthening information gathering and communications functions, among others. In order to enable stable use of cyberspace, Japan will also expand its posture and strengthen its capability in dealing with cyber attacks in a comprehensive manner.

b. The Cabinet Secretariat, the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces (SDF), the police forces, the Japan Coast Guard, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Justice and other government agencies will regularly cooperate with each other. In the event of various contingencies, the Cabinet, led by the Prime Minister, will make rapid and appropriate decisions and respond to such contingencies in an integrated manner in cooperation with the local governments. To

this end, the Government will examine the functions and systems related to its decision-making and response, through initiatives such as regular simulation exercises of various contingencies and comprehensive training and exercises, and consider necessary policies, including legal measures.

c. After examining the current organization, functions, and structure of the Cabinet related to security issues, including the Security Council, the Government will establish a body in the Prime Minister's Office which will be responsible for national security policy coordination among relevant ministers and for providing advice to the Prime Minister.

d. Japan will continue to improve its system for responding to various disasters and for civil protection. The national government and local governments will closely cooperate with each other to ensure an appropriate response.

e. Japan will participate in activities to improve the global security environment, including international peace cooperation activities, in a more efficient and effective manner, with government ministries and agencies cooperating not only with each other but also with non-governmental organizations and other entities. Taking into consideration the actual situations of United Nations peace-keeping operations, Japan will consider how it will participate in future peace-keeping operations by examining current policies, such as the five principles for participation in peace-keeping operations.

f. Japan will strive to make its security and defense policies easier to understand, so as to promote an understanding of security and defense issues among its people, as well as to secure national security. It will also strengthen its information dissemination abroad in order to further deepen the international community's understanding of its security and defense policies.

(3) Japan's defense force — Dynamic Defense Force

Japan's defense force is the ultimate guarantee of its national security, representing Japan's will and ability to prevent direct threats to Japan from reaching the country and to eliminate any threat that reaches it.

Under the current trends of the security environment, building defense forces that can effectively respond to security challenges is important. In particular, comprehensive operational performance such as readiness for an immediate and seamless response to contingencies is increasingly important, considering shortening warning times of contingencies due to exponential advances in military technology. Clear demonstration of national will and strong defense capabilities through such timely and tailored military operations as regular intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance activities (ISR), not just maintaining a certain level of defense force, is a critical element for ensuring credible deterrence and will contribute to stability in the region surrounding Japan. To this end, Japan needs to achieve greater performance with its defense forces through raising levels of equipment use and increasing operations tempo, placing importance on dynamic deterrence, which takes into account such an operational use of the defense forces.

At the same time, the roles of the defense forces are increasing and becoming more diverse, and it is necessary to strengthen bilateral and multilateral cooperation and actively conduct international peace cooperation activities.

For these reasons, Japan's future defense forces need to acquire dynamism to effectively deter and respond to various contingencies, and to proactively engage in activities to further stabilize the security environment in the Asia-Pacific and to improve the global security environment. Japan should no longer base its defense on the traditional defense concept, "Basic Defense Force Concept," which places priority on ensuring deterrence through the existence of defense forces per se. More specifically, Japan will develop a Dynamic Defense Force that possesses readiness, mobility, flexibility, sustainability, and versatility.

These characteristics will be reinforced by advanced technology based on the trends of levels of military technology and intelligence capabilities.

In order to deal with the increasingly difficult security environment, Japan needs to steadily build an appropriate-size defense force. In doing so, Japan will choose truly necessary functions on which to concentrate resources, and carry out structural reform of the defense forces, thereby producing more outcome with limited resources. To this end, Japan will drastically rationalize and streamline the SDF overall through fundamentally reviewing, in light of its difficult fiscal condition, the equipment, personnel, organization and force disposition, including the equipment and personnel that have been maintained as preparation to defend against a full-scale invasion. Moreover, by implementing a drastic review of the SDF personnel management system, Japan will seek to curb personnel costs and improve efficiency as well as increase the strength of SDF personnel by lowering its average age. These initiatives will lead to improving the structure of the defense budget, which has a high proportion of personnel cost that currently suppresses the expenditure for the SDF's activities.

2. Cooperation with Its Ally

Japan and the United States, which share basic values, have maintained an alliance centering on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, and the Japan-U.S. Alliance remains indispensable in ensuring the peace and security of Japan. In addition, the military presence of the U.S. armed forces in Japan allows countries in the Asia-Pacific region to have a strong sense of security by functioning as deterrence against and response to contingencies in this region. The Japan-U.S. Alliance is also important for Japan to participate in multilateral security cooperation and effectively respond to global security challenges.

In light of the significance of the Japan-U.S. Security Alliance as described above, Japan will further deepen and develop the Alliance to adapt to the evolving security environment. In doing so, Japan will

continue to engage in strategic dialogue and specific policy coordination with the United States, including bilateral assessment of the security environment and bilateral consultations on common strategic objectives, and roles, missions and capabilities. Japan will also promote cooperation in existing fields, including intelligence cooperation, deepening of bilateral contingency planning, various operational cooperation including that upon situations in areas surrounding Japan, ballistic missile defense and equipment and technology cooperation, as well as consultations to improve the credibility of extended deterrence and information security. In addition, in order to strengthen the U.S. forces' deterrent and response capability to regional contingencies, Japan will study measures to enhance bilateral cooperation with the United States. Moreover, Japan will strengthen various regular cooperation, such as joint training and joint/shared usage of facilities, and promote regional and global cooperation through international peace cooperation activities, maintenance and enhancement of international public goods such as outer space, cyberspace and sea lanes, as well as in the field of climate change.

At the same time, while maintaining the deterrence provided by the U.S. forces, to reduce the burden on local communities such as Okinawa where U.S. military bases are located, Japan will steadily implement specific measures to review the posture of the U.S. forces in Japan. It will also take active measures for the smooth and effective stationing of U.S. forces in Japan, including Host Nation Support.

3. Multi-layered Security Cooperation with the International Community

(1) Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region

In order to effectively promote measures to further stabilize the Asia-Pacific region, together with the Japan-U.S. Alliance, a security network needs to be created by combining bilateral and multilateral security cooperation in a multi-layered manner.

In particular, Japan will strengthen its cooperation with the Republic of Korea and Australia, which are allies of the United States and share basic values and many security-related interests with Japan, through bilateral initiatives and multilateral cooperation involving the United States. Japan will also maintain and enhance security cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, which are its traditional partners. Moreover, Japan will enhance cooperation with India and other countries that share common interests in ensuring the security of maritime navigation from Africa and the Middle East to East Asia.

Japan will promote confidence with China and Russia, which have significant influence over regional security, through security dialogues and exchanges, and establish and develop a cooperative relationship with them in areas including non-traditional security fields. In particular, with regard to China, in line with efforts to establish a “mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests,” and recognizing that it is extremely important to enhance a constructive and cooperative relationship with China in various fields, Japan, together with countries including its ally, partners and other countries concerned, will actively engage in encouraging China to take responsible actions in the international community.

Concerning multilateral security cooperation, through such frameworks as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus), Japan will play an appropriate role in efforts toward establishing regional order, norms and practical cooperative relationships, particularly through initiatives in the non-traditional security field.

(2) Cooperation as a member of the international community

In order to improve the global security environment and help maintain the security and prosperity of Japan, Japan will actively engage in diplomatic efforts, including the strategic and effective use of Official De-

velopment Assistance (ODA), in order to resolve root causes of conflicts and terrorism.

Along with these diplomatic efforts, Japan will robustly engage in international peace cooperation activities. In doing so, Japan will strive to provide assistance which makes use of its knowledge and experience and will conduct such activities strategically, while comprehensively taking into account the various conditions surrounding it.

Moreover, regarding activities concerning the global security environment, Japan will enhance cooperation with the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and European countries, play an active role in international activities to maintain and strengthen international public goods, including the stable use of the maritime domain, outer space and cyberspace, and actively facilitate efforts by the international community to promote disarmament and prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, missiles and other means of delivery. In addition, Japan will actively participate in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in the event of large-scale natural disasters or pandemics.

For the international community to effectively respond to new challenges of the 21st century, the organization of the United Nations, as the sole universal and comprehensive international body, needs to be reformed in a way that increases its effectiveness and credibility. Japan will continue to actively tackle this challenge.

V. Future Defense Forces

1. Roles of Defense Forces

Japan will strengthen its defense forces in order to perform its roles properly in the following fields based on the Dynamic Defense Force concept. In doing so, the SDF will ensure regular cooperation with relevant organizations.

(1) Effective deterrence and response

In order to closely follow trends in military activities of neighboring countries and detect indications of various contingencies promptly, the SDF will ensure information supremacy through continuous ISR in the country and its surrounding areas. Should various contingencies occur, the SDF will quickly and seamlessly respond as the situation unfolds. In addition, the SDF will maintain a minimum necessary level of preparations against full-scale invasion, given possible changes in uncertain future circumstances.

In pursuing the above, priority will be placed on the following areas in particular.

a. Ensuring security of sea and air space surrounding Japan

The SDF will strive to ensure the security of the surrounding sea and air space and effectively respond to acts that harm Japan's national interests through such measures as continuous ISR.

b. Response to attacks on offshore islands

The SDF will respond to attacks on Japan's offshore islands by quickly deploying mobile units to prevent and reject invasion, in cooperation with other permanently stationed units. In such circumstances, the SDF will ensure air defense readiness on those islands to respond to cruise missiles and other attacks. It will also ensure air supremacy and the security of sea lanes in the surrounding sea and air space.

c. Response to cyber attacks

The SDF will respond to cyber attacks by operating functions necessary for defending the information system of the SDF in an integrated manner. By accumulating advanced expertise and skills needed to tackle cyber attacks, the SDF will contribute to the government-wide response to cyber attacks.

d. Response to attacks by guerrillas and special operations forces

The SDF will respond to attacks by guerrillas and special operations forces quickly and flexibly by deploying units with a high level of readiness while focusing on mobility. In particular, priority will be placed on ISR to prevent guerrillas and special operations forces from infiltrating coastal areas, protecting key facilities, and searching and destroying invading units.

e. Response to ballistic missile attacks

The SDF will respond to ballistic missile attacks by maintaining a continuous ISR posture. In addition, the SDF will respond effectively to ballistic missiles capable of evading interceptors by developing a multi-layered defense posture. Should by some chance any damage were to occur, the Government will take consequence management measures to minimize it.

f. Response to complex contingencies

The SDF will effectively respond to the above-mentioned contingencies while taking into account the possibility of different and multiple contingencies occurring consecutively or simultaneously.

g. Response to large-scale and/or chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) disasters

The SDF will respond to large-scale and CBRN disasters by conducting disaster relief operations anywhere in Japan through cooperation with local governments and other organizations.

(2) Efforts to further stabilize the security environment of the Asia-Pacific region

Japan will aim to stabilize the security environment in the areas surrounding Japan by conducting various activities, including continuous ISR, training and exercises, in a timely and appropriate manner.

In order to maintain stability in the Asia-Pacific region, Japan will

also promote bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation and exchanges as well as joint training and exercises in a multi-layered manner while enhancing the Japan-U.S. Alliance. Moreover, in non-traditional security fields, Japan will promote practical cooperation by utilizing SDF capabilities, including disposal of landmines and unexploded shells. Japan will also strive to establish and strengthen regional cooperation practice and support the capacity building of countries in the region.

(3) Efforts to improve the global security environment

Japan will continue to actively participate in international peace cooperation activities, including peace building such as humanitarian and reconstruction assistance and ceasefire monitoring. Japan will also actively engage in various activities conducted by the United Nations and other organizations such as arms control and disarmament, nonproliferation and support for capacity building. Moreover, Japan will cooperate with its ally, partners and other countries concerned to actively promote efforts to tackle international terrorism, secure the safety of maritime traffic and maintain maritime order.

2. Self-Defense Forces: Force Posture

The SDF will maintain the following postures in addition to capabilities necessary for responding to various contingencies so as to effectively perform the roles prescribed for the defense forces in section 1.

(1) Readiness

The SDF will raise the readiness of units by maintaining a readiness posture, enhancing mobility, and sustaining and improving skills and operations tempo. It will appropriately and efficiently station units so they can operate quickly and effectively enough. Japan will also secure

durable base functions, fuel and ammunition supplies (including training ammunition) and ensure the maintenance of equipment so that the SDF, as a Dynamic Defense Force, will be able to effectively perform its roles in deterrence and response.

(2) Joint operations

The SDF will facilitate smooth joint operations by maintaining command and control functions and an information-sharing system, utilizing advanced information and communications networks including satellite communications, as well as maintaining a posture to deal with cyber attacks, in addition to an information-collecting posture to collect information necessary for quick and effective responses.

(3) International peace cooperation activities

The SDF will strive to enhance capabilities and posture applicable to diverse missions, rapid deployment and long-term operations so it can actively participate in international peace cooperation activities.

3. Self-Defense Forces: Organization, Equipment and Force Disposition

(1) Basic concept

Japan will maintain an efficient organization, equipment and force disposition that will enable the SDF to effectively perform its roles described in section 1 while maintaining the posture described in section 2.

In this respect, in order to effectively and efficiently build up its defense forces, Japan will prioritize strengthening functions applicable to a wide variety of operations, functions that have asymmetrical capability, and functions which cannot be substituted. Specifically, Cold War-style equipment and organizations will be reduced, and the geographical location of forces and operational modalities of each service

of the SDF will be appropriately reviewed. In addition, the SDF will enhance its defense posture by placing priority on strengthening such functions as ISR, maritime patrol, air defense, response to ballistic missile attacks, transportation, and command communications, including in the southwestern region.

To respond to changes in the security environment, budget allocation among each service of the SDF will be subject to drastic review by excluding sectionalism and from a comprehensive perspective regardless of precedent.

To promote joint operations of the SDF and strengthen the posture for cooperation between the SDF and the U.S. Forces, Japan will comprehensively review the modality of basic operational units (divisions and brigades) and the five Regional Armies of the Ground Self-Defense Force while giving consideration to improving the efficiency of command and control functions.

As regards preparations against full-scale invasion, the SDF will maintain relevant knowledge and expertise at a minimum necessary level in order to respond to possible changes in uncertain future circumstances.

(2) Priorities in strengthening SDF organization, equipment and force disposition

To strengthen the organization, equipment and force disposition, the SDF will place priority on the following matters.

a. Strengthening of joint operations

In order to facilitate joint operations, the SDF will enhance the basis for joint operations, including the functions of the Joint Staff, command and control system, information-collecting capability and education and training. The SDF will also develop effective and efficient systems applicable to joint operations by reorganizing, merging, centralizing and creating hubs for functions that extend across all three services of the SDF, such as transportation, medical service, anti-aircraft

artillery, search and rescue, procurement, supply and maintenance of equipment, and management of camps and bases.

b. Response to attacks on off-shore islands

The SDF will permanently station the minimum necessary units on off-shore islands where the SDF is not currently stationed. Also, the SDF will enhance its capability to respond to attacks on those islands and ensure the security of the surrounding sea and air space by securing bases, mobility, transport capacity and effective countermeasures necessary for conducting operations against such attacks.

c. Strengthening capabilities for international peace cooperation activities

The SDF will enhance its capabilities for international peace cooperation activities by upgrading equipment, strengthening maritime and air transport capability, enhancing its logistical support posture, enhancing its engineering and medical functions, and reinforcing its education and training systems.

d. Enhancement of intelligence functions

In order to detect indications of various contingencies promptly and collect, analyze and share information appropriately, the SDF will strengthen its diverse information-collecting capabilities utilizing advanced technology, including space technology, and the all-source analysis and assessment capabilities of the Defense Intelligence Headquarters and other organizations. Additionally, the SDF will strengthen the information sharing system among sections responsible for information collection, operations and policy making. Furthermore, the SDF will improve the system for providing appropriate intelligence support for activities conducted in remote areas through such measures as strengthening capabilities to collect geospatial information, so as to enable SDF units dispatched abroad to perform missions smoothly and safely. In addition, the SDF will make efforts

to expand and enhance intelligence cooperation and exchanges with countries concerned.

e. Incorporating progress in science and technology into defense forces
In order to develop defense forces underpinned by advanced technology and information capabilities, the SDF will appropriately exploit the achievements of technological innovation. In particular, the SDF will ensure reliable command and control and quick information sharing by developing an advanced command communications system and information and communications network, as well as develop a system for responding to cyber attacks in an integrated manner.

f. Efficient and effective build up of defense forces

Mindful of increasingly severe fiscal conditions, Japan will control defense expenditures by further rationalizing and streamlining its defense forces. At the same time, Japan will make sure its defense forces smoothly and successfully perform their missions while harmonizing other measures taken by the Government. To that end, Japan will clearly prioritize among its defense projects, concentrate resources on selected projects and promote efforts described in chapter VI.

(3) Organization, equipment and disposition of each service of the Self-Defense Forces

A. Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF)

(a) The GSDF will achieve appropriate force disposition of highly mobile units with ISR capabilities according to geographical characteristics in order to integrally intertwine various functions and effectively respond to various contingencies. These units can be rapidly deployed to various locations, and are capable of performing diverse missions, including international peace cooperation activities. In so doing, priority will be placed on the defense of off-shore islands where SDF units are not currently stationed, and the organization and personnel structure of

units will be reviewed so as to ensure thorough rationalization and streamlining of the defense forces.

(b) The GSDF will maintain mobile operating units sustaining specialized functions so that it can effectively perform such operations as air transportation, airborne operations, defense against NBC (nuclear, biological, and chemical) weapons, special operations and international peace cooperation activities.

(c) The GSDF will maintain surface-to-air guided missile units so that it can effectively provide air defense to protect operational units and key areas.

B. Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF)

(a) The MSDF will maintain destroyer units and ship-based patrol helicopter units that can be operated flexibly so as to ensure the defense of the seas surrounding Japan, the security of sea lanes, and conduct of international peace cooperation activities, by regularly conducting such operations as ISR and anti-submarine operations. In addition, the destroyer units will maintain Aegis-equipped destroyers capable of providing multi-layered defense for the whole of Japan against ballistic missile attacks, together with the surface-to-air guided missile (SAM) units mentioned in paragraph C(c).

(b) The MSDF will maintain augmented submarine units so that it can effectively conduct regular underwater ISR on a broad scale in the seas surrounding Japan as well as patrolling activity in those seas.

(c) The MSDF will maintain fixed-wing patrol aircraft units so that it can effectively conduct regular sea-surface ISR on a broad scale in the seas surrounding Japan as well as patrol in those seas.

(d) The MSDF will maintain minesweeper units so that it can effectively conduct minesweeping in the seas surrounding Japan.

C. Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF)

(a) The ASDF will maintain air warning and control units so that it can conduct continuous ISR in most air space over Japan and the surrounding areas, detect and track any ballistic missiles flying into Japanese air space, and effectively conduct warning and control when necessary.

(b) In addition to the air warning and control units mentioned in paragraph (a), the ASDF will maintain fighter aircraft units comprised of highly capable new fighter aircraft, an air reconnaissance unit, as well as air transport units and aerial refueling/transport units which enable effective international peace cooperation activities, so that fighter aircrafts and support functions can conduct national air defense in an integrated manner.

(c) The ASDF will maintain surface-to-air guided missile units which will provide air defense to protect key areas and multi-layered defense for the whole of Japan against ballistic missile attacks, together with the Aegis-equipped destroyers mentioned in paragraph B(a).

The specifics of major organizations and equipment are as shown in the Annex Table.

VI. Basic Foundations to Maximize Defense Capability

In order to prepare, maintain, and operate the defense forces in an efficient and effective manner, Japan will place priority on the following matters.

(1) Effective utilization of human resources

Japan will take various measures to maintain high morale and rigorous discipline among SDF personnel. In order to appropriately adapt to the declining birth rate, the increasing ratio of people receiving higher education and the diversification of SDF missions, it will strive to recruit,

retain and develop high-quality human resources and provide necessary education and training. The SDF will also enhance a medical service infrastructure to maintain the health and strength of personnel. Moreover, Japan will enhance the intellectual foundations for national security issues by promoting research and education in that field. In order to ensure appropriate treatment of personnel involved in the execution of arduous or dangerous missions, Japan will review the overall institutional framework of the SDF personnel treatment system.

At the same time, the SDF will appropriately manage the total number and structure of SDF personnel so as to maintain the vigor of the forces. In this respect, the SDF will review the rank and age structure so as to reduce the proportion of officers, warrant officers and sergeants and increase the number of privates while giving consideration to the balance among the missions of the SDF and the physical strength, experiences and skills of personnel. In addition, the SDF will also carry out reform of its personnel management system by reviewing the duties of SDF personnel from the perspective of optimization of assignments, so as to give precedence to younger personnel in assignment to front-line units while applying an optimum level of salaries and other terms to personnel engaged in other duties. This reform will include review of personnel management policy in line with the direction toward personnel cost reduction for national civil servants as a whole. Moreover, the SDF will secure effective defense capability amid severe fiscal conditions by further rationalizing personnel and curbing personnel costs while streamlining logistical operations through effective utilization of private-sector resources and capabilities. In this respect, Japan will promote effective use of retired SDF personnel in society, implement measures to support their re-employment including in the public sector, and ensure they receive adequate post-retirement treatment. The SDF will also seek to introduce an early retirement system to be implemented together with the above measures. In addition, Japan will actively promote public-private cooperation and personnel exchanges.

(2) Enhancement of the basis for operating equipment

The SDF will enhance the operational basis of equipment essential to the exercise of defense capability through such measures as efficiently and effectively maintaining equipment and by maintaining a high level of operations tempo.

(3) Improvement in the efficiency of equipment procurement

The SDF will improve the cost-efficiency of equipment procurement by making thorough efforts to curb the lifecycle costs of equipment, including the acquisition cost, and through improving the overall contract system and further adopting efficient procurement systems such as short-term lump-sum purchases. The SDF will also enhance transparency over procurement by strengthening the external audit system.

(4) Development and maintenance of defense production capability and technological bases

From the perspective of the importance of national security, Japan will set forth a strategy for defense production capability and technological bases. With this strategy, Japan will identify critical defense production capabilities and technologies that should be kept in the country and, through selection and concentration, develop and maintain defense forces in a stable manner from the medium- to long-term perspective by concentrating resources on the development and maintenance of those capabilities and technologies.

(5) Consideration of measures in response to changes in the international environment regarding defense equipment

In contributing to peace and promoting cooperation in international community, there are increasing opportunities to conduct effective coop-

eration activities through measures such as the utilization of heavy machinery and other defense equipment carried to the site by the SDF and providing equipment to disaster-stricken countries. Moreover, it has become the mainstream among developed countries to improve the performance of defense equipment and to deal with rising costs of equipment by participating in international joint development and production projects. Japan will study measures to respond to such major changes.

(6) Relationship between defense facilities and local communities

In order to promote efficient maintenance and improvement of defense facilities, Japan will implement various measures to reconcile interests between such facilities and the surrounding local communities in close cooperation with relevant local governments.

VII. Additional Elements for Consideration

1. These Guidelines provide the vision for our defense forces for approximately the next decade, to promote innovation of the defense forces. In case there are significant changes in circumstances, Japan will review and, if necessary, revise the Guidelines in light of the security environment and technological trends at that time, among other things.
2. Japan will conduct systematic transition management and ex-post verification so as to ensure smooth, swift and appropriate transition to the defense forces outlined in these Guidelines. Japan will also conduct constant study on the future of its defense forces so as to contribute to the review and revision process mentioned in paragraph 1.

(Attached Table)

Ground Self-Defense Force	Personnel		154,000
	Regular personnel		147,000
	Ready Reserve Personnel		7,000
	Major Units	Regionally deployed units	8 divisions 6 brigades
		Mobile operation units	Central Readiness Force 1 armored division
Surface-to-air guided missile units		7 anti-aircraft artillery groups/regiments	
	Major Equipment	Tanks Howitzers and rockets	Approx. 400 Approx. 400
Maritime Self-Defense Force	Major Units	Destroyer units	4 flotillas (8 divisions)
		Submarines units	4 divisions
		Minesweeper unit	6 divisions
		Patrol aircraft units	1 flotilla 9 squadrons
	Major Equipment	Destroyers Submarines Combat aircraft	48 22 Approx. 150
Air Self-Defense Force	Major Units	Air warning & control units	4 warning groups 24 warning squadrons 1 AEW group (2 squadrons)
		Fighter aircraft units	12 squadrons
		Air reconnaissance unit	1 squadron
		Air transport units	3 squadrons
		Aerial refueling/transport unit	1 squadron
		Surface-to-air guided missile units	6 groups
	Major Equipment	Combat aircraft Fighters	Approx. 340 Approx. 260
Assets capable of ballistic missile defense (BMD)*	Aegis-equipped destroyers		** 6
	Air warning & control units		11 warning groups/squadrons
	Surface-to-air guided missile units		6 groups

* The numbers of units and equipment in this row are already included in the Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces' major units sections above.

** Additional acquisition of BMD-capable, Aegis-equipped destroyers, if to be provided separately, will be allowed within the number of destroyers set above after consideration of development of BMD-related technologies and fiscal conditions in the future, among other factors.

- BASIC POLITICAL FRAMEWORKS
- **FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY**
- FUNDAMENTAL ECONOMIC RULES
- CULTURE AND CIVILIZATION
- LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT