Intergenerational sustainability dilemma and a potential solution: Future ahead and back mechanism

Shibly Shahrier, Ph.D., Researcher, Research Institute for Humanity and Nature, Kyoto, Japan

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The flow of the presentation

The flow of the presentation: Research Issues

- ► How the individual social preferences/level of prosociality change with the ongoing modernization of societies under the market economy and democracy?
- ► How this change affects human decision for intergenerational sustainability?
- ► How to maintain intergenerational stainability when societies are becoming modernized?

Research issue- i: Social preference and the ongoing modernization of societies



Research issue- ii: Change in social preference, modernization and intergenerational sustainability



Research issue- iii: New mechanism for maintaining intergenerational sustainability



Research issue- i: Social preference and ongoing modernization of societies

Motivation

- Culture-gene coevolutionary theory: Change in culture brings about a change in human behavior (Boyd and Richerson, 1985, Dawkins, 2006, Henrich et al., 2005, Henrich, 2004, Richerson and Boyd, 2008).
- Societies in the developing countries of Asia and Africa are becoming urbanized and modernized at a faster speed (American Association for the Advancement of Science, 2016, Wigginton et al., 2016, McDonnell and MacGregor-Fors, 2016).
- Ongoing modernization of competitive societies can be considered as a change in culture.

Open questions

No study exists regarding human social preference in relation to ongoing modernization of competitive societies.

Question 1

How does the ongoing modernization of competitive societies affect human social preference?

Hypothesis

Figure: "competition for survival and success" as a cultural trait or meme, its propagation and more competitive people.



Methodologies

Methodology- i: Experimental treatments

- To include the treatment of ongoing modernization,
 - we conducted survey-experiments in three different regions:
 - Urban areas (modernized), Dhaka
 - Semi-urban areas (transitional), Bogra
 - Rural areas (less-modernized), Dacope.
- ▶ To measure individual social preference or choices for the level of competition and cooperation, we use a game of social value orientation (hereafter, SVO) (Van Lange et al., 1997, 2007).

Methodology- ii: The Study Regions



Methodology- iii: Social value orientation game

- Option 1: You receive 500, and the other receives 100.
- ▶ Option 2: You receive 500, and the other receives 500.
- Option 3: You receive 560, and the other receives 300.
- Three orientations: Competitive, Prosocial and Individualistic
- ► The complete game consists of such nine questions, each of which consists of three options as introduced above.
- when at least 6 of 9 of the person's choices are consistent with one of the orientations, he/she is categorized as that orientation.

Methodology- iv: Calculation of the payoff from the game

Your choice Your random pair's choice В Α В You get 500 - 570 540 You You get get Other 280 480 100 300 Other 500 100 →300 280 + 480 gets 560 - 510 510 You get You get 560 100 510 100 510 Other 500 Other 110 110 You get 520 520 550 You get 520 500 500 get Other 120 Other 100 Other > 520 120 320 100 560 480 490 490 480 490 get get 490 Other 490 100 →300 490 **→**300 You get 560 You get 500 490 Other > 300 500 Other 500 gets

Empirical results

Result- i: Summary statistics of the three value orientations with respect to study region

Table: Percentage of each social value orientation by study region

| | Competitive | Individualistic | Unidentified | Prosocial |
|---------|-------------|-----------------|--------------|-----------|
| Dhaka | 32.34 | 30.84 | 19.16 | 17.66 |
| Bogra | 23.65 | 22.46 | 31.74 | 22.16 |
| Dacope | 17.66 | 32.63 | 15.27 | 34.43 |
| Overall | 24.55 | 28.64 | 22.06 | 24.75 |

Concluding remarks

- ▶ The ongoing modernization of competitive societies is a crucial determinant of SVOs.
- Individuals in highly modernized societies survive, achieve, or succeed by competing.
- ► The idea of "competition for survival and success" as a cultural trait.
- shift from "cooperation for survival and success" to "competition for survival and success."
- Issues require cooperation such as intergenerational sustainability will pose more danger.

Research issue- ii: Change in social preference, modernization and intergenerational sustainability

Motivation

- Intergenerational sustainability is pivotal for the survival of human society, global ecosystem, and genes.
- intergenerational sustainability is unique due to its unidirectional nature.
- competition cannot ensure the most efficient allocation of resources in some cases.
- Saijo (2015) hypothesized that competition and market negatively affects intergenerational sustainability.
- ▶ Shahrier et al. (2016) find that with ongoing modernization of competitive societies, the number of proself people increases.

Literature review

- ► Sherstyuk et al. (2016): Dynamic externality game, infinitely lived decision makers versus multiple generations:
 - Multiple generations setting makes dynamic externalities more challenging.
 - Intergenerational learning and history may be positive or negative.
- ► Hauser et al. (2014): The laboratory experiment of intergenerational goods game, unregulated versus median voting:
 - Voting or democracy promotes intergenerational sustainability.
- ► Kamijo et al. (2017) design and implement a laboratory experiment of intergenerational sustainability dilemma game:
 - imaginary future generation improves intergenerational sustainability.

Open questions

Question 2

How does the ongoing modernization of competitive societies affect intergenerational sustainability?

- The determinants of intergenerational sustainability:
 - Actions of the previous generations
 - Social preference.

Methodology

Methodology-i: Experimental sessions and treatment


- Intergenerational sustainability dilemma game (hereafter, ISDG)
 - ► Treatment: Rural (less-modernized)
 - Control: Urban (Modernized)
 - ightharpoonup experimental sessions, rural = 14, and, urban = 14.
 - ► In each session = 6 generations, in each generation = 3 subjects.
 - ▶ Payment: Experimental money = USD 5.12 on an average.
 - Randomization, anonymity across generations, and outgroup setting.

Methodology-ii: Decisions in the game

- Two decisions
 - ightharpoonup "AB game" (Choice between 'A' and 'B'): A = X; B = X 300.
 - ► "Split game": split the money among the generation members (Initial endowment = 300 points).
 - ▶ The more point you get the more money you earn.
 - Determining generation membership: The chip you picked indicates the following type of information:

G3-2.

How the decision of a generation affects subsequent generations?



Methodology-iii: First mechanism to maintain intergenerational sustainability

- ► Imaginary future generation (hereafter, IFG)
 - ► The minister of future: Assigning a member in each generation as a representative of the subsequent generations.
 - ▶ 7 sessions in urban and 7 sessions in rural.

Results

Result-i: Percentage of choices

Table: percentage of group choice A and B

| | Α | В | Overall |
|-------|-------|-------|---------|
| Urban | 70.24 | 29.76 | 100 |
| Rural | 20.24 | 79.76 | 100 |

Result-ii: With and without IFG in urban and rural

Table: Percentage of group choice A and B between the urban and rural areas with and without imaginary future generations (IFG)

| | Urban | | F | Rural | | |
|----------------|----------|-------------|----------|-------------|--|--|
| | with IFG | without IFG | with IFG | without IFG | | |
| \overline{A} | 69.05 | 71.43 | 14.29 | 26.19 | | |
| В | 30.95 | 29.57 | 85.71 | 73.81 | | |
| Subtotal | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | | |

Result-iii: Prosocial member per generation

Table: Distributions in the number of prosocial members per generation between the urban and rural areas

| Number of prosocial members | Number of generations | | |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------|-------|--|
| in one generation | Urban | Rural | |
| 0 | 53 | 12 | |
| 1 | 15 | 34 | |
| 2 | 12 | 34 | |
| 3 | 4 | 4 | |
| Subtotal | 84 | 84 | |

Concluding remarks

- As societies become more modernized under market and democracy, intergenerational sustainability tends to be more threatened.
- More prosocial people in each generation enhances the intergenerational sustainability.
- More prosocial people in rural areas, generations choose more intergenerational sustainability.
- IFG fails to improve intergenerational sustainability.

Research issue- iii: New mechanism for maintaining intergenerational sustainability

The new mechanism: Future ahead and back mechanism (hereafter, FAB)

The mechanism:

- ▶ Step one: You are a member of the next generation, request your previous generation to choose one between *A* and *B*.
- Step two: In the second stage, you will take the decision from your actual position.
- If both the decisions are the same, you are done.
- Step three: If the two are not the same, majority voting will determine the final decision.
- ▶ We implemented ISDG with FAB only in a highly modernized society (8 sessions and 48 groups).
- Individual interview: individual choice before and after group discussion.

Results

Result- i: Choices under each treatment

Table: Frequency and percentage of generations' choices of options A and B in Basic ISDG, ISDG with IFG and ISDG with FAB

| | А | В | Overall |
|---------------|-------------|-------------|-----------|
| Basic ISDG | 29 (69.05%) | 13 (30.95%) | 42 (100%) |
| ISDG with IFG | 30 (71.43%) | 12 (29.57%) | 42 (100%) |
| ISDG with FAB | 7 (14.58%) | 41 (85.42%) | 48 (100%) |

Result- ii: Prosocial member and choices under each treatment

Table: Distributions in the number of prosocial members per generation and percentage of choice B under each treatment

| # of prosocial members | Percentage of choice B | | | |
|------------------------|--|--|--|---|
| in one generation | Basic | IFG | FAB | - Overall |
| 0 | $11.54\% \left(\approx \frac{3}{26}\right)$ | 3.85% ($\approx \frac{1}{27}$) | $80.00\% (= \frac{12}{15})$ | 23.53% $\left(\approx \frac{16}{68}\right)$ |
| 1 | $14.29\% \left(\approx \frac{1}{7}\right)$ | $50.00\% \left(=\frac{4}{8}\right)$ | $76.00\% \left(= \frac{19}{25} \right)$ | $60.00\% \left(= \frac{24}{40} \right)$ |
| 2 | 100.00% $\left(=\frac{7}{7}\right)$ | $100.00\%\left(=\tfrac{5}{5}\right)$ | $100.00\%\left(=\tfrac{8}{8}\right)$ | $100.00\% \left(=\frac{20}{20}\right)$ |
| 3 | 100.00 % $\left(=\frac{2}{2}\right)$ | $100.00\%\left(=\tfrac{2}{2}\right)$ | - | $100.00\%\left(=\tfrac{4}{4}\right)$ |
| Subtotal | $30.95\% \left(\approx \frac{13}{42}\right)$ | $29.57\% \left(\approx \frac{12}{42}\right)$ | $85.42\% \left(\approx \frac{41}{48} \right)$ | $50.00\% \left(= \frac{66}{132} \right)$ |

Result- ii: SVO and opinion change

Table: Social value orientations and individual opinion changes by percentage in ISDG with FAB

| Social value | Individual opinion change | | | | |
|-----------------|--|---|--|----|---|
| orientation | ВВ | AA | AB | BA | Subtotal |
| Competitive | $0.00\% \left(\approx \frac{0}{33} \right)$ | $45.45\% (\approx \frac{15}{33})$ | $54.55\% (\approx \frac{18}{33})$ | - | $100.00\% \left(\approx \frac{33}{33}\right)$ |
| Prosocial | $82.93\% \left(\approx \frac{34}{41} \right)$ | $4.88\% (\approx \frac{2}{41})$ | 12.20 % ($\approx \frac{5}{41}$) | - | 100.00% $\left(\approx \frac{41}{41}\right)$ |
| Individualistic | $5.36\% \left(\approx \frac{3}{56} \right)$ | $23.21\% (\approx \frac{13}{56})$ | 71.43% ($\approx \frac{40}{56}$) | - | 100.00% $\left(\approx \frac{56}{56}\right)$ |
| Unidentified | 7.14% $\left(\approx \frac{1}{14}\right)$ | $35.71\% (\approx \frac{5}{14})$ | $57.14\% (\approx \frac{8}{14})$ | - | 100.00% $\left(\approx \frac{14}{14}\right)$ |
| Overall | $26.39\% \left(\approx \frac{38}{144}\right)$ | $24.31\% \left(\approx \frac{35}{144}\right)$ | 49.31% $\left(\approx \frac{71}{144}\right)$ | - | $100.00\% \left(\approx \frac{144}{144}\right)$ |

Concluding remarks

- ► FAB is successful to maintain intergenerational sustainability in highly modernized societies.
- Memory of role-playing and more logic-based reasoning.
- ▶ It can be used to solve the public goods problems with inter-temporal nature.

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